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Abstract

Reality is nevermore. Reality, or our state of being, has always been a site of
contestation. Avatars are representations of us; they are digital beings emerging from our
minds to populate and add a new layer of simulation to our conception of reality. Avatars
now penetrate our consciousness and demand our attention. They need us, but not as much
as we need them. Avatars are digital containers of identity operated by us, their initial
puppeteers. They are the key cultural constituents of what French theorist Jean Baudrillard
(1994) conceptualized as the hyperreal. I propose a theoretical framework that describes
how avatars incorporate media as an inherent part of their nature and find a hosting body in
cyborgs to navigate and spawn in media. I propose the birth of a new scion that combines
avatar, medium and cyborg into a conceptual being that I call “ICEVORG.” The
ICEVORG expands beyond representation into the actual physical world by means of
media transgression—more specifically, by the use of the Strange Loop (Hosftadter, 1980,
p. 10), as an effective soil to thrive and interrogate our ideas of reality by means of
iteration, expansion, fragmentation and naturalization.
The development of the framework explains how the conceptual creature spawns in
the interstices between fiction and reality. The ICEVORG transgresses boundaries to reach
and transcend the concepts of the avatar and cyborg in order to generate meaning and
pursue relevance in contemporary society. Through qualitative analysis of two selected
case studies I will introduce evidence of ICEVORGS and how they nurture the discourse
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on the development of identity in cyberspace by becoming agents of change. Finally, in
order to construct my argument, I employ autoethnography, a research methodology that
allows for a more personal voice to be included as part of the research process.
Autoethnography helps me explore and develop the notion of the ICEVORG in the more
appropriate context of hybrid media.
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Proem
It was the end of the spring term in 2001. Emilio, my first born, was five months
old. He and his mom were arriving from a trip to Los Angeles, and I picked them up at the
Richmond International Airport. After not having slept for three consecutive days driving
to the airport was an unforgettable adventure. I was attempting to write my first thesis
project to present to my academic adviser. I intended to write a “new” theory of design in
the interval of a few days, and I discovered, out of exhaustion and frustration, that failure
was imminent. Nonetheless, I kept trying. One book just led to another book, which
pushed me into the dark and cold abyss of failure. My family members were expected to
arrive at midnight, and Red Bull was not an option in 2001, just dark, heavy coffee. So, I
drank enough of it to wake up half of the East Coast. I drove in a surreal state. I think that
moment must have been close to what descriptions of a drug-induced altered state of mind
must feel like. I drove smoothly on the black pavement with no music or any other sound
beyond what the environments around me provided. I was not blinking much, and my
pupils were dilated—that I remember. I arrived at the airport and met them with a huge
smile and sign that I printed on white paper. The sign bore a red heart with the outline of a
man extending his arms to greet his people.
We walked to the car and I explained my sleep deprivation to my wife, so she
decided to drive. I sat down in the back seat behind the driver and placed my son’s car seat
by my side to the right. I covered it with a blanket so the headlights of approaching cars
wouldn’t wake him up. I must have fallen sleep that very instant. Sometime later, I woke
up on a hospital bed and my previous reality had vanished.
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Upon my return to what could be described as ¨normal¨life I noticed that my way of
thinking was different yet I could not explain how or why. It was not until I had a
professional clinical psychologist test my brain and diagnose it with a condition known as
Attention-deficit Hyperactivity Disorder that I found out I could become a normal person
by turning myself into a conceptual cyborg. It entailed the ingestion of drugs that I
conceptualized as micro-computers altering my natural state of being to improve it. To
better understand what ADHD is here is a brief explanation: Attention-deficit
hyperactivity disorder, or ADHD, refers to a behavioral condition that has been firmly
established as a psychiatric disorder that meets the criteria for the validation of psychiatric
diagnoses as outlined by Robins and Guze (1970). The first published case reports of
children exhibiting ADHD-like difficulties appeared in the mid-1800s. Not until the turn of
the century, however, was any attempt made to view such problems scientifically [What
problems? You need to describe in the first sentence what it is.]. In what is often credited
as the first of such attempts, Still (1902) described a group of children whose behavior was
characterized by symptoms of inattention and overactivity, which began in early
childhood, persisted over time, and deviated significantly from expectations for peers of
the same age (Anastopoulous & Shelton, 2001).
In spite of the great amount of resources and attention given to the condition, it
continues to be considered highly controversial, and is questioned by journalists, the
media, politicians, and other interest groups (Buitelaar, 2008). The condition is, however,

12
accepted as such by the government and its education system. Section 5041 represents
federal recognition of ADHD as a condition. Its intent is to provide protection for
individuals against discrimination by classifying them as persons with disabilities. Even
though the term “disability” is itself constantly under the critical observation of
policymakers and the general public, it is accepted as a universal means for signifying
“difference.”

Figure 1: Evidence. Composition of digital images captured after the accident
to show the level of impact that the car, and my head, suffered. Photographs
by Vladimir del Rosario.

1

Section 504 is federal civil rights law under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. It provides protection against discrimination
for individuals with disabilities. Students in school settings fall under the civil rights protection of Section 504.
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When I woke up at the hospital, I found out what had happened. Luli, my (now) ex-wife,
was driving home and I fell asleep in the back seat, having forgotten to remove the
mediating interface between my eyes and the physical world, better known as “glasses.”
As soon as she joined I-94, we were struck by another car from behind. According to the
police report, the uninsured driver of that car was travelling at 160 miles per hour. The
impact was direct and we were spun off the highway. The car was totaled (Figure 1), but
remarkably neither Luli nor Emilio sustained major injuries. I was not that lucky. The
impact broke the back seat, and I hit the front seat with my face. My glasses shattered and
broke into my forehead with such force that they punctured a hole in the left side of my
skull, right above the eye. Innumerable scenarios could have developed in a much more
sinister way than what occurred. I could have lost my eye, or I could have opened a door
into a different dimension, that of ADHD, a point of no return. I must say that I had ADD
before the accident, however it went unnoticed until the accident somehow turned to
volume of it up. That is my personal theory based on my findings on how the condition
comes to be according to experts in the field. They claim that recent studies have focused
on abnormal brain anatomy as a cause of ADHD. Through the use of brain imaging
technology, including functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), positron emission
tomography (PET), and single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT), certain
regions of the brain have been identified as different in patients with ADHD. The fMRI is
a special type of MRI that allows for visualization of the structure of the brain and can
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measure the activity of the different areas of the brain in response to certain activities. The
advantage of this type of scan is that it does not require an injection of dye into the blood
stream to visualize activity levels. Instead, it measures the differences in oxygen use in the
various areas of the brain.
The frontal lobes of the brain, composed of the prefrontal and frontal cortex, make
up about one-third of the brain’s surface. This is the region where higher intellectual
functioning, or “executive functions,” takes place. This region controls the skills that relate
to planning, initiating, problem solving, inhibition, impulsivity, and understanding the
behavior of others. The frontal lobes also help control voluntary body movements, speech,
and, to some degree, mood. The prefrontal area of the frontal lobes is connected to other
areas of the brain that are responsible for the control of the neurotransmitters dopamine,
norepinephrine, and serotonin (Buttros, 2007; Shelton, 2001).
The causes of ADHD continue to be explored as a flood of both clinically
diagnosed patients as well as self-identified patients add to the statistical data base. As of
2013, the main causes contributing to ADHD were thought to be: 1) pre- and perinatal
influences, such as prematurity, low birth weight, pregnancy and birth complications, and
mother’s use of alcohol or tobacco during pregnancy; 2) parental and family factors such
as critical expressed emotion versus expressed warmth, inconsistent parenting, parental
divorce, family conflict and early institutional rearing; and 3) acquired neurobiological
risks, such as closed head trauma and exposure to lead (Buitelaar, 2013).
I remember my very last conversation with a doctor at Virginia Commonwealth
University Medical Center prior to my official discharge. He said to me: “They did a great
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job with the scar. You seem to be doing fine. We don’t know what’s going to happen to
you; only time will tell.” And it did, very clearly and very soon. The direct hit to my
frontal skull, its fracture, and the swelling of the frontal lobe that followed resulted in what
I call my “squirrel brain.” From that moment on, my life changed. I began to notice a great
deal of additional energy, and that was a good byproduct of the event, I must say.
However, restlessness followed suit and with it difficulty in focusing, reading,
concentrating, and seeing life with the same perspective that I once had before the
accident. Even though the world kept spinning on its axis, my perception of it did not. I
became a replica of myself, an avatar, and a fragmented reflection of whom I had been.
Good introduction of the figure of the avatar. Perhaps I travelled through the rabbit hole or
walked into the other side of the mirror; maybe I switched dimensions. In any case, I knew
then that I needed to learn more about this change
Most people will, during their lifetime, exhibit some –if not all—of the symptoms
associated with ADHD. The list of symptoms is extensive and continues to be revised in
light of new research. The attention-related impairments associated with ADHD affect
different people in different ways. Here are some that relate to the argument I am
attempting to construct:
1. Losing a train of thought, which is irritating as it breaks the flow of
conversation.
2. Sustaining a conversation proves difficult when too much noise is around.
3.

Sustaining an in-depth conversation about a single topic proves difficult.
(Other thoughts or ideas come flooding into the mind that cannot be avoided.)
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4. Daydreaming or a wandering mind occurs with the slightest stimulation,
especially when reading long texts that require a higher level of engagement.
5. Starting lots of tasks but never finishing them.
6. Getting distracted and pulled into doing something else that “promises” to be
either more stimulating or incredibly interesting.
7. Regarding time as moving either too slowly or too fast.
8. Engaging in procrastination or false business.

Restlessness is one of the core symptoms of ADHD, and it may prevent individuals from
relaxing and/or achieving adequate sleep. In fact, people with ADHD have been shown to
exhibit higher levels of nocturnal activity. However, this increase in nocturnal activity has
not been shown to affect sleep continuity in a significant way. In other words, ADHD does
not cause individuals afflicted with it to wake up from a sleeping state. Nevertheless,
adults with ADHD commonly report experiencing difficulties with ceaseless mental
activity, and this problem may well persist into the night and prevent them from sleeping
(Young & Bramham, 2007).
Fourteen years have gone by since I had the accident. Ever since, I have been
working closely with college students and have learned to recognize behaviors that are not
only aligned with what the scholarly literature on ADHD describes, but with my very own
experiences. I have tried to learn about the condition and find ways to cope with it in order
to create a balance between a regular/normal life and the independence that my brain
simulates. I have also tried to normalize my life using prescribed drugs. There are two
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primary stimulants that are used in the treatment of ADHD: amphetamines (Dexedrine,
Dextrostat, Adderall, and Adderall XR) and methylphenidate (Ritalin, Ritalin LA,
Concerta, Metadate ER, Metadate CD, Focalin, Focalin XR, Methylin, and Daytrana).
There is no standard dose that is effective for all individuals. All of these medications are
classified as Schedule II medications by the FDA, which means that they present the
potential for abuse. These rapid-acting medications can produce a change in behavior 30
to 45 minutes after oral ingestion. The short-acting preparations, on the other hand, reach
maximum effectiveness within two to four hours, with the useful effects wearing off within
three to six hours. The FDA recently approved the use of a transdermal patch of
methylphenidate for the treatment of ADHD, though the patch is only effective for 11 to
12 hours (Daytrana, 2006). At present, the transdermal patch is the only non-oral
medication available for the treatment of this disorder (Buttross, 2007). I have
experimented with Ritalin and Adderall only in different dosages, and only under the
supervision of my physician. Results in my case had varied, but for the most part, these
medications have helped me deconstruct reality and understand how external chemical
stimulation is capable of altering the identity, even the ontological status of a person. In
other words, my very own self becomes an avatar when I my consciousness is altered by
the effects of said drugs. When I take Ritalin I enter a parallel reality that not only allows
me to experience reality in a different way but also influences my perception and allows
my artwork to become more fruitful as it is expressed in the work that I have produced
over the last 14 years.

18
In my experience, one of the most—if not the most—complicated aspects of
dealing with ADHD has been producing extensive structured written documents. I have
struggled every step of the way. I struggled when I wrote my undergraduate thesis to
become a designer; I struggled with completing my thesis to obtain my MFA in Design
and Visual Communication; and I have struggled every time I have had to write a paper
during my doctoral program. Having to confront the multi-headed monster called
“dissertation,” I found myself lost, completely lost, and if I may add, defeated, and
depressed. I could not find a way around writing a document to prove that I am capable of
doctoral research. Just when I was ready to give up, I found a possible salvation.
What is a doctoral dissertation after all? As a doctoral candidate engaged in the
production of said document, I could argue that a doctoral dissertation is nothing more than
a critical and systematic observation of a tiny piece of the body of knowledge—any tiny
piece of any body of accepted knowledge. This observation is meant to contrast the
thoughts and ideas of the aspiring scholar with those who came before him or her in an
attempt to contribute a new insight to a given field. A dissertation is, undeniably so,
traditionally delivered as a body of text organized in a very specific and rigorous form. As
it is described in an article entitled “Faculty Perceptions of the Doctoral Education,”
“Quite apart from the specific characteristics of the doctoral dissertation as a process and
document itself, the dissertation also can be viewed as reflecting much of our academic
and intellectual culture. Most obviously, the dissertation reflects the capabilities of the
author – the training received, the technical skills and the analytical and writing abilities
developed” (Isaac, Quinlan, & Walker, 1992, p. 242). The dissertation is undoubtedly
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meant to demonstrate the capabilities of the author, the training received, the technical
skills acquired, and the analytical writing abilities developed. However, as Harrison points
out the dissertation also has informal, emotional, and historical importance that extends
beyond the document to the construction of the identity of the candidate and her or his
future professional life (Harrison, 2009).
One of the most significant factors determining what constitutes a doctoral
dissertation lies in its goal: to make a significant contribution to the field. What qualifies as
a contribution to knowledge in the field is where the most differences among disciplines
appear. One could argue though, that a decisive factor in defining “contribution” entails
assisting in the evolution of the cultural production within the program itself. It has been
suggested that other factors beyond reason, argument, and evidence have significant
influence on the direction of the research and its final outcome (Hull, 1988).
According to Isaac, Quinlan, and Walker (1992), the experience gained in the
production of the dissertation is crucial to develop a successful breadth of knowledge, and
to achieve a higher degree of originality. Following these reflections, I decided to venture
into the production of a dissertation document that would allow me to employ an
alternative format more conducive to my wandering ADHD brain. Such a format would
allow me to insert my idiosyncratic voice as an artist, a designer, and an educator, and by
the way, as a non-native it would also challenge the English language construction
demanded by traditional documentation at the doctoral level. Good strategy, good
argument. In other words, I needed to find a format that could mediate between my
inherent need to fight against the structure of any system while preserving the system to
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avoid its destruction, That is I want to be a rebel within the constraints of the system itself
and I think I can achieve it through my work without braking any rules. I think I found
such a format in what contemporary scholars have called autoethnography.
Autoethnography is an intriguing qualitative method only given minimal acceptance
for the time being. Emerging from postmodern philosophy, in which the dominance of
traditional science and research is questioned and alternative ways of knowing and
inquiring are legitimated, this method of scholarly inquiry offers a way to give voice to
personal experience as a means for advancing broader understanding. It begins with a
personal story and intertwines with more traditional forms of scholarly narrative as need be
to advance the construction of ICEVORG as a conceptual being. The characters described
in the stories argue in favor of the research questions presented by the author, and
ultimately of the construction of knowledge. They reveal the ways in which combined
stories can both create reality and be portals to greater understanding in the humanities
(Wall, 2008).
I completed my doctoral coursework in 2010. Life then took me into a completely
unexpected path that helped me grow not only as a person, but, more importantly, as an art
educator and professional artist. I had the opportunity to visit Rome, where I hugged trees
that had witnessed Roman armies conquer and be defeated; I met the David, and the David
in Florence, where I also experienced a sublime viewing of Damien Hirst’s one-hundredmillion-dollar work of art entitled For the Love of God. As a South American from the
highlands of the Inca peoples I was particularly touched when I saw the golden ceilings
made with the first gold brought from America, and saw right before my eyes, the thick
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glass separating Michelangelo’s Pietà from myself. I slept in the very same town where
Martin Luther changed the world with his ideas. I fell in love with Berlin, and adopted
Paris as my home (at least in my dreams). So, I wondered how to discard all of that
phenomenological experience when the ultimate goal of my dissertation is to demonstrate
that such reality is no longer accessible to us. How could I not include my thoughts and
experiences coming face-to-face with the Mona Lisa? Autoethnography showed me a valid
way to express myself without disrupting—that much—the status quo of academia.
According to Sarah Wall (2006), producing an autoethnography is a challenging
task, but it can lead to the creation of a credible text while preserving the personal and
natural voice of the researcher. As with any other form of narrative, autoethnography can
assume many variations and styles, yet it is a valid and rigorous form of inquiry. In her
words:
Autoethnographers tend to vary in their emphasis on auto- (self), -ethno- (the
cultural link), and –graphy (the application of a research process) (Ellis & Bochner,
2000, paraphrasing Reed-Danahay, 1997). This variable emphasis on the separate
dimensions of autoethnography results in the production of manuscripts that differ
significantly in tone, structure, and intent. It must also be noted that some authors
who have pursued autobiographical inquiry have not referred to their written
products as autoethnographies. (p.6)
Resolving to use autoethnography implies a process of identity construction that involves
passing through portals of self-perception, which are a consequential product of the
personal narratives that a doctoral candidate chooses to share. Stories are intertwined with
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theoretical arguments, as well as with more traditional uses of scholarly methods for citing
references. The autoethnographic process pushes the author to construct a metanarrative of
the document while re-positioning views of self and value systems, particularly with
respect to knowledge and what it means to be a knower (Harrison, 2009).
However, scholars who are experienced in using this relatively new way of
constructing and delivering scholarship warn new colleagues about the potential emotional
writing, lack of honesty with oneself about the motivations behind the research, and, above
all, the potential failure to connect personal experience with theory. As autoethnography
continues to emerge, define itself, and struggle for acceptance, it is important that those
working with it reflect on the use of the method and share their experiences with their
colleagues and peers (Harrison, 2009). From Harrison’s (2009) perspective, the process of
learning to construct one’s identity through this particular method of inquiry suggests the
need to negotiate spaces for new conceptions of knowledge worthy of academic
consideration. Autoethnography, Harrison (2009) writes, “Is my account of learning to be a
PhD graduate and therefore, or learning ‘doctoralness’ or that level of knowledge currently
accepted as worthy of a doctorate will enable the ‘back and forth gaze’ inward towards the
personal and outward to the social, marrying the private and the public realms” (p. 256).
Using autoethnography implies making a path into new and unstable territories, yet
taming and cultivating nature in these territories. With the implementation of
autoethnography, untamed nature is developed and refined for agriculture and nurturing
plants. It is important to acknowledge and understand the work of individuals in different
fields who choose to use the same academic format, and, together as a collective, reach a
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consensus on the relevance of the knowledge derived from such formats. Necessarily, then,
the sociocultural and interactional aspects of doctoral learning that occurs in the “stuck”
moments are central to understanding the process of knowledge construction in our everchanging world.
Autoethnography is specially appropriate for my project of excellence as a valid
form of inquiry since this method is described as a practice that moves into the foreground
“the multiple natures of selfhood and opens up new ways of writing about social life”
(Reed-Danahay, 1997, p. 3). The method itself blurs discursive definitions and expands the
possibilities for a counter-discourse on the construction of modern identity.
Simultaneously, it questions the authenticity of the voice that tells the story; therefore, it
problematizes the nature of self and allows self-reflection to gain a level of objectivity that
will procure insights into the scholar’s discipline. This method of inquiry is even more
relevant today when the construction of identity has shifted dramatically so as to empower
the individual through the use of electronic means of cultural production. This is especially
true in the arts and design since these disciplines demand innovative formulations aimed at
challenging the status quo.
From this particular method of inquiry, I plan to generate a level of discourse that
amounts to “multiphrenia,” which Rolling (2004), in interpreting Gergen’s (1991)
definition of “autoethnography,” identifies as the increase of multilocality, plurality, and
intertextuality in the postmodern era. In other words, multiphrenia describes the neverending embeddedness of our own stories within those that seem to belong to others.
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Rolling (2004) reflects on the reasons why we need to find venues for personal expression,
arguing:
Humans have always understood the need for unmitigated stories of the self; it is
why we paint ourselves, sing ourselves, dramatize ourselves, glorify ourselves in
marble and stone, write ourselves into histories and her-stories, dream ourselves in
the night. (p.551)
Even though the body image is only a component of psychological self-knowledge, it is a
major factor in constructing identity in the modern and postmodern era due to the endless
repetition of images and their inter-textuality. In addition to my intention of becoming a
Doctor of Philosophy in order to further my teaching career in higher education, I am
above all a designer and an artist. I must add that I observe myself and construct myself as
a combination of both disciplines, but my academic training is that of a designer.
I will elaborate on what I see as similarities and differences between being an
educator and being a designer later on in this dissertation; yet, in a nutshell I must say, that
the difference between the two is intentionality. Why is intentionality important and
relevant for approaching my dissertation using autoethnography? It is important, if not
crucial, because the combination of art and design processes turn a messy journey into an
organized and polished final product. It is that final product, which, by its own virtue, is
the silent container of a complex and multi-linear process.
Scholar Allan J Munro has worked on the subject of design and electronically
emerging technologies at the post-doctoral level for more than 14 years. He has also
worked as an ethnographer with a background in psychology. After his first post-doctoral
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position at Oxford University’s Computing Lab, he developed an interest in using
ethnographic methods to “inform the design of new technologies, critique prototypes and
scenarios for new technologies, and as a tool to inspire and challenge innovation” (Munro,
n.d., para. 3)
In addressing the validity of autoethnography as a research method for designers,
Munro (2011) explains that the process of design is “messy” and the final design emerges
from the experience that the designer has with a great number of sources, stimuli,
interactions, and conversations. Through these, the designer can understand the clients’
needs and wants, which are important inasmuch as they provide elements crucial to the
successful outcome of the process. In contrast to more traditional research with sources
from printed texts on theory, tables of statistical data, and scholarly articles, Munro
indicates that in his experience, working with scholars who do not fit in the disciplinary
boundaries requires the work to be completed in collaboration to develop a common
understanding of a problem. In Munro’s words:
Despite inner-group diversity a certain level of shared common
understanding, and/or repeated interactions is needed to bind people together as a
group… One of the central tenets of design (and creativity) is the push and pull of
idiosyncrasy. However, the idiosyncratic is bound (or framed”) by like-mindedness
of designers and their practice. Designers share practice, share an understanding (or
at least an acceptance of the necessity of validation and to a certain extent share the
criteria for such validation. (Munro, 2011, p. 156)
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Munro (2011) also argues that the creative process of design is embedded in the
culture of self, the culture of design, and the culture of evaluation and assessment. He
claims that autoethnography is a methodology for capturing and analyzing new knowledge,
one that best fits the complexities brought to the discourse on knowledge from
interdisciplinary practice:
…As it [knowledge] emerges from the interplay between these three cultures in the
practice of report writing emphasize the notion of a ―systematic investigation‖
leading to a solution of the problem. Thus a research report has to (a) demonstrate
evidence of some form of systematic thinking, has to (b) present the findings of that
systematic thinking and has to (c) argue the case from this for new knowledge.
Autoethnography provides a system that is an effective research strategy for
fulfilling these obligations, as it provides a strategy for evidence gathering and
evidence interpretation that is embedded in the temporality of emergence as a
critical design process. (Munro, 2011, p. 156)
On the other hand, Munro (2011) acknowledges that autoethnography is still debated
within the field of design when it comes to defining what constitutes research. Some
design practitioners give more emphasis to the final product itself, as opposed to other
practitioners who suggest that documentation is a necessary form of establishing evidence
to support the final product. All definitions agree, however, that new knowledge needs to
be placed in a public arena in some way, shape, or form (usually a written form). Whether
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that final documentation takes the shape of an electronic-only format or one that must exist
in print as well continues to be a subject of debate (Munro, 2011).
As I designer, I agree for the most part with Munro’s arguments, yet I prefer to
keep a rather comfortable distance in order to attempt to preserve a certain level of illusory
objectivity. However, I came to conclude that a more rigorous and traditional approach to
delivering my doctoral work was simply not possible, not only due to the challenges
pertaining to the language itself but, above all, because of my personal need for producing
innovation through experimentation. I do see myself as an agent of change, and I have
constructed my identity as a person, as well as a scholar and educator, around this notion.
Over the past decade, I have been teaching professionally, in academia, and I have tried to
push the idea of innovation as much as I have been allowed. I believe it is one of the main
responsibilities of scholars to innovate educational practices, yet, paradoxically, I have
observed that tenured scholars are the least inclined to do so. I will elaborate on these
thoughts later, but I think it is important to stress the fact that what I seek as an artist,
designer, and above all as an educator is to preserve the personal voice of students, not
only as a form of resistance against the system but more importantly as a way to humanize
the process of education. In my experience, when students are considered human rather
than entities that flood universities to gain knowledge, true education takes place.
The ultimate goal of research is to assist in the construction of culture and cultural
practices. According to Munro (2011), contrary to the culture of individuality, individuals
are cultural agents. From the standpoint of anthropology and sociology, he suggests that
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individuals shape cultural practices, and in return, cultural practices shape individuals, thus
turning them into cultural agents:
Sociology informs one that a person is the product of the interface between the
individual, on the one side, and the environment, time and culture into which he or
she is born, on the other. Furthermore, the individual is a product of his or her own
unique attributes, preferences, abilities and proclivities, and contributes in his or
her own way to the development of the environment and culture. Thus the
individual shapes and is shaped by the environment. (Munro, 2011, p. 157)
It is then through the proposal of a narrative that resembles, in one way or another, the
discourse of a diary or a journal, such as that of autoethnography, that I will capture and
communicate the design and art-making processes sustaining my main argument: an
account of the reality we experience on a daily basis, and how our identities are
constructed and how those constructs – that are many -- can be evidenced by relevant
artwork found in the world today. Since autoethnography is constructed with stories of
events that can be visual, inspirational, theoretical, cognitive, comparative, or simply
anecdotal, I expect these stories to provide core research moments that will procure a
reflective strategy, which captures decision-making thoughts and reflections/insights as
events unfold. Each “experience” lived becomes, therefore, an integral element to construct
and support my project.
Based on the arguments presented in the development of my proem, I conclude that
using autoethnography as the method of scholarly inquiry to structure my project to
comply with the regulations of the MATX program, as expressed in its published list of
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expected outcomes: “Students will demonstrate the ability to conduct independent research
and produce new, specialized knowledge within the broad parameters of media, art and
text,” and “Students will develop competence in interdisciplinary and disciplinary research
methods and responsible conduct of research” (MATX, 2015, para. 1).
I am convinced that autoethnography meets the special criteria that my “restless” brain
demands, which are the result of my ADHD. The scholarly argument that I now present
should be analyzed and considered as a significant contribution to the field of
interdisciplinary studies, and to the pedagogical philosophy proposed by the MATX
program.
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CHAPTER ONE
Like Dwarfs on the Shoulders of Giants2

“The appearance of the nonexistent as if it existed motivates the question as to the
truth of art. By its form alone art promises what is not; it registers objectively,
however refractedly, the claim that because the nonexistent appears it must indeed
be possible.” -- Theodore Adorno3

In 1998, when I first arrived to the United States to obtain my Master of Fine Arts
(MFA) in Design and Visual Communication, I remember feeling intrigued by what I
thought then to be linear clouds drawn on the sky. I never saw anything like it before and
could not understand why they were there. Quickly enough, my restless brain concluded
that the government was spraying chemicals on the population to stimulate economic
consumption, and I proceeded to tease my classmates with this theory. Obviously, my
intention was to fool them, but my curiosity remained. It was not until a few years later
that I heard about them again: this time as a robust conspiracy theory supported by 26
formal references in Wikipedia (“Chemtrail Conspiracy Theory,” 2015). The article
describes a theory of government control through the spraying of biological agents for
purposes undisclosed to the general public. The article cites evidence from formal
organizations such as the National Air and Space Administration (NASA), the
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The Metalogicon of John Salisbury. University of California Press. p. 167.
Aesthetic Theory.1970
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Office of Atmospheric Programs (OAP)
to discredit the conspiracy theory, thereby providing a rationale to the population who
chooses to go beyond the hearsay. In other words, responding to a claim that commonsense
deems as irrational opens a tiny door to the possibility that the story contains some truth.
That small promise of truth was enticing enough for me to go a few layers deeper to find
out more about the “truthness” within this truth. As I delved into research on this subject, I
found out that according to Rossman (2001), what I referred to as “linear clouds” were
actually “contrails” (Figure 2). They are the byproduct of cold jet engines climbing up the
skies to reduce distances in a way that would had been impossible before technological
development in air transportation. Stroud explains that the humid exhaust from a jet engine
mixes with the atmosphere, which is at a much lower pressure and temperature than the jet
exhaust. The water vapor contained in the jet exhaust condenses and may freeze. This
mixing process forms a cloud very similar to the one our breath makes on a cold day. In
Rossman words:
Depending on a plane’s altitude, and the temperature and humidity of the
atmosphere, contrails may vary in their thickness, extent and duration. The nature
and persistence of jet contrails can be used to predict the weather. A thin, shortlived contrail indicates low-humidity air at high altitude, a sign of fair weather,
whereas a thick, long-lasting contrail reflects humid air at high altitudes and can be
an early indicator of a storm. (Rossman, 2001, par. 3)
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Figure 2: Contrails. Digital capture of contrails as seen in the sky on any given day.
Image by the author.

What I find fascinating is how fragile the construction of knowledge can be, and
more to the point, how important the role of interpretation is in the construction of reality.
Today, we can look up at the sky and see a sign with no referent (in this case, the contrails
with no plane), and quickly conclude that they are not natural—that those “drawings” were
made by an agent that is the product of a human process. One could even generate more
creative connections between the sign that one sees in the sky and one or many conspiracy
theories, ranging from total political control to aliens harvesting us for food. However, the
point I want to make is that I have observed that reality is constructed through personal
observation in conjunction with what the media feeds us to be “the truth,” and that “truth”
is accessible for analysis only when a third agent is present; in this case, the contrails

33
themselves represent this third agent. If planes left no contrails in the sky we, as scholars,
could not push the boundaries of knowledge, for there would be no questions to pose, and
no curiosity to feed.
Imagine the same situation happening in the year 1534. Contrails appear in the sky,
but there is no possible explanation to establish a connection between the object that one
sees in the sky—the plane—and its possible cause. Since there were no planes at the time,
could contrails have existed? How would one attempt to provide a rational, let alone
scholarly, explanation for the observed phenomenon? The answer is rather simple:
intelligence. According to Campbell (1974), intelligence is the acquisition of new
knowledge as theorized by the “chance-configuration theory,” which states three core
propositions:
1) The acquisition of new knowledge, the solution of novel problems, requires
means of producing variation. 2) These heterogeneous variations are subjected
to a consistent selection process that winnows out all those that exhibit adaptive
utility, and 3) The variations that have been selected must be preserved and
reproduced by some mechanism; without such retention, a successful variation
cannot represent a permanent contribution to adaptive fitness. (p.170)
In other words, to be intelligent according to these three core principles is to have the
capacity to acquire new knowledge that solves problems by establishing variations within
the solution that adapt and transpose in order to solve other problems by means of some
mechanism that allows reproduction and archiving. This particular theory is one of many
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theories that attempt to define what intelligence is, a subject of scholarly analysis which
continues to receive academic interest (Eysenck, 1993).
Lucas Cranach der Ältere (1472 – 1553) was a German Renaissance painter and
printmaker appointed as the Electors of Saxony court painter for the majority of his career.
He was also a close friend of Protestant reformer Martin Luther. In 1534 in Wittenberg,
Germany, he created a woodcut allegory to illustrate Luther’s Bible. The title of the piece
is The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Workshop of Lucas Cranach. Luther: Bible Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse. 1534. University of California,
San Diego, California. ARTstor Slide Gallery. Web. 02 Oct. 2013.
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In his piece, Cranach uses his intelligence to construct a scene that depicts four
horses standing on clouds. The first horse, to the left, gestures action to signify the
initiation of the Apocalypse. The two horses right behind the first are simply standing,
waiting to be called to action, while the fourth stands, head down, observing the people it
stands atop. This particular horse is ridden by no other than the Death himself, in a gesture
that implies, one could argue, deep relaxation, even happiness. Above all, an angel
oversees the scene, yet his gaze is directed above him; he is waiting as well, to receive a
final order that will release the full power of final destruction. The annihilation of the
human race as we know it is commanded by no other than the Almighty Himself.
The reason why I bring this particular image to the discourse is to point out that
Luther’s Bible represented a very important paradigm shift in that it changed the way
knowledge was constructed and delivered from a production of a reduced number of units
containing handwritten information to a mass produced original prints. I am not attempting
to suggest that Luther’s Bible was the first text to do so, not at all. What I am suggesting is
that the medium he chose, in tandem with the technology of reproduction and distribution,
worked in favor of his intention and thus procured a radical change in how reality was
perceived. The relationship between image and text, combined with the medium chosen to
bring them together, made the difference in terms of the number of people reached with a
new proposed form for perceiving reality. Luther’s Bible brought that change, and from a
secular point of view, one of the most important contributions of the release of this
document was the radical increase in literacy. One may argue that Luther’s Bible as a
whole was meant to reach a large audience; the images you describe added to the
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accessibility of the Bible, its impact on a common and diverse audience. According to
Haile (1976), Luther’s sensational dispute, which would end in a new order within the
known religions, an order that continues to this day, was crucial in the popularization of
literacy. The common man, always curious, wanted to know what the fuss was all about,
Haile indicates. To have access to a medium that contained what (at the time) was
undeniably perceived as “knowledge” became a strong motive for learning how to read.
The psychological power of the printed word continued to transform the way reality was
constructed, and it provided the masses access to a new world and a parallel universe. Such
a universe was only accessible through the mediation of the Church and the images that
constructed the universe as contained and controlled within their walls—in the form of
paintings and artwork, that is. The release of a new medium into the world meant the
further development of the world of literature as well. Haile (1976) explains:
…[E]ssential to the stunning popular success of the Luther Bible was his theory of
literature, which for the first time enabled the people to understand these works
from ancient Hebrew as related intimately to their own lives. […]To appreciate the
broad popular appeal of Luther the interpreter, it may help if we first observe his
work as a popular artist. Many German Humanists were influenced by the
aristocratic Italian Renaissance with its visions of clear and balanced form, of
rationality and propriety; but northern Europe would eventually come to express its
own character in the profusions of Rabelais, Fischart, and Shakespeare with their
endless combinations and crass juxtapositions. (p. 818)
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Yet, what I would like to emphasize in the development of my own scholarly work is the
importance of a new medium combining text and image for the general population, and
more specifically for its construction of knowledge. Having access to the “Word of God”
was simply impossible without mediation before Luther’s Bible. To walk into a church
was equivalent, I will argue later on, to what virtual reality proposes today. A whole
different phenomenological approach to the construction of knowledge began to emerge,
yet to see an image such as The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse in a medium that was
constructed to signify the word of God was meant to be an experience that would
consequently change the viewer’s behavior. It was intended to make the invisible visible
while using “knowledge” as the agent that would determine the structures of power in the
society of those times. The relationship between power and knowledge, and how the
former is used to control and define the latter, takes place when authorities claim it as
“scientific knowledge.” Foucault (1988), for instance, shows how “madness” was used to
categorize and stigmatize not just the mentally ill but the poor, the sick, the homeless, and
anybody who would venture to challenge the status quo (as cited in Stokes, 2004).
In spite of the development of science, and the radical change that technology has
brought into our lives over the last two hundred years, I would argue that not much has
changed in terms of how we relate images and texts to what we believe to be knowledge.
Consider, for instance, The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse as an informational
device, not as allegory, myth, art, or creative writing. Then, project yourself back to those
times when, after reading that particular passage of the Bible, perceived as the direct word
of God, you would walk out and look above expecting to find the horsemen coming. Is it
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any different than today with our expectations of a UFO launching a massive attack,
resulting in our own apocalypse? Let me illustrate by showing an image, a chart, from a
1943 catalog How to Identity Warplanes (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Clement Co., J. W. "How to Identify Warplanes." Chart. Atlas of the World at War. Ed. Division
Matthews-Northrup. Cleveland and New York: World, 1943. 44-45. Ser. 39. David Rumsey Historical Map
Collection. Web. 17 Oct. 2013. <http://www.davidrumsey.com>.

This image, I argue, is conceptually equivalent to Cranach’s woodcut. Both images
were conceived and designed to produce the same effect in the viewer: to provide a map of
elements to recognize in the sky, or “The Heavens,” if I may add. In the first case, the
Church is the agent who provides the rules of engagement with the world, which is to
prepare us, humans, for what will come. In the second case, the warplane chart, the images
in combination with the text serve the same purpose, which is to get as ready as we can for
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what will fly above our heads, to better recognize the elements appearing in the sky and act
in accordance with the norms established by the powers that be. What can be observed is
that which changes between the two images presented for analysis, the level of abstraction
used to render the elements, as well as the medium itself. What I am suggesting does not
venture beyond a rather simple observation, but my intention is to demonstrate that not
much has changed in spite of the development of technology. Reality continues to be a
construct dependent upon the use of mediating agents. For the successful construction of
these media, and for them to achieve their communicative goals, they are meant to become
invisible to our senses. In other words, reality is a phenomenological construct that
depends on a medium, or many, to be able to present, construct, and deliver concepts, and
ultimately to deliver meaning.
In addition, my narrative will demonstrate that said relationship between media has
conjured a reality, or the perception of one, that is based on the moment when reality is
represented and confined to a medium other than physical reality itself. It is important to
note that I am strongly emphasizing the relationship between image and text, considering
both, to a certain extent, two visual representations of reality. The first one —image— is a
two-dimensional representation of objects existing in reality, and the second one —text—
is a visual representation of sounds (spoken language) expressed graphically. This is
important because what I will be discussing throughout my dissertation pertains to images,
even when those images correspond to three-dimensional physical objects positioned in
space and time. With that purpose in mind, I must add that to understand what an image is
remains of great importance to my study. I will be referring consistently to the scholarly
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work of W. J. Mitchell (2005), one of the leading scholars in media theory and visual
culture today. Mitchell is a professor of English and art history at the University of
Chicago whose scholarship is focused on the theorization of image. He suggests that
images are living creatures (Mitchell, 2005). That conception alone has incited my
curiosity since I believe it has a direct correlation to my scholarship. According to
Mitchell, the definition of an image has varied as history has evolved, yet what has
remained a common denominator across definitions is the role images play in the
construction of power. On the other hand, to define images today is a task somewhat more
complex than before, considering the images’ contemporary mechanic and electronic
reproducibly (Benjamin, 1935; Davidson, 2009; Mitchell, 1984; 2003). Asking what
images are today entails a more complex undertaking that involves not only the image and
its ontology, but also how the image has permeated different media to produce a certain
effect, and how media have reflected the image back to us.
Moreover, images come from the world of semiotics, a discipline that studies the
signification of signs and the complexities involved in understanding them as a system of
meaning. To complicate matters, as Mitchell (1984) explains, language and image are no
longer what they promised to be. Mitchell writes that both are “Transparent media through
which reality may be represented to the understanding” that “have become enigmas,
problems to be explained, prison houses which lock the understanding away from the
world” (Mitchell, 1984, p. 8). Put differently, it is the role of scholars to mediate between
the locked meanings and the public by liberating meaning through analytical
argumentation. As scholars begin to unlock layers of meaning, new layers of meaning
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emerge to reveal insights that were not visible before. For example, my linear clouds were
mere symbols that reflected my ignorance until I chose to find out the meaning they carried
inside. Images then, I would argue, are containers of meaning—pregnant vessels
navigating through oceans of information waiting to be seen, paid attention to, found. For
Mitchell (1984), what images want is to exist, to be, to become relevant in the construction
of culture, perhaps even to continue on through endless reproduction and dissemination.
Mitchell’s argument that images “want to be” could be found in any fossil displayed in a
museum of natural history exemplifying an animal trapped in between rocks and thus
transcending its own reality to be “documented” for posterity. Nature has found a way to
preserve a form through time in what could be argued to represent her playing the role of
an historian and documentarian.
Attempting to personify nature as an entity with librarian desires may be farfetched,
yet when we begin to analyze the involvement of humanity in the process of image
construction, the story becomes much more interesting. An early medium used to convey
messages is found in petroglyphs and cave paintings. One site that is host to such early
media is the now-celebrated Altamira cave in Cantabria, Spain (Cartailhac, 1902). Long
ago, there were humans with the capacity, and the need, to use images to construct and
convey meaning, employing paint (no less)—one of the highest-valued media in art, even
today. The images that we see from this particular category usually represent animals and
humans, in scenes that we can recognize and identify. However, they are only the tip of the
iceberg when it comes to what has been found and cataloged. According to Conkey (1997),
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only a small group of these images “make sense” to us; others will remain locked for a
period of time until scholars unlock their meanings:
Many appear to be animals or parts thereof, but are ‘unfinished’ to our eyes. Other
markings abound: geometric shapes, some repeated in only certain cave sites;
negative hand prints; other shapes often interpreted as human body parts (e.g., a socalled phallus or a vulva); dots; short lines; finger markings in soft clay surfaces or
on the floors of caves and shelters. (p. 51)
Our understanding today of these images is that they were made (and some rejuvenated or
touched up over time) over a period as long as 25,000 years, between about 34,000 to
11,000 years ago. Images from the Grotte Chauvet (in the Ardèche region of France, which
dates images as beginning about 34,000 years ago) are separated in time (by about 17,000
years) from the newer, 17,000-year-old images at Lascaux. Our forensic knowledge of
these images have increased substantially over the past few decades. We have identified
both different and repetitive “recipes” (including binders and extenders) for the colors used
(Clottes, 1993); stone implements used for engraving or for processing the pigments have
been found with characteristic use/wear patterns; even some traces of scaffolding or rope
have been documented (Conkey, 2010; Leroi-Gourhan & Allain, 1979).
The point I am trying to make is that constructing images to reflect and leave a
mark of our presence in this reality is not a new phenomenon, but rather one that has been
an integral part of being human. The other aspect I want to stress is that any expression of
meaning, regardless of the message, requires a medium to be, to exist. To call cave
paintings “art” may also be too much of a stretch. For Davis (1985), cave paintings do not
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warrant particular attention because they are artistic and somewhat more developed, but
because they present unique qualities that may demonstrate that humans were using
creativity in the early stages of evolution. Considering the use of images as a means to
reinforce certain ideologies of human nature, and the creativity used to manufacture them,
entails accepting that our level of abstract thinking was developed to the point of enabling
symbolic value to become part of our understanding of the world, perhaps as long as
30,000 years ago. In fact, some have suggested the birth of visual culture declares the
initiation of abstract thinking capabilities in early humans (Lewis-Williams, 2002).
Moving from cave painting to computer-generated graphics may be a a giant leap,
yet it is necessary to show that pertinent issues in image scholarship continue to engage the
evolution of humanity in relation to that of media. Images reflect who we are as
individuals as well as a collective (Mitchell, 2004). When we reduce the scope of
observation from the collective to the individual, one could argue that images, or the
construction of images, are always representations of the self. Early scholars and early
researchers of the 20th century, Conkey (1997) argues, struggled to understand what cave
painting evince. Religion? Magic? Abstract thinking? We are, according to Conkey, like
cave painters: “aesthetic, cognitively sophisticated, attentive to meaning-making and
symbolism. We, like the cave painters, attempt to manipulate people and the world around
us, and develop coping mechanisms and instruments of social action” (p. 280). We “shake
with a cave man” in as much as we are able to confirm that we share the same modernity
with them, as exemplified in the shared power to make images imbued with meaning
(Haltunnen, 2009). The question, then, is which way does the mirror work and who is
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looking at whom? Berger (2002), a well-known commentator of contemporary visual
culture, challenges our intention to learn more when he says:
Perhaps we will have to be content with intuiting that they came here [into the
caves] to experience, and to carry away with them in memory, special moments of
living a perfect balance between danger and survival, fear and a sense of protection.
Can one hope for more at any time? (p. 18)
What I am arguing is that human-made images will always go beyond themselves since
their intention is to communicate meaning. They are containers of meaning that allow us
to reflect on ourselves and our evolution throughout history, yet they only provide us with
clues, hints, to who we are—never complete and fixed narratives in time and space. Good
argument.
To attempt an understanding the concept of the self from the perspective of image
construction and its analysis is to venture in a serious and complex journey. Could there be
a more profound philosophical inquiry in human history than inquiry into the self? Said
inquiry represents a fundamental quest that has been revisited for millennia, most likely by
every philosopher in one way or another. This journey has never found a definite answer,
nor an absolute truth. As times have changed, expedited by the development of advanced
technologies of communication, so has our understanding of how reality is defined,
constructed, and experienced. Informed by common sense, one could argue that the need to
know more about humanity has evolved over time as well and it has become only more
complex.
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Moreover, words like body, soul, consciousness, and self, words that we currently
use to describe the constituents of the individual, have evolved in their definitions over
time as well. Bodies have been the subject of attention for every discipline, from
mathematics to computer science to art. All disciplines, nonetheless, have been informed
and supported by philosophy in their search for a universal truth about not only the
mechanisms that govern our bodies and our minds, but especially about how the
components of the individual relate to one another to form a holistic person. When we
travel back in time through the text, we can find that Aristotle (384BC- 322BC) was
already theorizing about the nature of the self expressed as awareness, as well as about the
interest to understand complexities. He provides in Methaphysics a description of the
complex nature of the indivisible parts comprising a thing or a human:
Are we then to say that the All is composed of indivisible substances? Some
thinkers did, in point of fact, give way to both arguments. To the argument that all
things are one if being means one thing, they conceded that not-being is; to that
from bisection, they yielded by positing atomic magnitudes. But obviously it is not
true that if being means one thing, and cannot at the same time mean the
contradictory of this, there will be nothing which is not, for even if what is not
cannot be without qualification, there is no reason why it should not be a particular
not-being. To say that all things will be one, if there is nothing besides Being itself,
is absurd. For who understands 'being itself' to be anything but a particular
substance? But if this is so, there is nothing to prevent there being many beings, as
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has been said. It is, then, clearly impossible for Being to be one in this sense.
(Aristotle, 187a, pp. 7-9)
I am somewhat resistant when it comes to accepting Greek philosophers as a point of
departure for understanding the way our thinking has evolved over the last 2000 years. But
when I read their words, or what we trust to be their words, and feel challenged by their
thoughts, and agree that they continue to apply to the times we live in now, I find myself
amazed. It is shocking that 2000 years ago intellectuals were dealing with issues of how to
define what a human is made of and the conceptual split between mind and body. As early
as 2000 years ago, humans were haunted by the perception of “something” of a nonphysical nature being part of every one of us. As early as 2000 years ago, philosophers
from all over the world were already analyzing, exploring, and transforming the way we
understand the image of the self that is perceived by others and by our very own selves.
Yet, what I find to be even more interesting is that we still do not have a definite answer to
the question about the constitution of the self.
When I use the term “technology,” I am also referring to written languages as a
means to represent verbal communication, following the path of French philosopher
Jacques Derrida who contributed to the world his analysis on language and semiotics. As
technology continues to evolve, the capacity of the human brain also improves to
accommodate new forms of presentation and representation. Derrida’s reflections will be
incorporated throughout my dissertation to help structure my own arguments about the
construction of reality as it is mediated by current technologies of communication. My
project analyzes the projected and constructed image of the self—the way they come into
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being, to exist, and ultimately to interact with us in a conscious and non-conscious fashion.
I will also describe the many reasons why we, as humans, struggle to explain ourselves
through technology. In a way, this project is about a focus on the mirror, where we find the
reflection of our physical selves. The mirror is, when understood as a physical object,
subject to phenomenological inquiry and metaphorical interpretation. When we as
scholars enter a realm of analysis and contemplation, we can observe ourselves
reinterpreting the surface of the mirror (media) where we reflect on as humanity at large.
Over the last tweny years or so, I have experienced a recurring thought that I use
frequently during my teaching, and it goes like this: Imagine for a second what a world
without the phenomenon of physical reflection would be like. Everything is the same; all
life is as it is today, but there is no reflection. I invite my students to ponder about how this
imaginary reality would change them—how in not having access to our own image we
would have to rely on artistic interpretations to see ourselves. Could we exist in the way
we do if we did not have access to the way we look? Could we sustain a certain degree of
peace of mind over the anxiety generated by not having access to our reflected image?
What would be the consequences of said reality? For McLuhan (1964), searching for our
image in the mirror creates, over time, what he describes as “Narcissus Narcosis,” or the
reconceptualization of the mirror as a servomechanism that becomes an extension of our
body. This medium, however, numbs us, and becomes a closed system that enslaves by
preventing us access back to our selves. McLuhan’s term is thus negative, a form of
“death” of the body. McLuhan continues by saying that to accept the reflected image is not
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a mere phenomenon but an undeniable part of ourselves, an “amputation” of the essence of
our consciousness that pushes us to assimilate the reflection as an extension of our bodies.
I will focus on these questions as my dissertation proceeds. To conclude my
introduction, I have observed that reflection in the real physical world where we
experience our bodies is constant and reliable. However, the phenomenon itself, reflection,
always depends on a medium “to be.” In other words, even the illusory nature of the image
requires a medium to exist. Whether that medium is the surface of water, the screen of a
cell phone, or even our own consciousness is irrelevant. What matters is the
acknowledgement that the medium (or media) is always there, and it is possible to access it
by virtue of its ontological nature.
However, when the surface or the medium where the image reflects—both
physically and metaphorically—changes, so does reality and the way we construct it. For
Benjamin (1936), the mode of human perception changes over time, and with it, he argues,
humanity’s entire mode of existence. As he explains, “Just as the entire mode of existence
of human collectives changes over long historical periods, so too does their mode of
perception” (Jennings, 2008, p. 9). In this line from his seminal essay “The Work of Art in
the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility,” written in Paris while in exile during the
mid-1930s, Benjamin defines how the human sensorium adapts to new realities brought to
the discourse of life by technology. Additionally, Benjamin conceptualizes a principle that
I find to be most relevant to the development of what I will later theorize as a crucial
constituent of what I define as ICEVORG. Benjamin describes the notion of “auratic” and
“nonauratic” forms of art. The term “aura,” which first appears in the 1929 essay “Little
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History of Photography” and is then fully developed in his later works, refers to an
invisible space which is part of a conceptual realm. He asks,
What, then, is the aura? A strange tissue of space and time: the unique apparition of
a distance, however near it may be… [i]t rests on two circumstances, both linked to
the increasing emergence of the masses and the growing intensity of their
movements. Namely: the desire of the present-day masses to ‘get closer’ to things,
and their equally passionate concern for overcoming each thing's uniqueness by
assimilating it as a reproduction. Every day the urge grows stronger to get hold of
an object at close range in an image or, better, in a facsimile, a reproduction. And
the reproduction, as offered by illustrated magazines and newsreels, differs
unmistakably from the image. The alignment of reality with the masses and of the
masses with reality is a process of immeasurable importance for both thinking
perception. (Benjamin, 1929, p. 43)
For Benjamin, a work of art may be said to have an aura if it claims a unique status based
on the relationship it establishes with an observer, or if it possesses a certain sense of
intimacy, even when the image itself stops being unique and becomes a reproduction or
one of an endless number of reiterations. It creates, he explains, a psychological
inapproachability between painting and spectator or between text and reader, a tension that
is necessary for the “aura” to become the subject of phenomenological experience
(Jennings, Doherty, & Levin, 2008). The “aura” of art is impossible to comprehend and
know directly: it surrounds the work, giving it a special power of signification, but it
cannot be perceived or translated into simple definitions.
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What has changed, drastically, since Benjamin developed his theories, is the
medium itself, which has made it possible to observe their validity and relevance. We are
living in times when the mirroring image is no longer constrained by the rules of the
physical world. Thanks to the development of technology, different forms of
representations have emerged over the years. They have provided us with an array of
never-experienced-before possibilities on electronic surfaces that can be adjusted and
manipulated to construct variations of the images that permit us to perceive the world as an
alternative construct being reflected back to us. More accurately put, what I find important
about the new media where our current forms of identity are constructed and maintained is
the nature of it. New media are liquid. The inherent ability that new media present adapts
to emerging forms of expression and perception that are necessary to understand the notion
of ICEVORG.
To summarize, what I have intended to present in my introduction by shifting gears
from 1534 to the Second World War to today’s conspiracy theories, is the fragile
construction of knowledge. What I have learned over the years as a doctoral scholar in the
making, as well as a professor of art and design, is to give credit to the power of personal
experience above all other “media” that inform us about how to construct, criticize, and
accept (or reject) what reality is. When it comes to the construction of more elaborate
concepts or theories on how elements of life operate, what I have found to be essential to
analysis and inquiry is the incorporation of the experience of others. However, regardless
of how convincing an argument I construct, it will continue to be just that: an argument.
An argument is a collection of observations intertwined rationally with the intention to
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plant a drop of rain into the never-ending sea of knowledge. I call my drop of rain
ICEVORG, and I will walk through texts to try to make sense of my proposal and to
attempt a somewhat clear communication with you, my reader, by virtue of reflection with
myself.
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CHAPTER TWO
Simulacra and the Void in the Mirror
It was probably 1997 and I was still a student of design in Cuenca, a city located in
the highlands of the Andes in Ecuador. The school that I chose to attend was fairly new.
My father, who was already retired after having served as a professor of architecture and
the dean of the State School of Arts, was one of its cofounders. Founding the school was
an attempt to replicate the structure of an educational model that changed the world
forever, the German Bauhaus. My father was one of the members of the group of architects
and professional artists who decided to found a “new” school to fulfill society’s need for a
new type of professional. Like no other institution, the Bauhaus (Weimar 1919, Dessau
1925, Berlin 1932) is an icon in the development of art and design education in the modern
era. Although there is no such thing as a Bauhaus style, per se, what have come out of that
cultural shift are blueprints for the construction of a new order and a new reality (Jaeggi,
Oswalt, & Seemann, 2009).
The Bauhaus was, to a certain extent, a political movement in its own right. It was a
movement that was manifested not in riots, but rather in attempts to change society from
the inside out. The philosophy of the Bauhaus was to pursue the ideal of the
Gesamtkunstwerk, meaning the integral work of art, in the form of the Haus am Horn, a
self-contained dwelling designed by Bauhaus painter and teacher Georg Muche. Along
with Adolf Meyer and Walter Gropius, Muche designed and built Haus am Horn for the
Weimar Bauhaus’s exhibition in 1923. The concept of the house was to provide society
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with “the greatest comfort with the greatest economy by the best craftsmanship and the
best distribution of space in form, size, and articulation” (Fox, 2009, p. 71). By
demonstrating in practical terms the concept of a total work of art, the Bauhaus was
proposing a change in reality and a shift in paradigms that were, by all means, political and
meant to affect society as a whole (Forgács, 1991).
When the school was founded, a Bauhaus Manifesto served as its philosophical
foundation and constructed the identity of the school, more importantly a relation to the
larger community it represented. Appealing to potential Bauhaus students in an elevated
prose and emotive language, in the Bauhaus Manifesto Gropius formulated the mature
statement of their program:
The ultimate aim of all visual arts is the complete building! To embellish buildings
was once the noblest function of the fine arts; they were the indispensable
components of great architecture. Today the arts exist in isolation from which they
can be rescued only through the conscious, cooperative effort of all craftsmen.
Architects, painters and sculptors must recognize anew and learn to grasp the
composite character of a building both as an entity and in its separate parts. Only
then will their work be imbued with the architectonic spirit, which it has lost as
'salon art'. The old schools of art were unable to produce this unity, since art cannot
be taught. They must be merged once more with the workshop. The mere drawing
and painting world of the pattern designer and the applied artist must become a
world that builds again. When young people who take a joy in artistic creation once
more begin their life's work by learning a trade, then the unproductive 'artist' will
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no longer be condemned to deficient artistry, for their skill will be now be
preserved for the crafts, in which they will be able to achieve excellence.
Architects, sculptors, painters, we all must return to the crafts! For art is not a
'profession'. There is no essential difference between the artist and the craftsman.
The artist is an exalted craftsman. In rare moments of inspiration, transcending the
consciousness of his will, the grace of heaven may cause his work to blossom into
art. But proficiency in a craft is essential to every artist. Therein lies the prime
source of creative imagination. Let us then create a new guild of craftsmen without
the class distinctions that raise an arrogant barrier between craftsman and artist!
Together let us desire, conceive and create the new structure of the future, which
will embrace architecture and sculpture and painting in one unity and which will
one day rise towards heaven from the hands of a million workers like the crystal
symbol of a new faith. (Gropius, 1919, p. 31)
In a publication that I would describe today as advertising (Dahl, 2011), the Bauhaus
Manifesto was released to the public. The text was accompanied by Lyonel Feininger's
woodcut The Socialist Cathedral (Figure 5), which is described by Kramer (1994) in The
New Criterion in the following terms:
…a Gothic cathedral rendered in a graphic style that combined semi-abstract Cubist
forms with a distinctly Expressionist rather than Constructivist manner. That the
medieval cathedral was drafted into service as a symbol for the Bauhaus was only
one of the many historical oddities attending its inception, and it caused the school
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some trouble when the Bauhaus came to be dubbed ‘the Cathedral of Socialism.’
(p. 2)

Figure 5: Feininger, Lyonel. Woodcut for Program of the State Bauhaus in Weimar. 1919.
MoMA, New York. Weimar: Staatliches Bauhaus, 1919.

It is clear that the Bauhaus school’s social purpose was political. The events and
circumstances of the school were intertwined with the political and social events of
Germany. The contradictions of the Bauhaus became more substantial as society began to
mass-produce designed objects, and as this production became more standardized.
Technology became a key factor in the fusion of the artist with the technician and the
artisan. But, what I intend to stress is the fact that what was really important then, and
which may be lacking now, is the political philosophy and the ideological proposal behind
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education. 	
  The contradiction between the content of the manifesto and its visual
representation is a demonstration of early stages of the tension among architects, artists,
and craftsmen. I would even suggest that it could be interpreted as evidence of an early
tension emerging from the intention to create a sense of interdisciplinarity in education. 	
  
In contrast, my Bauhaus education was not charged with politics, a manifesto, or
any particular ideology other than to look at the ancient cultures of the Andes from the
perspective of design, in a futile and meaningless attempt to “save” them from complete
obliteration. What was a German educational model doing in the middle of a small city in
the Ecuadorian Andes anyway? That question may be answered by a single word:
globalization. Globalization is a model of reality meant to destroy the concept of
individuality not only at the personal level, but at the more controversial level of culture,
by using mechanical reproduction of the image as the principal and most powerful weapon
of mass destruction and conquest. It is through the endless repletion of a single model,
such as that of the Bauhaus, that meaning gets diluted and changes. I experienced that
dilution firsthand when I became a designer with no particular ideology other than to
become a producer of goods—an artist who was not solely an artist and a designer who
was not an architect either. I attribute this identity crisis to the fact that I attended a
simulation of the Bauhaus, not the real thing. A simulation is not the real, or is it?
Ever since I arrived to Richmond to work on my dissertation, I have decided to go
to the gym. It was a major decision, not only because I had been avoiding exercise for a
few years, but more importantly because I inherited the “blessing” of unhealthy levels of
high cholesterol in my blood. I refer to it as blessing since knowing that my blood is
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constituted in such a way has forced me to construct my life around that knowledge, and as
a consequence my whole identity. In other words, I have to live according to what my
blood’s elements dictate. As I walked into the Virginia Commonwealth University’s
(VCU) Cary Street Gym, the scale astonished me; the level of detail put into the
construction of the facilities indicated dedication and commitment to providing students
with a venue that I came to call the “Cathedral of Simulacra.” In the same fashion that
Feininger’s woodcut meant to represent “The Socialist Cathedral,” VCU’s Cary Street
Gym has become a place where people come religiously to pledge to the world of
simulation and to inadvertently accept it and embrace it as real. I have observed that there
is nothing real inside a gymnasium. Nothing at all! Everything is hyperreal, a simulation of
the second order, as Baudrillard would claim.
For French philosopher Jean Baudrillard, the world is no longer a place where one
can find reality. What is reality anyway? I have asked this question since I was 14 years
old, at a time when I could not comprehend why the world is the way it is. I had
experienced the same feeling before. It happened the day I found out that my eyes capture
different interpretations of the same sensory data in front of them. I must have been eight
or nine, and I was lying on the bed watching television with my face pushed against it so
that one of my eyes was partially covered by the blankets. As I closed the other eye, I
“saw” that what my open eye was seeing was a different view of the same scene. That very
moment I learned about the gap between my eyes. What was going on? Why were my eyes
not seeing the same thing? As I put my hand on my nose, as an extension of my nose to
separate what seemed to be a single field of vision, I understood what was happening but

58
could not make sense of it yet. I needed to learn more, and 30 years later, Baudrillard’s
texts found me.
When constructing his argument that reality is no longer accessible, Baudrillard
uses Jorge Luis Borges’s short narrative of an empire that disappeared when it was covered
by its own map. The emperor commissioned his cartographers to work on a map to
represent the territory. In their desire to make the best work possible, to transcribe with
such exactitude the real, the actual territory was completely covered and was no longer
accessible. Baudrillard argues that meaning, and the construction of meaning, is arbitrary.
Baudrillard has brought the terms “simulacra,” “simulation,” and “hyperreality” into
circulation among theorists discussing the relations established between humans and
society also between humans and perceived “reality.” Baudrillard defines simulation by
contrasting it with dissimulation in terms of various modes of feigning. He explains:, “To
dissimulate is to feign not to have what one has. To simulate is to feign to have what one
hasn't” (Baudrillard, 1988, pp. 167-168). He clarifies his meaning by stating that to
simulate is not simply to feign, but that someone who simulates an illness produces in
himself some of the symptoms.
When Heyd (2000) describes a good simulacrum, he compares it to something like
a column, writing: “It should not disappear from sight if we walk around it. In the same
manner we would not expect a column to disappear in the physical world as we walk
around it” (p. 16). A simulacrum, however, does not refer to a copy of the original. In
Heyd’s (2000) words:
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… the notion of simulacra arises in Plato's discussion in the Sophist of two types of
imitation: likenesses or similitudes (Greek: eikon) and semblances or simulacra
(Greek: phantasma). Plato proposes (in the voice of the Stranger) that ‘[t]he perfect
example’ of a likeness ‘consists in creating a copy [of a statue] that conforms to the
proportions of the original in all three dimensions and giving moreover the proper
color to every part.’ Simulacra, in contrast, are imitations that seem to be likenesses but are not. Plato's example is of ‘colossal’ works such as sculptures located
on the roofs of temples, the upper part of which was exaggerated in size for the
sake of (what the Greeks apparently thought of as) proper aesthetic enjoyment. In
the case of such works we have imitation that ‘only appears to be a likeness of a
well-made figure because it is not seen from a satisfactory point of view, but to a
spectator with eyes that could fully take in so large an object [it] would not be even
like the original it professes to resemble.’ (p. 16)
In other words, for Baudriallard simulacra do not have, necessarily, the same
structural quality that likeness claims. The key to understanding his notion of simulacra is
to approach it dialectically—by understanding what it is not. He explains: “To dissimulate
is to pretend not to have what one has. To simulate is to feign to have what one doesn't
have” (Baudrillard, 1994, p. 3). I find this reflection fascinating because it contains a
whole universe of meaning in only 22 words. It is the foundation for today’s reality, where
we do not need to dissimulate, to pretend what we do not have, because there is no need to
do it. We have it all, and all is a simulation.
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The Cathedral of Simulacra
As I walked into VCU’s Cary Street Gym, I experienced the same feeling that I did
when I walked into Saint Peters’ Cathedral in Vatican City. I felt overwhelmed, anxious,
appalled, surprised, excited, skeptical, and intrigued. There were no lit candles in the gym,
but the air was warm and the silence invaded every crevasse where it could hide. People do
not talk, and when they do, they maintain a certain sense of solemnity. I am not the
exception, but rather another sheep walking into the slaughterhouse of past selves, ready to
better my flesh-and-bone avatar. The fact that I am there, that anybody is there, is because
we acknowledge consciously or subconsciously that our bodies need improvement. To
walk into a gym is a demonstration of our imminent decay. In the same fashion as walking
out of a church after tuning our spirit, we know that we will have to come again, and again,
and again because the body, or spirit, will continue its inexorable downpath to the end.
Interestingly enough, I found out that the building where the Cary Street Gym is
located once housed a marketplace, an auditorium, and a warehouse, then it became a
world-class recreational facility (“The Cary Street Gym: A Brief History,” 2010). The
building was designed to simulate the architectural characteristics of a European
department store in France or Italy during the late nineteenth century. According to the
description published on VCU’s facilities site, there is a direct architectural correlation
between the Third Street Market (a former use of the building) and the San Lorenzo
Market in Florence, Italy: “Both bear remarkably similar gabled roofs and exposed steel
frame,” the description reads (VCU Recreational Sports, 2010, para. 2). In 1906, the
building’s function changed from marketplace to Richmond’s city auditorium. Later on, it
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would be transformed again into a multipurpose warehouse until 1978, when VCU
purchased the building to create the Cary Street Gym. As a marginal note, I find it quite
interesting—and to a certain extent ironic—that the place was transformed from a
marketplace to sell goods to nourish the body into a marketplace of ideas and forms of art
to nourish the spirit, to finally a recreational gymnasium to continue fulfilling its
nourishing purpose. Good analogies. In 1997, the gym’s roof caught fire and made frontpage news in the Commonwealth Times, the student newspaper (Hill, 1997). In spite of the
money invested in fixing the damage, it was not until 2007 that VCU’s rapid growth in
student population, and the resulting need to keep the school in shape, warranted a full
renovation of the building.
As I delved deeper into the layers covering this space, I decided to find out how
Baudrillard’s metaphor about the map and its territory applied to the Cary Street Gym. If I
am going to construct an argument about this place sharing the same symbolic status of a
cathedral, I better put my thoughts to the test before going any deeper. I decided to pay a
visit to today’s cartographer of the Empire: Google. What I discovered is fascinating
(Figure 5). As I began my quest inside the digital monster, the monolithic monopoly of
cyberspace, or the Wal-Mart of cyberspace as I have baptized it, I was introduced to a
super powerful tool called Google Earth®. This software attempts to cover the globe in the
same way Borges described in his narrative—eventually with the intent of replacing it. It is
a virtual global map. The original software used to map the globe was called EarthViewer
3D, and was created by Keyhole, Inc., a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)-funded
company acquired by Google in 2004 (“Google Earth,” 2015). The free downloadable
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software was released as Google Earth® in 2005, and is currently available for use in
major electronic platforms, such as Linux, Windows, and Mac OS X, as well as for
portable devices running iPhone® OS or Android®. In 2008, the software was also
released as a plug-in for Internet browsers. According to Paul Rademacher (2008), the
technical facilitator behind the seamless integration of Google Earth® with the Internet
browsing experience of every user, the objective of Google Earth is to superimpose images
obtained from satellite imagery, aerial photography, and 3D Graphic Information Systems
(GIS) to “let people fly around the planet at lighting speed and zoom in on rich highresolution imagery, mountain ranges, and even 3D buildings” (para. 1). For Rademacher,
“the experience of having a piece of software to access the globe from above was not fully
developed. It needed to integrate it all in order to cover the map that covers the map” (para.
1). Here Baudrillard’s words make even more sense, as he said that covering the territory
was not enough, that the replacement of the map has taken over the actual territory to
change our perception of it, and therefore of reality. In Rademacher’s (2008) own words:
Today, I'm happy to announce the release of the new Google Earth Browser Plugin, which brings the full power of Google Earth to the web, embeddable within
your own web site. Driven by an extensive JavaScript API, you can control the
camera; create lines, markers, and polygons; import 3D models from the web and
overlay them anywhere on the planet. In fact, you can even overlay your content
over different planets, stars, and galaxies by toggling Sky mode, letting you build
3D Google Sky mashups. You can also enable 3D buildings with a single line of
JavaScript, attach JavaScript callbacks to mouse events, fetch KML data from the
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web, and more. Our goal is to open up the entire core of Google Earth to
developers in the hopes that you'll build the next great geo-based 3D application,
and change (yet again) how we view the world. (para. 2)
Google certainly has changed the way we view the world. Yet, that change has been
received with criticism. According to Matthew and Shambaugh (2005), it is quite easy for
a wide range of actors, such as scholars conducting research, tourists obtaining travel
information, and terrorists gathering information about potential targets, to take advantage
of the navigation opportunities offered by easily accessible networks, such as Google
Earth. Matthew and Shambaugh argue that the same resources that empower contemporary
economic and political systems also have the capacity to generate incentives, capabilities,
and opportunities for illicit actors, which could result in implications for human and
national security proving the unexpected connections between reality and representation.
It is interesting to note the efforts that have taken place to cover certain areas that
have been deemed potential targets of terrorist attacks, as well as sensible spots where
national security may have been compromised. Such spots include military facilities in
Israel, South Korea, Russia, India, and the infamous spot known as Groom Lake, Homey
Airport, Dreamland, Paradise Ranch, Home Base, Watertown Strip, or by its popular
culture name, Area 51 (“Area 51,” 2015). Officially, Area 51 is referred to as the Nevada
Test and Training Range, and is operated by the United States Government and the CIA.
Even Hamas,4 the Islamic resistance movement, has reportedly used Google Earth to plan

4

Arabic:  ﺣﻤﺎﺱسḤamās, "enthusiasm", an acronym of  ﺡحﺭرﻙكﺓة ﺍاﻝلﻡمﻕقﺍاﻭوﻡمﺓة ﺍاﻝلﺍاﺱسﻝلﺍاﻡمﻱيﺓةḤarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah,
"Islamic Resistance Movement") is the Palestinian Sunni Islamic or Islamist organization, with an associated military
wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, located in the Palestinian territories.
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rocket attacks on Israel from Gaza. In other words, all of the evidence seems to point to the
fact that the map has indeed covered the territory, and not content with it, another map has
already began to emerge to cover it as well. Yet, once again, this new map claims to be an
even better representation than the representation itself and will eventually cover its
predecessor under the promise of technological improvement.
In Figure 6, I have digitally constructed a composition of screen shots and digital
photographs that show the Cary Street Gym as raw information obtained from Google
Earth Pro®. The first two screen captures on the top are depictions of what claims to be the
most advanced version available as of October 2013. Figure 6 is a collection of 3D
geometric constructions that represent the size and scale of the buildings in shades of gray,
while showing the selected spot—in this particular case, the Cary Street Gym—in color to
establish a focal point. The software itself allows control over the perspective point and the
aerial point of view, something that is impossible in real life unless one has access to a
helicopter. Not even a plane or helicopter could get as close to the flexibility and control
over the views and angles. When compared to a traditional printed map, the versatility and
control offered by a hyperreal approach is unparalleled and impossible to match by any
real situation. The next two panels/screen captures correspond to two other forms of
representation that let us, as viewers, play with the imagery in such a way that we can
collect more information than we may ever need to, and from point of views that are, once
more, not possible with the so-called naked eye
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Figure 6: Cary Street Gym. Image composition of several screen captures to show Google Earth’s capability to digitally construct a
reality that contains more information that what our senses are capable of perceiving. The last two images at the bottom had been
captured with current technology and under circumstances that would not have been possible otherwise. They are examples of the
order of the Hyperreal. Bottom right hand corner image by the author using an iPhone® 4s.

As a result of these introductory observations, I am comfortable in supporting the
argument that the Cary Street Gym is indeed a place that exists beyond its physical
presence in space and time. I argue that it does qualify as a monumental structure
comparable to that of a temple or church in terms of scale and occupation in space and
time. In the same fashion that any cathedral exists to make a point in the urban landscape,
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the gym stands out among the other buildings. The structure is an 18,000-square-foot
fitness center with over 185 pieces of fitness equipment, and 7 weight circuits. Flat screen
TVs are all over the place, all showing up to four different channel-feeds side by side,
though none of them with audio. There are smaller monitors throughout the space as well
that are constantly showing VCU announcements from the university calendar, postings
about research studies, and the like. However, I have noticed that most people are not
paying attention to them. When they are not in the middle of routine, and sometimes while
they exercise as well, their attention is on their rectangular cell phone screens. My
somewhat hyperbolic claim is that the Cary Street Gym is a monumental construction,
comparable to that of a temple or church, with discrete sections, regulations, and rituals,,
America as a hologram.
The first thing to catch my attention is the entry protocol. Everybody is required to
have their fingerprint digitized in the same way one does when entering the United States
through customs. Without relinquishing one’s identity, there is no access to the Cathedral.
In that moment, the level of my curiosity hits the roof. My fingerprint? Really? Do I need a
passport to enter this sacred space? Yes, a VCU I.D., and my now my digitized palm-print.
As I walk further into the beast, I see what seems to be a skyscraper rock-climbing wall,
where humans tied to ropes are climbing to demonstrate their bravery. The wall has in
front of it a smaller formation that sits in the center of the area designated for climbing. On
this rather tiny mountain, people can pretend they are free climbing without the need of a
second person to prevent their injury or even death from a 30-foot freefall. As I keep
exploring the space, I find a four-court area where people can play basketball, volleyball,
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table tennis, and badminton. The areas can be divided with huge drapes that remind me of
theater curtains; “Are they stages where people play?” I wonder.
Many walls had been designed as cells of lockers that vary in size and are digitally
operated with a temporary personal code. The first two or three times I visited the
Cathedral, I remembered very well the code I chose to lock my belongings, but I could not
remember the exact location of the locker. They all look alike. Wondering about the
purpose of that design decision and the lack of visual discrimination for the user, I cannot
help but think of the concept of normalization as removing individuality, and furthermore,
the notion that one becomes nothing but a numbered subject to reuse at the end of a cycle.
The Cathedral has more to offer: on the second floor, there is an indoor turf area for
playing soccer, dodge ball, or any other related activity (Figure 6). The turf is green and it
represents a soccer field reduced in scale and surrounded by thick panels of tempered glass
to keep viewers from getting hit by the ball. The regulation lines on the artificial grass are
part of the grass itself, so no need to repaint them. Outside the glass cage, there are several
stands where people can sit to watch the game evolve. A huge panel hovers over the turf to
announce the score and time remaining. Further down the aisle, one can find the indoor
running track that lets you run to the place where you started by selecting different lanes,
some designated for walking, others for running. Nine and a half laps equals one mile. On
the same floor, one can find racquetball courts as well. Drinking fountains and bathrooms
are located throughout the space.
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Figure 7: Digital images captured during several workout sessions to illustrate the different areas, equipment,
and spaces available at the Cary Street Gym. All images were captured by the author using an iPhone® 4s
“smart” cellular phone.
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In America, Baudrillard’s (1986) key insight is expressed in a highly charged quote
that reads: “America is neither dream nor reality. It is a hyperreality” (p. 28). Here
Baudrillard is referring to his experience visiting America, observing that its population
has no sense of simulation, but is itself simulation in the most developed state. Americans
are unable to perceive their conditions because they do not have the language to describe
it; they are models (Rubenstein, 2010). America is described by Baudrillard as a “giant
hologram,” where the whole can be refracted into any of its parts, whether a desert, a street
in a Midwestern town, a Burger King, or a Californian house. For Baudrillard, America’s
reality is profoundly cinematographic (Rubenstein, 2010)5. He traveled through America
with the intention of documenting his experiences in a phenomenological way, as a
firsthand experience. During his travels, he became fascinated by popular sporting
activities, including: break dancing, marathon running, skateboarding, jogging,
bodybuilding, and windsurfing. Many of these shared the attribute of self-reference
towards death, often by seeking sacrificial exhaustion or what Baudrillard would describe
as an intentional suicide to create meaning (Genosko, 2010)6. According to Genosko,
Baudrillard’s interest focused on Formula One motor racing. He observed that driver and
machine are joined seamlessly with the human acting as a double of his car, a projectile,
that allows the driver to experience life and death at the same time, and this experience
would let the driver feel alive.
However, the relationship observed between the driver and his racing car is
5
6

Smith, R. G. (2010). The Baudrillard dictionary. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Smith, R. G. (2010). The Baudrillard dictionary. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
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replicated in the less dramatic relationship between a person and his or her car. The
connection between object and person enables the experiencing of utopia through the
interstate highway, a path that “leads nowhere, but keeps me in touch with everyone”
(Baudrillard, 1989, p. 53). In America, he is particularly touched by the observation of
men running. In his engaging, poetic description of a man running, he describes the
activity as primitive, as an out-of-body experience performed to deny, even reject, the
subconscious perception of the simulacra by the American people. He even goes on to
compare a running man with a possessed spirit elevating the status of transcendence
through a meaningless act, that of running, to discover the meaningless end of his life and
life of everyone in an amazing textual construction, in my opinion:
Apocalypse. Nothing evokes the end of the world more than a man running straight
ahead on the beach, swathed in the sounds of his Walkman, cocooned in the
solitary sacrifice of his energy, indifferent even to catastrophes since he expects
destruction to come only as the fruit of his own efforts… [t]he jogger commits
suicide by running up and down the beach. His eyes are wild, saliva drips from his
mouth. Do not stop him. He will either hit you or simply carry on dancing around
in front of you like a man possessed. (Baudrillard, 1989, p. 38)
It all makes sense to me now. As I keep discovering the never-ending layers of simulation
that make up the Cary Street Gym, I can do nothing other than feel amazed by the prowess
of Baudrillard in his acute observations of the replacement of reality. As I gaze and gaze, I
unearth the layers of simulation until I reach what I see as the heart of the Cathedral of
Simulacra: the underground level where the baptismal fountain welcomes us all to be
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reborn in the hyperreal. A complete section below the surface of the earth has been dug up
to create what could have been in the past a water hole or a natural subterranean fountain,
but is today an aquatic facility.
To my amazement, there is a huge hot tub functioning as an appendage of a longer pool
that ends with another circular appendage. Not only is the temperature inside the belly of
the building different (warmer), but it also artificially controlled throughout the space as in
every building in America.

Figure 8: Baptismal Fountain. Digital images captured by the author using an iPhone® 4s “smart” cellular phone to show
the Cathedral of Simulation’s baptismal font.
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The water emanating from the hot tub is much warmer than the other pools, and the
water jets simulate a waterfall with pressure obtained from electronically controlled
engines generated by machines that are kept out of sight.
With the exactitude of a map, the design of the pools was intentionally made to
demonstrate complete control over the elements. The precision needed to construct a
building of this magnitude specifically devoted to the act of practicing sports, reminds me
of Baudrillard’s words when he describes Formula One racing. The desire to control the
elements indicates how important gymnasiums are within American culture. Meeting the
“vortex” made the Cathedral of Simulacra memorable. “The vortex” is the name I used to
refer to the appendage at the end of the lane that accents the pool. It is a circular
construction that has engines to simulate a mass of whirling water similar to a whirlwind,
which is designed to provide resistance to the people who choose to walk inside this area.
This is a temple, I keep telling myself, a temple devoted to worship, and the pools are the
baptismal font where we are born into a parallel reality that promises to be much better
than any reality previously experienced.
When I imagine the space empty, every day after midnight, with nobody inside, no
breathing souls, only computerized electronic systems to secure the environment, I think of
Baudrillard’s (1989) words describing the desert surrounding Las Vegas as a “sublime
form that banishes all sociality, all sentimentality, all sexuality” (p. 71). It is an empty
space void of meaning, sterile, and cleansed to keep the promise of exactitude we expect,
as clients, users, and worshipers of the Cathedral. It was then, in ruminating about the
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empty space, that the insight about the space and its level of simulation came to me. I
imagined the space and it fit Baudrillard’s (1986) description word for word:
[T]he silence is something extraordinary, as though it were itself all ears. It is not
the silence of cold, nor of barrenness, nor of an absence of life… A silence internal
to the Valley itself, the silence of underwater erosion, below the very waterline of
time, as it is below the level of the sea. No animal movement. Nothing dreams here,
nothing talks in its sleep. Each night the earth plunges into perfectly calm darkness,
into the blackness of its alkaline gestation, into the happy depression of its birth. (p.
71)
As I connected his words to my experiences with the space and in the space, it all came full
circle to me. Simulacrum was a fact and there was nothing I could do about it, or even
anything I would like to do about it, other than observe the phenomenon evolve and take
over. Reality has gone defunct; it is no longer accessible, except by means of scholarly
analysis or deep, systematically controlled observation. It is an illusion constructed on the
basis of disappearing images and reflections of reflections in the same fashion that a mirror
reflects itself on the mirroring surface of another mirror. “Behind every fragment of reality,
something has to have disappeared in order to ensure the continuity of nothing”
(Baudrillard, 1996, p. 3). And in order for this to take place, Baudrillard suggests that an
endless proliferation of images and screens must occur. The image can no longer reflect
the Real because the image for Baudrillard is the Real. In his book The Perfect Crime
(1996), he elaborates on the notion of simulation by arguing that images as representations
of objects have disappeared by becoming transparent to themselves, and, at the same time,
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entirely present to themselves in real time. Instead of being absent from themselves in
illusion, he suggests, “they are forced to register on thousands of screens, off whose
horizons not only the real has disappeared, but the image too” (Baudrillard, 1996, p. 5). It
is only through technology, Baudrillard argues, that the endless reflections can be gathered
to let us observe what remains of the world that once was real.
However, I would like to pause for a moment to reflect deeper on the function of
the Cathedral of Simulacra. I have observed that we go there regularly, and that our
behavior is similar, to a certain extent, to the way we behave inside any sacred space in
search of wisdom, spiritual clarity, and existential guidance, all of which ground us in
reality and ultimately provide a source of empowerment to exist in the Real. Yet, when I
analyze the reasons why we walk into the Cathedral of Simulacra, and if my observations
are correct, an equivalent source of wisdom, guidance, and grounding in a different reality
should be procured. When I walk out of a catholic cathedral I left with a sense of peace and
achievement. The cleansing process reboots my inner dialogue and I feel reassured. When
I walked out of the gym a similar sensation takes place but for my body. In spite of worn
out muscles and body damped in sweat I feel fine. We do both in the name of personal
improvement. But why? I ask myself. Why do we come to the Cathedral of Simulacra
other than to improve our selves, to cleanse our bodies and minds, and to ultimately
construct a better self? I will argue then that the main function of the Cathedral of
Simulacra is to improve our selves through the betterment of our bodies, or the betterment
of our avatars,7 a concept that I will deconstruct and analyze as my dissertation evolves.
7 From the Sanskrit noun avatāra meaning "to cross over"
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Yet, why is it that we need to go to a sacred place? Konieczny (2009) argues that “public
ritual carries social as well as religious meanings as shown especially in studies of objects
and spaces in which dramaturgy, practice, and bodily experience are emphasized” (p. 419).
According to Konieczny, these studies assume the importance of contexts for interpreting
ritual—contexts that include not only material, sensory, and bodily elements, but also the
social relations with which these are intertwined (Bell 1992; Brown 1991; Orsi 1985;
Turner 1982). She argues that even religious architecture and artistic representations used
in worship can contain social meanings alongside religious meanings; furthermore, these
meanings are replaced by new interpretations as they are passed from generation to
generation. New generations then reinterpret spaces, as well as objects, constituting a
remake of material culture, and, ultimately, of collective and individual identity. The
modifications procured by the reinterpretations of spaces and objects can “Disclose
changing, renewed, and or/remade identities; they are, in effect, socially informed aesthetic
responses to the past” (Konieczny, 2009, p. 421).
I will argue then that gymnasiums, such as the case of the Cathedral of Simulacra
can be interpreted as a secular temple where new generations not only construct,
reconstruct, and alter their bodies, but in doing so, live under the presumption that they can
control their identities.
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The Magic Mirror on the Screen
Queen: Magic Mirror on the wall, who now is the fairest one of all?
Magic Mirror: Over the seven jeweled hills, beyond the seventh fall, in the cottage
of the seven dwarfs, dwells Snow White, fairest one of all.
Queen: Snow White lies dead in the forest. The huntsman has brought me proof.
Behold her heart.
Magic Mirror: Snow White still lives, the fairest in the land. 'Tis the heart of a pig
you hold in your hand.
Queen: [repulsed] The heart of a pig! Then I've been tricked!8

I had religiously frequented the Cathedral of Simulacra during Fall 2013 as part of
my field research to develop this dissertation, and as I mentioned earlier, after my doctor
condemned me to the maintenance of a healthy lifestyle. I was never interested in playing
team sports, and when I did (I used to play basketball obsessively), I would play and
practice solo. I devoted hours and hours to shooting a ball into a hoop in hopes that it
would go through, and, when it did, the whole process began all over again. It was
nonsense, but being a creature of habit, in practicing basketball, I found peace from my
wandering brain. During my college years in the 1980s, gyms began to sprout up all over
the cityscape, and without hesitation, I joined one. I cannot recall how my body began its
transformation, except on one occasion when I felt a “bump” in the back of my arm. It was
a cold afternoon when I finally met my triceps, and I must admit that it was a nice day in
8

Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs. Prod. Walt Disney Productions, 1937. Transcript.
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the reconstruction of my identity. After many years of what may be described as an interest
in bodybuilding, the interest vanished and was replaced by the grind of daily life. Still, my
long, solo basketball sessions did not stop until much later when I injured one of my
Achilles tendons. I was in my mid-thirties, and decided to retire from the imaginary NBA.9
The reason why I include these anecdotes is because being part of the gym culture,
and the imaginary NBA culture, became integral to the construction of my identity. I was
in my design education years when the legendary Michel Jordan led the Chicago Bulls to
their historic victories. By the 1990s, Michael Jordan’s basketball games could be seen in
93 nations. This exposure was possibly due to the emergence of new communication
technologies, particularly direct broadcast satellite (DBS), which was launched into orbit
by NASA, thus securing control of broadcast messages. With names like Ted Turner and
Rupert Murdoch, and transnational companies such as Disney, Viacom, and Time Warner
creating satellite cable networks oblivious to geographical boundaries, the world had
entered a new era, one which complied with the order of the hyperreal inasmuch as it was a
territory covered by a new one made of electronic information that gave a sense of a
smaller world. The nineties was also a time when the professional basketball players
decided to rid their heads from bodily fibers as a fashion statement and go bald. I was no
exception. In a small town in the middle of the Andes, the removal of my hair was quite an
event. I was 21, or perhaps 22, and from that day on, my head has been shaved. Even
though my receding hairline has claimed as much space as possible, I maintain “control”
over the way I look. The lack of hair growing on my head has become an integral part of
9

National Basketball Association
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the way I construct my identity and that of my avatar. I construct one of many
representations of who I am as a result of a process of internalization, a process designed to
construct an image meant to reflect back to my consciousness that which I perceive in the
mirror. The internalization I experience in the mirror occurs in much the same way that
any other shining surface that claims to have the capacity of showing us who we “really”
are, monitors, screens, video, digital cameras, cell phones, even audio devices, are
designed to capture and reflect our selves, and then feed that perception, and therefore our
very personal “reality.” This is a process by which every individual constructs a visual
representation of the self for the other. The construction of one’s own avatar becomes
particularly evident when the Cathedral of Simulacra enters into the discourse. I argue that
this place could be theorized as a factory of avatars.
In an essay entitled “A Manifesto for Avatars,” Little (1999) introduces the notion
of avatar by indicating that the word “avatar” originally referred to the incarnation of
Hindu deities. Transferred to the realm of the computer, he argues, avatars have come to
mean “any of the various ‘strap-on’ visual agents that represent the user in increasing
numbers of 2 and 3D worlds” (p. 3). According to Little, the use of the term “avatar” to
represent the self or user in the context of shared online internet environments first
occurred in the early 1980s with the development of LucasFilm’s Habitat Project. The
term then became mainstream with the success of the Neal Stephenson’s 1992 novel Snow
Crash.10 Stephenson’s protagonist, Hiro Protagonist, discovers the name of a new pseudonarcotic called “Snow Crash,” which serves as a mediating agent to access what
10
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Stephenson dubs the “Metaverse.” Here, online participants have virtual bodies, and the
hackers can be spotted by the fine detail of their avatars, or virtual bodies, whereas the
general public can only purchase low-resolution avatars at Wal-Mart (Seneca, 1994). The
Snow Crash effects are apparently unique in that they are experienced in the Metaverse as
well as in the physical world. The blurring of boundaries between the two worlds is, I
argue, the distinctive characteristic that connects the world of fantasy with the physical
reality we are limited to experiencing with our senses. Or put differently, in his 2006 book
The Shape of the Signifier: 1967 to the End of History, Walter Benn Michaels describes
how the bodies of humans are infected by information they can’t read; the virus, he claims,
gets the words inside you even if you have not read them. Michaels emphasizes
Stephenson’s (1992) views that languages are codes rather than groupings of letters and
sounds to be interpreted. For Michaels, the transgression between worlds (as described by
fiction) is possible to observe today in different and emerging media. To illustrate the
transgressions taking place today, he uses the analogy between the digital virus and the
biological virus—between computer code and genetic code—and how when a body that is
infected by a virus does not become infected because “it understands the virus any more
than the body that does not become infected misunderstands the virus” (Michaels, 2006, p.
69). To clarify, one does not need to be conversant in different codes to be affected by
them. That is essentially what occurs when we create avatars to represent our bodies.
It is important to note that discussions of the nature of avatar are often mixed with
current cyborg theory (Haraway, 1991), a theory that I will refer to as my discourse
unfolds. However, in order to construct a clear picture of how I understand avatars in this
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project, it must be said that avatars are not the same as cyborgs. In a nutshell avatars are
representations of the person whereas a cyborg is both the person and its representation.
Avatars do not have a body whereas cyborgs cannot exist without a body. Avatars are
lifeless, inert matter, Cyborgs are hybrid forms of flesh and technology. Cyborgs can be
represented as avatars but avatars cannot be cyborgs as they are representations of organic
or hybrid forms.
That said, both avatars and cyborgs forge an alternative resistance and a set of
forceful conditions for imaging what Turkle (2005) has termed “the second self,” a concept
based in imaging, language, and psychology.
As I observe the people in the Cathedral of Simulacra, and how they move, act, and
interact, I can see a clear connection between the notion of avatar and what is actually
taking place today, any day, inside the walls of the Cary Street Gym. What is the main
purpose of people but to create a better looking, healthier, and more socially acceptable
self? To socialize in silence? To feel part of a larger community? I have no doubt about the
aforementioned reasons that stimulate a person to work on its body at the gym, especially
when I speak from my very personal and unique point of view, as if I could have another. I
am there to better myself, to control the levels of cholesterol and triglycerides in my blood
stream. But it does not end there; I am there for the social interaction too, or the lack
thereof. Even though we share the same space, as humans, we are isolated from others by
means of technology. An important number of people, including myself, are connected to
media through earplugs. We are isolated purposefully, yet sharing the same air. Why?
What is the purpose of this self-imposed isolation? Would it be reasonable to argue that
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we, the people inhabiting the space at any given moment in time as a collective
consciousness, are located in more than one reality at a time?
Perhaps my argument reads like science fiction, yet I argue that we do live this
way; we do exist in different realities simultaneously. Are these realities overlapping or
rather in conflict? I cannot but wonder and find out. Moreover, the spaces or realities that
we experience in any single time continuum are not limited to two, but are theoretically
limitless thanks to the design, construction, and nourishment of the avatars we create to
represent us. In order to better understand the notion of avatar that I am proposing in my
work, I need make a strong reference to a component of the avatar that is of vital
importance: the production itself. The avatar as reflective image depends on a medium to
come to be. The ontology of an avatar begins in the production of the reflected image, also
expressed in terms of a process that is defined as a codependency of language and code.
In his book The Mirror of Production, Baudrillard (1975) claims that the simulation
model for creating oneself is defined by its mode of production, and that it is determined
by the system of exchange of value, and more profoundly by its code: “[Man] can think of
himself only as something to produce, to transform, or bring about as value” (p. 20). By
transforming one’s self, value can be added as an intentional layer of meaning, yet in doing
so, we simultaneously become dependent on the image we construct. We become our own
phantasm. Baudrillard (1975) explains:
This remarkable phantasm is confused with that of representation, in which man
becomes his own signified for himself and enjoys himself as the content of value
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and meaning in a process of self-expression and self-accumulation whose form
escapes him. (p. 20)
Baudrillard’s (1975) reflection becomes evident as I analyze the roles that avatars play in
our lives, and how the reduction of the representation of the self to the limitations of an
image mediates our new forms of existence in electronic worlds. Even though Baudrillard
is discussing politics and the economy, I find his insights to be completely applicable to
the construction of identity in cyberspace, as the current systems of production have
shifted from mechanical to electronic; they have shifted from real to hyperreal and beyond.
In this role, the construction of the self as a reflected image adds value to the process itself.
As Baudrillard (1975) argues, it is not a question of “being” oneself but of “producing”
oneself (p. 20). The ultimate dimension of value and meaning, he indicates, relies on the
way a human being has “learned to reflect on himself, to assume himself, to posit himself
according to this scheme of production which is assigned to him” (Baudrillard, 1975, p.
19).
To complicate the point, Little (1999) explains that avatars are homogenous
representations rooted in prevailing constructions of successful commodification and
accumulation, for example: pop icons, juvenile fantasies, dumbed-down cartoon
characters, and racially pure, young, white “perfect bodies.” The avatar, he contends, is
being used as a tool for the “playful generation of territories of signification and
empowerment” (Little, 1999, p. 5). The juxtaposition of meanings presented by both
Baudrillard and Little when describing representations of the self assist the creator –a.k.a.
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operator—of the avatar in the process of accumulation of meaning, and ultimately in the
accumulation of power through representation.
If this holds true, then anybody can generate power through representation. My
experiences as a designer, an artist, and, above all, as an educator, confirm these theoretical
observations. When I go to the Cathedral of Simulacrum, I do gain leverage over my
consciousness, as the awareness of my body and mind become more acute. I feel lighter.
As a matter of fact, I have shed about 15 pounds throughout the development of my work
by regularly attending the Cathedral. I feel better as well, both emotionally and
psychologically. At the same time, I am acutely aware that this is all nonsense. Such a
realization becomes the dialectical force that helps me stay focused when analyzing the
experience. But who do we really care for? Is it my body or the man reflected on the
surface of the mirror that is meant to be consumed by others? Am I really constructing
myself as a physical manifestation of my consciousness, or is it the image reflected on the
surface of the screen or mirror that I am concerned about most? The distinction between
the two is relevant and significant.
When Little (1999) discusses avatars, he describes them as visual representations of
a corporeal body, a strap-on visual agent, he calls it. But what is more important is that the
use of avatars involves a pairing or doubling at a metaphysical, semantic, and dimensional
level, “between the corporeal and the immanent, language and thing, image and imaged,
mind and body, and we shall see, between self and commodity”(Little, 1999, p. 6). As a
commodity, avatars are drawn from the image database of advertising, fashion, and
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entertainment. Little connects the idea of the avatar and the social, cultural, and economic
aspects explaining its ontology in these terms:
These countless generic representations-big-breasted, small-waisted babes,
idealized perfect-skinned trim and tan hunks, Disney-derived characters, bowling
pins, smiley faces, coffee cups, exotic animals, and steroid-driven snarling, hardboiled war machines-are not just the tool of the user behind the screen, but convert
instruments of multinational capitalism. (p. 4)
There are then two principles governing the definition of avatar relevant to my argument
and the application of this theory to the works of art to come: 1) avatars are corporeal
representations of an individual in this or that space; and 2) avatars provide a source of
identity not for being oneself, but for producing oneself, from both conscious activity to
primitive productions of desire (Little, 1999). For Baudrillard (1979), the human species
comes to consciousness through the mirror of production at the level of the imaginary, and
by going through it, humans recognize themselves “objectively.” Yet, humans are engaged
in “a continual deciphering of himself through his works, finalized by his shadow,
reflected by this operational mirror, this sort of ideal of a productivist ego” (p. 19).
In regards to my theorization of the Cathedral of Simulacra, I have followed
Baudrillard’s (1979) reflections concerning the way in which humans devote time and
energy to construct the identities through the image they project, and more importantly,
through the way they interact with the reflecting surface to begin with. To visit the
Cathedral regularly entails a continual production and reproduction of the self. A continual
production and reproduction of desire for the self at a more subconscious level, I argue,
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places us in a constant battle to reduce the space between our physical presence in this
reality and the space where reflected image exists. We do all of this in hopes of breaking
free from the constraints of the reality where we are physically imprisoned. It is only when
we touch the medium where the reflection is constructed that we become aware of the
illusion. It is only then when the medium becomes visible that we can acknowledge its
presence, changing its function from container of meaning to access point into its structure.
Our body, as Baudrillard (1979) would claim, is like a Formula One racing car at the
height of performance, with our consciousness becoming one with the reflected image. I
find his observation particularly true inside the Cary Street Gym where people, informed
by the reflection in the mirror, go to cultivate their bodies. The reflected image in
combination with consciousness, as Baudrillard suggests, becomes a unity similar to the
racecar driver and his double, the Formula One car. The reflected image as perceived by
one’s self works simultaneously with the body, with “each propelling the other to extremes
without being really clear which is the engine of this meteoric advance and which merely
the other’s double” (Baudrillard, 2002, p. 166). For Baudrillard, the alliance between car
and driver creates a pact reconciled by “the phantasm, the spectra, the ecstasy of speed” (p.
166). When I analyze his reflections in relation to the Cathedral of Simulacra, and the way
a human being relates to his or her reflected image, I find this relationship to be equivalent,
except for the key difference that the pact is not about speed, but about power and control.
Speed on its own right is a form of power expressed in much deeper ways that the mind
can understand. Facilitated by technology, and particularly by nanotechnology speed has
become integral to the fabric of the every day life. From the flow of electronic money to
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the unprecedented speed by which personal romantic relationships begin and end
everything moves at the speed of light. Cutting one tenth of a second in the stock market
translates into billions of dollars moving from one pocket to the next. As the old adage
declares that “time is money” today I would argue that “speed is power”. The image
reflected in the mirror provides constant feedback to its referent, and by virtue of that
feedback, lets the “driver of the body”—or operator—develop a sense of power through
the nourishment of the image. In the same fashion that Baudrillard describes the racecar
driver merging with his double, the car, the image and its reflection in the gym no longer
have identities of their own. Baudrillard explains:
[C]ar and driver are merely a living projectile, whose purpose is to reach the goal.
Keep your sights fixed on the podium… [a] perpetual calculation. The projectile
has to be constantly regulated, corrected. Only in appearance is the circuit the site
of the competition. The competition takes place elsewhere – on the world car
market, in the driver’s popularity charts, in advertising and the star system. The
race takes place on a screen, the screen of speed. For in these extreme
reaches, speed is no longer exactly a spatial dimension but a screen on which the
driver has to move with the dexterity of a teleconductor. (p. 168)
After 45 minutes of running nowhere with my feet locked to a machine, I am sweating, and
the temperature of my body must adapt to the new circumstances it has been subjected to
in order to preserve a balance. The increasing temperature becomes even more acute at the
waist level due to the “sauna” band that is wrapped around my belly. Further north in the
territory of my body, earplugs feed me Adorno’s (1997) Aesthetic Theory, as read by a
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computer-generated voice. Reading long texts is, for me, more complex than solving a
Rubik’s cube. I found a solution to my problem in the services of digital interpretation. I
have had whole books transformed from scanned images of each page to live texts by
using optical character recognition (OCR) software, followed by a computer’s aural
interpretation of the text. In other words, “Robert,” the computerized voice, is reading
theory to me—including the page numbers and footnotes (with acceptable glitches). This is
possible thanks to ReadTheWords.com, which offers software that converts written texts
into spoken audio files. According to the site’s description, the company started in January
2008 and promised “to assist students with learning disabilities with their studies by means
of auditory learning and auditory processing” (para. 4). I must admit that I do feel like the
driver of the racecar. Whereas reading was pure and simple medieval torture, technology
has helped me cover five to eight hours of material per day through listening.
The machine I am riding like a maniac lets me know not only my heartbeat, but also the
number of imaginary loops I have completed, as well as calories burned, strides taken, and
many other forms of practically useless information. I cannot help but think what the same
numbers of any given person working in a cotton field all day would have been. Or what
about the numbers of a Chinese worker laying train tracks in the American West? In
addition to listering, a portmanteau of my very own creation to signify “reading with the
ears,” interesting argument: does the concept of textuality change partly in the process of
listening as against the reading? I am making a digital composition using my iPhone®
4s®, which is connected to the Long Term Evolution (LTE) network® cellular network,
and utilizes Adobe® Photoshop® Touch for iPhone®. I am combining a photograph
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captured with my phone with a previously hand-drawn paper illustration; this is
multitasking at its peak. While experts have concluded that multitasking is not possible, I
respectfully disagree, given the circumstances. Although, I cannot avoid wondering what it
is that I am doing here: listening to the convoluted ideas of Adorno, painting a picture that
is not one, running nowhere yet feeling satisfied because I am bettering myself. Damn!
What’s going on with me? Is this real? Am I one more interloper in the desert of the Real,
as Baudrillard would claim? Am I a character in a Jorge Luis Borges’s narrative? As soon
as I look up and attentively observe around me, I quickly conclude that I am not, and that I
am instead trapped inside simulacra sponsored by my very own desire to nourish my
avatar.
At the same time, I look downstairs and see the dialogue between a human and his
avatar; I see the fully engaged interaction of a person with his projected image (Figure 9).
It is taking place in front of one of the many mirrors that inhabit the Cathedral. These
mirrors serve as a medium where worshippers can keep constant dialogue with their forms
to ensure that the production process fits standards established by advertising, media, and
the art industry. The man I observe seems to be dancing at first, but as I pay closer
attention, I decipher that he is actually fighting. Could my point of view be any better?
This guy is fighting his own image to improve himself! Could this be more poetic? More
revealing? Is this a blissful insight or pure serendipity? The avatar/operator dances to
simulate a fight with himself in a representation of what boxers would call “shadowing.”
Shadowing is an exercise used in training for combat sports to prepare the muscles for
later, stronger physical activity. Boxers do not talk about playing one another; boxing is a
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contest and a battle, but rarely a game. It is hierarchically organized, strictly monitored,
painstakingly mundane, and tightly sequenced (Hoffman, 2006). The man I observe is
simulating a fight to represent the concept of “shadowing,” but he is not shadowing, per se;
he is simulating it. The act of simulating a fight with his very own image is an act of
performance.

Figure 9: Shadowing Self. Digital images captured by the author using an iPhone® 4s “smart”
cellular phone to illustrate the relationship between body and reflection as it is constructed inside
the Cathedral of Simulacra.
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Therefore, what I captured with my camera that night in the Cathedral of Simulacra
is a clear and concise example of what Lacan (1960) identifies as the mirror stage, only
what I observed was in a context other than Lacan’s infamous child discovering his or her
own image. According to Lacan, the mirror stage marks a critical and defining moment in
a subject’s psychic development. It contributes to “a form of its totality” in the subject’s
spatial identification of itself (Lynch, 2008). Lynch (2008) analyzes the construction of the
ego as it is proposed by Lacan from a Hegelian perspective (dialectal reasoning) to assert
that it is only after the recognition of the image constructed by the mirror and assimilated
by the brain that we are capable of constructing our identity and consequently develop
social interactions.
Additionally, in analyzing Lacan’s mirror stage, Lynch (2008) observes that the
mirror stage “establishes the framework for inter-subjective illusion” (p. 216). My rather
light musings on Lacan’s theoretical construct regarding the development of the human
psyche serve a very specific purpose: to establish the irrefutable argument that the
reflection of one’s self as a means of representation plays a fundamental role in the
construction of a reality. I must emphasize that this is a reality, one reality, a reality
defined in the interest of this project as the space between subject and object, between
image and person. One reality is but an endless number of possibilities that range from the
purely theoretical to the strictly phenomenological. Ultimately, the function of the space I
am proposing in my work is to allow the production of the other as ICEVORG, the
conceptual creature that goes beyond avatar and cyborg using the spaces opened in
between texts. This opened space is medium as well as form, a concept that transgresses
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both worlds, both realities, that of the physical body and the mental construct where
identity finds the notion of self as other.
In his book Screened-Out, Baudrillard (2002) argues that with the arrival of modernity, we
entered what he calls “the age of production of the Other” (p. 51). He uses the “age of
production” to refer to a new form of identity construction facilitated by means of the
production and the reproducibility of originals, ad infinitum. When he refers to the notion
of the Other, he talks more specifically about “otherness” as the psychological projection
of the Self developing an awareness of the lack of individuality in a society where we are
fed the same media. We aim to produce the “Other” as a form of resistance to what is
perceived as an imprisonment to the symbolic value of the image. Pawllet (2010), with
regard to Baudrillard’s Otherness, suggests that with the technology of cloning, the
separation, the confinement and control of reproduction images’ deaths can finally be
eliminated. Pallet argues that, for Baudrillard, through the endless reproduction of the
image the “individual is reduced to his abstract and genetic formula to be “nothing more
than a message” (p. 46). We have entered a time in the history of humanity when meaning
is abstracted from the production of Otherness, and the person as a single irreproducible
entity has been destroyed. We are no longer limited to existing in a single space in a single
time. The evolution of media from a cool to hot medium has dismantled the limitations of
reality (McLuhan, 1964).
Still, the avatar as representation and medium is equivalent to the space in the eye
of the storm, the void, the silence that is surrounded by the spinning force of meaning—of
the human fighting against his reflection in the mirror. The avatar is, therefore, a space
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outside of the world, but inside of it as well, as Baudrillard (1997) suggests when he
describes Otherness. For this project, the avatar is the space in-between and the
background that engulfs the image, as well as the image itself. The physical perception of
the image is televisual, where the perception of the image becomes an extension of the
body. The reflected image becomes virtual reality, and by virtue of this transformation, it
escapes the laws of the real world. The image never dies. As Baudrillard argues, it turns
into a phantasm, an eternal entity, trapped in what I call the realm of our collective avatar.
The realm of our collective avatar is a parallel transgressing reality where avatars never
die, for they are images nourished by images. It is a transgressive space where death is not
an option because the life of an image has been reduced to its reproduction. In this project,
I conceive of Mary Shelley’s (1818) monster in Frankenstein or the Modern Prometheus
as a metaphor for avatars, and as such the concept of avatar has gained a life of its own.
We no longer control our avatars; they control us. Avatars, just like the monster, are
neither dead nor alive. Pawlett (2010) suggests that death is a form inseparable from life,
one which runs parallel to it. Liberation from death is a far more terrifying concept than
death itself; liberation does not await us at the end of life, but accompanies us faithfully
and implacably within it.
Pawlett (2010) conjectures that clones of the future may well pay for the luxury of
dying and becoming mortal once again in simulation, in cyber-death. He explains: “Where
previous generations have suffered alienation, future generations face an infinitely worse
prospect: the horror of never knowing death” (Pawlett, 2010, p. 55).
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“Is this really possible?” I wonder. Perhaps there is nothing beyond theoretical
observations. Reality is reality after all, right? But then something terrible happened in my
family—an event that will help me illustrate in a much more efficient way the intellectual
observations I attempting to construct. It is based on a rather macabre anecdote that Edgar
Allan Poe would have loved to transform into a short story: my cousin was murdered by
her avatar.
Yes, she passed away. She died young, leaving behind small children. We did not
really know each other well, as we lived in different parts of the country. Our experience
together was limited to her staying in my house for a few days thirty years ago. However, I
knew she grew up, became a physician, got married, and had three kids; or were there two
kids? Regardless, all I know is that her image lived in my head more as a referent to her
mother—my mother’s cousin— rather than as a referent to the woman herself. As a
parenthetical note, her image qualifies, in fact, as an avatar. Her image is a referent for the
person who was the source of the reflection and the space in between as well—the subject
and object combined in the form of an avatar. As I said, she was young, probably in her
thirties, married, with a great future ahead. However, as the story goes, her vanity played a
trick on her.
She was one of three siblings. Her older brother is a relatively famous plastic
surgeon in the coastal city where they live. This aspect is key to understanding the story
because the notion of self-image and the preservation of beauty is a rather important
cultural constituent of the identity of the people from this particular area of Ecuador. In the
same fashion than Venezuelan women have to live under the burden of the cliché of being
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“the most beautiful women on the face of the Earth,” women from the Ecuadorian coast
grow up with a similar cultural construct for developing their individual as well as
collective identities. To procure a more beautiful body—from her perspective—my cousin
decided to subject her body to plastic surgery. Keep in mind that, as I explained, I am
referring to a well-educated, and well-off, young woman with a great future ahead of her.
Her mother, my aunt, who is a practicing psychologist, did not approve of her getting
breast implants to fulfill her desire to construct this better image of herself. She was not
supportive of the notion of her daughter incorporating artifacts, augmentations, between
her body and her avatar (visual representation and medium) to construct what I am sure she
believed was a projection of a better self. Unfortunately, my cousin would not give up on
her desire and convinced her brother, the plastic surgeon, to proceed with the operation
without anybody else’s knowledge. So he did.
As the story goes, the procedure went as planned. There was nothing significant to
report beyond the fact that her parents did not know about the surgery, and that the
recovery process had to take place in hiding so they would not find out. At this point,
everything becomes sketchy for me. All I know is that there was a problem; some form of
virus invaded her body in the operating room. In order to avoid confrontation with her
parents, she did not let her brother know about the infection, or her family for that matter.
She was a doctor, after all. Unfortunately, before anybody could do anything about it, the
infection took over her body, moved to her heart, and she passed away. It was the first real
tragedy in the family. It was so nonsensical, so hard to understand, so absurd, so ironic. A
tragic story that could have satisfied Poe’s hunger for the macabre and inspired me to write
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a work of flash fiction that you can find the appendix section. Needless to say, her parents
were emotionally devastated, and her brother felt guilty to the core. The loss of life as a
result of her need to better the reflected image and her body as a medium meant that they
became her own worst enemies.
What I noticed upon her death was that her Facebook® profile page kept receiving
endless posts from people publishing messages, “addressing” her as if she were still alive,
as if her consciousness had never left. It was then that I realized what was happening that
people were having what I believe to be a true and honest dialogue with the avatar of a
fallen angel. I do understand that it is a form of demonstrating respect to her relatives, even
a nice way of preserving her memory for her children, but were the people visiting her
page and writing comments addressed to a dead person correct in doing so? Were they
sane? Were they serious? It has been three years since she died, and people still publish on
her Facebook wall, addressing their commentaries and salutations as if she would be
reading them. Baudrillard’s theories are valid! Reality does not exist anymore. Simulation
has taken over and avatars only need to be created, fed, and then they take over from there.
The avatars we create and craft are immortal.
In Ernest Becker’s (1973) Pulitzer Prize-winning book, Denial of Death, he argues
that humans are terrified of their own mortality, and, consequently, avoid the topic.
Escaping the inevitable has been a goal of humans throughout history, Becker claims, but,
humans never really escape what he describes as “death anxiety,” which evolves into forms
of representation that attempt to define a more permanent presence in the world. Humans
have developed tools ranging from storytelling to virtual reality to evade the existential

96
reality associated with death. Death and immortality are major recurrent story themes
across all media (Blascovich & Bailenson, 2012).
In his article “Ghosts in the Machine: Do the Dead Live on in Facebook?” Stokes
(2012) argues that online memorialization and mourning practices somehow license the
claim that the dead “live on through their online presence” (p. 363). Moreover, Stokes
argues, the online persistence of the dead helps bring into view a deep ontological
contradiction implicit in our dealings with its symbolic apprehension. Since we are
obliged to redefine what constitutes a body, a person, and a self in the era of virtual reality,
identities remain anchored to the medium wherin they had been imprisoned in order to
exist. Identity is just like a genie inside a bottle, except that no amount of rubbing the
container will bring the inhabitant out into the world; we can merely see, through the
relative transparency of the bottle, the power of the spirit trapped inside. The bottle and its
transparency are key elements for the construction of the concept of ICEVORG. In the
same fashion that our bodies are restricted to the physical world and to abide by its natural
laws, avatars inside electronic parallel universes, such as Facebook, must abide by the rules
and regulations established by the creators (programmers) to secure a place, and therefore a
presence, in that particular realm. “But what happens when the source of that light is
extinguished, and when the users behind the online identities die?” Stokes inquires (p. 4).
In response to Stokes, Max Kelly, Facebook’s head of security, indicates that even though
they [Facebook] wanted to be able to model people’s relationships on the platform, there is
not much they can do when the actual person is not around anymore to be able to log on
(Kelly, 2009). Facebook first decided to do nothing, but later on provided an option to
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keep profiles as online memorials “allowing other users to post tributes and messages,
sometimes speaking of the dead in third person, sometimes in second person” (Stokes,
2007, p. 5).
This is when things become interesting for me as a scholar attempting to
understand the construction of identity in today’s world. I am fascinated by the interaction
that takes place between the undeniable electronic ghost that stays behind once body and
mind have ceased to exist, and the related people left behind the threshold of uncertainty
involved in the whole process of death.
This is especially interesting in the case of my deceased cousin, whose friends still
post messages addressing her as if she would be able to respond. I take this interaction
between avatars—Facebook profiles—and living people as proof that reality has broken
free from the constraints that were unquestioned before. More importantly, I argue that the
naturalization of such interactions between the avatars of the deceased and living human
beings inhabiting electronic parallel realities is extremely fragile. These interactions are
evidence of the acceptance of a shattered reality where imagination may be the new
normal. The resulting hybrid world between fiction and reality can only be realized in the
relationship among the medium, avatars, and organic human beings.
In a 2012 article entitled “R.I.P. Remain in Perpetuity. Facebook Memorial Pages,”
Kern, Forman, and Gil-Egui assert that the relationship between the Facebook profile
pages of members who have passed correspond to ritualistic behaviors “akin to behaviors
performed at wakes, burials, and cemetery visits. The difference is that these discussions
and rituals are public, virtual, eternal, and direct” (p. 3). Kern et al. describe what Ricoeur
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(2004) notes as the third level of memory about the dead, which is the dialogue between
the mourner and the deceased. They explain,
Ricoeur argued that memorialization of the deceased occurs within and by the
mourner, between members of a group, and between the mourner and the deceased.
The dead never really die: but rather are perpetually sustained in a digital state of
dialogic limbo. (Kern et al., 2012, p. 2)
Kern et al. (2012) indicate that mourners, through the interaction they have with the avatar
of the deceased, remove themselves from the death of the individual, and, as a group, they
highlight that which is most important by writing a socio-cultural history of the individual.
The authors claim that “the group consciousness recalls individual memories that help to
support the constructed social memory (Halbwachs, 1992; Zelizer, 1995), satisfying a need
for both the individual and the collective in the remembrance process” (Kern et al., 2012,
p. 3). They also indicate that profile pages of the deceased serve the same purpose as
tombstones and urn vaults in as much as they provide family and friends a place to visit, to
decorate, to turn the place into a shrine in their honor, a public place to have a private
dialog with the dead either internally or externally.
Finally, for Ricoeur (2004), there are three spheres where memories exist: the
individual, the collective, and a place somewhere in between, “an inter-temporal plane.”
In his book Memory, History, and Forgetting, Ricoeur indicates that the individual and the
collective exist in a temporal and historical place, while the inter-temporal sphere includes
new narration formed through subconscious dialogues and dream states. These memories
are not necessarily based on the facts of a course of events or actual lived experiences;
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rather they are fictionalizations created without oneself (Kern et al., 2012). What I find to
be the most interesting aspect contributing to the argument I am constructing is the notion
of “inter-temporal plane” as a space in between narratives that allows for the formation of
parallel worlds, and therefore the possibility of entities, or theoretical constructs, inhabiting
said spaces. I contend that a new form of avatar results from the identities we create online.
It is rather obvious to understand how the perception of an avatar still reflects and feeds the
idea of “presence” in electronic worlds such as Facebook or Whatsapp. Admittedly,
accepting the idea that the avatars we create gain a life of their own in the same way that
Shelley’s (1818) Frankenstein does may be a bit more challenging to grasp.
When Ricoeur’s (2004) reflections about the function of memory in relation to the
perception of image go further into the depths of semiotics, it all begins to make sense. He
argues that memories are images, enigmas, which serve the purpose of presentation and
representation, presence and absence at the same time. He explains,
…[W]hat is there to say of the enigma of an image, of an eikon –to speak Greek
with Plato and Aristotle- that offers itself as the presence of an absent thing
stamped with the seal of the anterior? (Ricoeur, 2004, p. Xvi)
To elaborate on this concept of what an image is in relationship to memory and how to
solve the enigma, Ricoeur borrows the metaphor of the block of wax from Protagoras, a
pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, who was credited by Plato to have invented the
professional sophist. He was believed to have created a significant controversy during his
time by stating, “Man is the measure of all things,” meaning that there is no truth but that
which individuals deem to be the truth. Protagoras’s metaphor reads:
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Soc: Please assume, then, for the sake of argument, that there is in our souls a block
of wax, in one case larger, in another smaller, in one case the wax is purer, in
another more impure and harder, in some cases softer, and in some of proper
quality.
Theaet: I assume all that.
Soc: Let us, then, say that this is the gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses, and
that whenever we wish to remember anything we see or hear or think of in our own
minds, we hold this wax under the perceptions and thoughts and imprint them upon
it, just as we make impressions form seal rings; and whatever is imprinted we
remember and know as long as its image lasts, but whatever is rubbed out or cannot
be imprinted we forget and do not know. (North, 1921, p. 187)
He describes the metaphor as a way of representing the challenges posed not only by the
way our brains construct memory and forgetfulness, but more importantly how we develop
knowledge resulting from the relationship between the brain and the context in which the
acquisition of the imprints take place. I argue that Protagora’s wax is a medium equivalent
to contemporary electronic social media, such as Facebook, or any electronic medium for
that matter. We use these media with the purpose of establishing a presence in a territory
that belongs more to the realm of imagination than to a physical reality subject to the laws
of nature. To declare a territory and to become immortal has always been a constant pursuit
throughout human history. Perhaps we have achieved it already thanks to cyberspace, or
perhaps it is all an illusion— mere reference to a reality that is no longer accessible, or
even worse, a reality that is only accessible to those of us who can wear an avatar as a key
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to other dimensions. The time has come to define what I mean by “avatar,” and how the
theoretical construct I will present in the following pages is integral to the concept of
ICEVORG.
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CHAPTER THREE
How I Met God’s Avatar

As part of my professional teaching experience at Saint Olaf College in Northfield,
Minnesota, where I worked for four years as an assistant professor of New Media Arts, I
had the opportunity to travel to Europe in January of 2011. I applied to become a mentee
under the guidance of Professor Eric Lund who was then director of the college’s study
abroad program. Professor Lund had conducted a course comparing the Catholic Church
and the Lutheran Church by lecturing at sites across Europe where relevant events took
place. Being a mentee entailed observing a lead lecturer, and his or her way of teaching a
course abroad. After I lived that experience, I referred to the study abroad program as “the
ultimate Power Point experience.”
Aside from the joke, it is important to note that this methodology for teaching
eliminates the borders between presentation and representation, which usually raise
challenges to classes that are far-removed from the actual locations of the people and
places they describe. Approaching education in this way dismantles the gap, mental and
real, and allows true knowledge apprehension to take place. That is at least my opinion on
teaching. As a matter of fact, I think that is the only way education should be approached
and conducted, yet I understand all the constraints that physical reality –let alone economy- imposes on the education system.
In addition, I had never, as we say in Ecuador, “saltado el charco” before. This
expression could be translated as “jump over the puddle,” meaning to travel to Europe.
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Hence, the experience was unique in every sense of the term, and very memorable.
Everything was, to a certain extent, new to me, yet it had the familiarity embedded in
travelling that one acquires through experience, that is: standardized airports with
overpriced and limited selection of foods, uncomfortable, noisy airplanes that demand
one’s full trust in airspace technology, and everybody, with the exception of the people
who work in the stores, in constant transition and therefore transformation. I was about to
engage in the exploration of one reality that I had never experienced before, and I planned
to approach it in the best possible way. I decided that the trip I was about to embark upon
was going to be part of my research into the pursuit of reality, an intellectual pursuit that
would be incorporated in my doctoral dissertation as a phenomenological experience. This
pursuit sought to find out how close Europe—as a concept—was to the idea I had formed
of it in my head over the years using nothing but media (printed and kinetic). To finally be
able to see with my very own eyes images that were, for the most part, represented in
books became a magnificent way to test Baudrillard’s (1981) theoretical claims on the
Real. That is how I came to meet two women who were always near and dear to me:
Michelangelo Buonarroti’s Pietà and Leonardo Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa.
From the get go, I traveled with the intention of capturing reality, both
metaphorically and literally—or at least a sense of it. The decision to take my digital
camera with me was probably one of the most complex decisions I have ever made. I was
fully aware that I wanted to capture reality with my sensorium as the main, if not the only,
tool for achieving that goal. After three decades of taking photographs, and I am talking
about hundreds of thousands of images, I was completely aware that the trip could easily
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become an image-hunting trip instead of an experience to add to the “wax” of my mind, as
Protagoras theorized. I thought about it, thought again, and again, yet, I could not do it. I
could not part with my camera. My decision to take the camera with me resulted in
approximately 12,000 images collected over a period of about five weeks. I must say that I
did a great job resisting the temptation to turn the experience into an infinite storyboard of
my travels in Europe. However, I based my decision, read as “I found a valid excuse,” in
the reflection that this particular visit to Europe may be the only one that I would be able to
experience in my lifetime. This visit ended up not being the only one, as I made it back to
Milan in 2014, but that is a different story.
I began the experience in Rome, where I visited historical sites and began
conducting phenomenological research by collecting samples of what I considered to be
manifestations of something that Baudrillard (1981) claims to be long gone: the order of
the Real (as opposed to the Hyperreal). I decided that the best way to approach this search
would be to pretend to be an alien, which I am, a legal one, but an alien nonetheless. As an
alien, I would collect samples of physical matter, such as objects, that I could put inside
plastic bags to document my presence in space (see Appendix B). Not content with this
method alone, I also decided to exchange energy with the world I came to experience by
using my sensorium, as well as phenomenology, as the means to conduct research for the
my dissertation.
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In his text Introduction to Phenomenology,11 Sokolowski (2000) describes
phenomenology as “the study of human experience and the ways things present themselves
to us in and through such experiences” (p. 2). Phenomenology is significant, he argues,
because it deals, in a very thoughtful way, with the problem of appearance. The problem of
appearance is a problem that may be as old as the history of philosophy itself; that is, when
we understand philosophy as the human mind’s ability to produce abstract thinking and to
project it outside the realm of the body. It may be even more important today because the
notion of defining objects according to what they seem to be in the modern electronic era
has become a tremendous challenge for philosophers and scholars alike. Appearances have
been multiplied and magnified enormously, Sokolowski argues, as they have ventured
outside the scope of spoken or written words into the world of new media. Sokolowski
explains:
We generate them [appearances] not only by words spoken or written by one
person to another, but by microphones, telephones, movies, and television, as well
as by computers and the Internet, and by propaganda and advertising. Modes of
presentation and representation proliferate, and fascinating issues arise. (p. 3)
The term “phenomenology” has come to be erroneously considered an approximate
synonym for “intention”; however, these two terms should be differentiated inasmuch as
the intention of phenomenology entails the act of thinking rather than the act of doing.
Intention, for phenomenology, applies primarily to the theory of knowledge, not the theory
of human action (Sokolowski, 2000). We have to make the intellectual adjustment and
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understand the term as signifying primarily mental or cognitive, and not practical,
intentions. “In phenomenology, ‘intending’ means the conscious relationship we have to an
object,” he indicates (Sokolowski, 2000, p. 8).
My interpretation of Sokolowski’s (2000) arguments is one that understands
phenomenology as the act of constructing the object in my mind, and how it relates to my
consciousness through my senses, not how it could be constructed by my memory. It is
essentially a “consciousness of” or an “experience of” something or other. All of our
awareness is about objects, the construction of experiences of my presence in space and
time, and the relationship my body can construct –and does construct- with the physical
world. In an attempt to simplify the complexity of such a grandiose theory of perception, I
argue that phenomenology could be reduced to the single mantra that states:
Consciousness is consciousness of something; consciousness is consciousness of
something; consciousness is consciousness of something. Such is illustrated by the
fact that by repeating the sentence three times, it becomes an idea in the reader’s
mind. Before the iteration of the sentence, the thought had no mental image.
This reductive mantra assumes that repetition can realize/embody an idea and it is
important because it becomes a foundational intellectual construct about human ontology;
plus, I find it to be of great importance when analyzed under the lens of history.
Sokolowski (2000) describes how crucial it is to understand the concept of
intentionality/consciousness from a historic perspective:
Intentionality and consciousness do need to be asserted, because in the philosophy
of the past three hundred of four hundred years, human consciousness and
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experience have come to be understood in a very different way. In the Cartesian,
Hobbesian, and Lockean traditions, which dominate our culture, we are told that
when we are conscious, we are primarily aware of ourselves or our own ideas.
Consciousness is taken to be a bubble or an enclosed cabinet; the mind comes in a
box. Impressions and concepts occur in this enclosed space, in this circle of ideas
and experiences, and our awareness is directed toward them, not directly toward the
things “outside.” (p. 9)
Phenomenology argues that consciousness of an object results not only from reasoning and
our mental impressions, but more importantly from direct experience with the object itself
through our senses. It is rather important to the construction of the theoretical framework
for ICEVORG to understand phenomenology as a process of awareness. Said process is
rooted in intentionality as an act that includes mental constructions of meaning in
conjunction with the experience of the physical world. These two ideas together are of
great significance to my dissertation. Throughout the development of my argument, I will
continue to reinforce the idea that phenomenology allows us to construct a reality that is
not merely an illusion that may disappear inside our minds, but a hybrid construct between
what our minds can mentally construct and what our senses perceive in the physical world.
I am making use of phenomenology as a tool to grab the world, so to speak, and to analyze
the function of ICEVORG as a medium for art-making, one which is rooted in the notion
of being “aware of” and/or “being conscious of.” As a final remark, in spite of the
complications that electronic technology brought us, phenomenology allows us to have a
world in common through a reality that may be subject to shared experience.
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Put simply, if we do not have a world in common that we can analyze and
experience, Sokolowski (2000) argues, we cannot enter into a life of reason, evidence, and
truth. We have free license to live our lives as mere individuals capable of turning our
mind to our “own private world, and in the practical order we do our own thing: the truth
does not make any demands on us” (p. 10). Therefore, I needed to prove that there was a
“real” world in Europe, and not just a mere illusion that resulted in the adoption of the
phenomenological perspective that I just introduced. I needed evidence. Using a plentiful
supply of zip bags that I brought from Minnesota, I began to collect evidence whenever I
had a chance. “But, what to collect?” I wondered. I needed to define certain criteria. The
evidence had to be something that could not only prove that I was actually in Europe (for
the benefit of my project), but also prove to myself that I was really there, too. The answer
would come a few days later when my mind cooled off and the jetlag dissipated.
Ever since I set foot in Europe, I decided to exchange energy with the objects I
came across. Why? I could argue that it was divine intervention, a Eureka moment of my
very own experience, but it wouldn’t be true. I preferred to take sides with Thomas, one of
the Twelve, the one who was called the Twin, the one who said according to Saint John,
“Unless I see in his hands the mark of the nails, and put my finger into the place from the
nails, and put my hands into his side, there is no way I will believe” (John 20:25 King
James Version).

109

Figure 10: Touching. Documentation of phenomenological research during my trip
through Italy, Germany, and France. January 2011. All the images captured by the author.

It took me quite a few days to adjust to Europe. The adjustment was not so much in
terms of jetlag or culture shock, but in terms of grasping the idea of standing on the same
ground where so many historical figures stood; these are figures who live scattered in my
mind as some sort of fuzzy image, though some exist in high definition. I was standing in
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the territory lit by the same sun that nourished Roman emperors, popes, artists of the
caliber of Michelangelo, Caravaggio, Rubens, Leonardo Da Vinci, even self-proclaimed
Christians who were devoured by hungry lions to satisfy the morbid curiosity of the
people. I was impressed by the physical fact that I was standing on historical grounds. At
some point, I thought I was absorbing too much information at once, and I thought that I
would collapse. How am I supposed to be objective while feeling imprisoned by an
overloaded sensorium? How am I supposed to find out if Baudrillard (1981) is correct
about the Hyperreal in a place where everything seems to be as old as history itself? How
am I supposed to tell what is real and what is not in a place like this where everything
around the body is perceived as the real thing? How am I supposed to unearth evidence
from a place that has not been covered by a better rendering of itself (Baudrillard, 1981)?
On the other hand, a place that preserves its original objects –or so it claims-- is the ideal
laboratory to better understand what phenomenology is all about, and how it informs and
shapes the theoretical construct I am calling ICEVORG. It is quite reasonable to suggest
that the places I visited contained primary sources to be perceived with a
phenomenological approach and under the theoretical notion that I stood before real
objects.
The phenomenological movement fits the twentieth century like an old glove. The
work that is generally considered to be “true” phenomenological work was developed by
the German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859 –1938). The specific work that established
Husserl as a key player in the history of philosophy was his copious seminal text, Logical
Investigations, which was split into two volumes (Sokolowski, 2000). In interpreting
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Husserl, Sokolowski indicates that phenomenology is “the study of human experience and
of the ways things present themselves to us in and through such experience” (p. 2).
Phenomenology is particularly influential for my work because it handles the problem and
importance of appearance in regards to extensive technological dissemination of images
and words. Everything seems to become pure appearance in today’s world of mediated
communication. Sokolowski elaborates upon his interpretation of phenomenology by
formulating the problem of appearance according to three themes: 1) parts and wholes, 2)
identity, and 3) presence and absence. I will elaborate on these three components further
into the text, but I must first make sure the notion of phenomenology is well understood, as
said concept is vitally important to understand ICEVORG.
The term “phenomenology” is a compound of the Greek words phainomenon and
logos. It refers to the action of giving meaning (logos) to various phenomena and the ways
in which things appear. “Phenomena” here refers to the elements present in any given
context that can be grasped by the sensorium to become part of our consciousness. In other
words, phenomena are the information that travels from our sensory apparatus to our brain,
where they become intentionality (Cerbone, 2006; Sokolowski, 2000).
In his book Understanding Phenomenology, Cerbone (2006) explains that
phenomenology is concerned with the ways in which things show up or are manifested to
us, and with the shape and structure of the manifestation. Perception, he explains, is “a
form of manifestation but not the only one,” yet the forms of manifestation are neither
arbitrary nor idiosyncratic; rather they are “essential structures, irrespective of whatever
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the causal underpinnings of experience turn out to be… these structures must be delineated
in such a way that are themselves made manifest in experience” (p. 7).
For Husserl (1913), phenomenology may be reduced to intentionality, once again
understanding intentionality as the capacity of the human brain to connect direct inferences
to the experience of an object and to derive meaning from those experiences. However, we
do not only refer to objects that are in our immediate presence. When we talk or refer to
something that is absent, we are talking about the image constructed in our mind of an
object that has previously established a sensory experience. Human thinking is such that it
transcends the present and conjures the absent—what is not there yet exists in our mind.
That is one of the reasons why understanding phenomenology becomes a more complex
and challenging task. For Sokolowski (2000), in phenomenology there are seven different
kinds of absence corresponding to concepts that intentionality can take on: 1.) the absence
of the other side of things we perceive, 2.) the absence of things meant only through words,
3.) the absence of things being remembered, 4.)the absence of things only depicted, 5.) the
absence of those “who are far away as opposed to the absence of those who have died,”
(Sokolowski, 2000, p. 8), 6.) the absence of the past and of the future, and 7.) the absence
of the divine.
The disparity between the actual object, and the possibility of assigning inferences
or referential meaning to the experiences of said objects, is what creates a problem in
understanding media today. Yet, that same fuzzy territory is also the precise one that
allows ICEVORG to become a valid conceptual proposal. I find the fuzzy spaces existing
in between structures, the spaces through which fiction invades the space of reality and
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reality of fiction, the most interesting location for examination. Both accounts of the
construction of signification require a structural framework, as Sokolowski (2000)
indicates. For him, there are three structures that appear constantly in phenomenological
analysis. As he explains, “If we are aware of these forms, it will be easier to understand
what is going on in a particular passage or the development of a particular theme” (p. 22).
The first form is the relationship between the parts and the whole; the second form is the
structure of identity in a manifold; and the third form is the structure of presence and
absence. “The three are interrelated but they cannot be reduced to one another,” he
explains (p. 22). In other words, to analyze an idea, theory, or experience under the
scrutiny of phenomenology, one must understand that the three structures are selfcontained. Just like a Swiss army knife, it is the object that exists and contains the whole,
the parts, and its identity as such, including the name, the way we sound it, and the mental
image resulting from the combination of all the structures once they have been captured
and experienced by the senses. Without touching, using, or even cutting yourself with a
Swiss army knife, phenomenological analysis of what constitutes a Swiss army knife is
simply impossible.
Understanding Europe from the perspective of phenomenology would not have
been possible without my adventures through the streets, cafes, and museums, and the
sounds, scents, and images I perceived in all those places. Evidently, this perspective
invites a very big question in terms of what reality is today when we are able to “know”
Europe, or Israel, or the North Pole, or the moon by immersive virtual reality, new and
electronic media, the Internet, and social networks. Therefore, in order for me to turn my
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exploration of the places I traveled through Europe into reality, I needed to touch, smell,
see, taste, and hear reality. Still, the challenge of capturing reality became an even more
daunting task. How should I collect evidence—real hardcore evidence—of my presence in
these new realities? I decided to do two things: first, to touch “reality” in terms of objects,
to smell elements, and to activate my senses (as many as I could) in order to experience
Europe through a phenomenological lens. Second, content, but not fully satisfied, with my
approach, I focused on collecting a piece of evidence that was a container in its own right.
I found the answer I was looking for in DNA.
By placing my hands on objects that were centuries old and activating the sense of
touch, I became aware that I was indeed exchanging thermodynamic energy. The energy
that my body generates when touching the physical object I selected as evidence tries to
find a thermodynamic balance. The sense of touch detects forces that stimulate the body’s
surface, which in turn activate mechanosensory cell types to tune in and respond
selectively to stimuli, such as vibration, stretch, and pressure. The sensing of force is
fundamental to the development and survival of multicellular organisms. The forces
applied to the skin are encoded by touch receptors. The function of touch is likewise
essential for coping with behaviors that range from avoiding bodily harm to social
exchange (Lumpkin, Marshall, & Nelson, 2010). For instance, touch receptors in our
fingertips are important for the fine tactile acuity required to manipulate objects with high
precision. More importantly, the sense of touch does not begin and end on the fingertips,
but extends to the whole surface of the body.
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The sense of touch functions whenever people take hold of something and move it
in some fashion. For example, it functions when one lifts a phone to grab it from one of the
pockets in a pair of pants, or when one operates one of the exercise machines found in the
Cathedral of Simulacra. Sense of touch is even at work when one is playing with a
Microsoft® Kinetic12 Xbox 360® game console, wherein one becomes the literal
embodiment of the controlling device—an action that apparently removes the mediating
agent, but in reality only removes the physical structure, as it is reinterpreted by the use of
infrared light invisible to the naked eye. Touch, one could argue, is an extension of sight, a
non-visual impression of spatial dimension and certainly of physical existence in space and
time (Turvey, 1996). According to Turvey (1996), this kind of touch is referred to as
“dynamic touch” or “kinesthetic touch” (p. 1134). What sets dynamic or kinesthetic touch
apart from other forms of touch, he argues, is the prominent contribution of muscular effort
and its sensory consequences. When touching does not take place and we are forced to
determine the existence of an object by only relying on our sight, we have to deal with a
different set of challenges. Size constancy for instance, Turvey explains, is an ancient and
essentially unsolved problem in the psychology of perception:
How can people see that an object is of the same size when they change
their viewing distance relative to the object? The problem is thought to be
created by a mismatch between the size of the object and the size of
something else that the perceiver uses in order to perceive objects. The

12

Kinect is a motion-sensing input device by Microsoft for the Xbox 360 video game console based around a webcamstyle add-on peripheral. It enables users to control and interact with the Xbox 360 without the need to touch a game
controller.
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something is the retinal image. As an object recedes, its retinal image
shrinks. The most common solution supposes a mental computation in
which perceived image size is multiplied by a perceptual measure of
distance to obtain the object’s actual size (e.g., Epstein, 1982; Kilpatrick &
Ittleson, 1953). Many years of experimentation have found that visual size
constancy is inexact, becoming worse with increasing distance. (p. 1141)
In other words, the further one stands from the object the more challenging it would be to
estimate the length of it by sight, let alone attempt a phenomenological investigation of any
object under these circumstances. This inexactitude, to use one of Baudrillard’s (1980)
favorite terms, is particularly important as it pertains to the theoretical framework for
ICEVORG. I will argue that it is the gap between sensory apprehension of the Real world
and the way we visually perceive it in our minds that provides fertile ground for
ICEVORG to take place and transgress boundaries through metalepsis or the strange loop.
In addition, it is particularly interesting to note that in the same fashion there is a
gap between the perceived length of an object and its physical extension when it comes to
how heavy we perceive an object to be as opposed to its actual physical weight. Weight
refers to “the force with which an object is pulled earthward” (Turvey, 2006, p.1141.)
Turvey (2006) elaborates by stating that Ernst Weber (1834-1978) determined what came
to be known as the first quantitative law in psychology, which was based on perceived
heaviness. In other words, an object’s perceived weight is dependent upon the size and
mass of it as captured by sight rather than the weight sensed by lifting the object.
According to Webster, that discovery laid the foundation for what is today referred to as
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“psychophysics,” and marked a fundamental shift in the field of psychology by the middle
of the 19th century.
In 1891, the French physician Augustin Charpentier confirmed Weber’s argument
when he proved that larger objects of the same weight are perceived as lighter. To illustrate
the disparity, imagine a large box that when compared to a smaller one of the same mass is
perceived by the brain as if it would be lighter. This phenomenon is called “the size-weight
illusion,” and can be observed with other aspects as well, for instance with color; a metal
container is perceived as lighter than wooden containers of the same size and mass, and
darker objects feel lighter than brighter objects of the same size and mass (Camp, 1917).
Finally, Turvey (2006) explains that the brain’s commands for force, which are needed to
move objects, are used in a “mental procedure that reveals a mismatch between the forces
expected to be appropriate and those that are actually needed” (p. 1142). In a more downto-earth description, anyone can recall lifting something that one thinks is heavy, yet upon
exercising excessive force, one finds out that the brain was wrong in its appreciation,
resulting in an excessive amount of force put into one’s muscles. Such misjudgment
ultimately generates the “whoops” expression that usually happens in these cases. Most
dramatically, Turvey argues, these anticipations in our mental mechanisms that combine
predetermined experiences of correct-false expectations are very different from “the
understanding that the perceptions one gets through dynamic touch and unique functions of
mechanical stimulation” (p. 1143). Put differently, the argument is that we cannot go
through life using only our sensory apparatus in spite its ability to connect us with what we
construct as the Real.
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In summarizing the previous pages, I argue in favor of the use of touch as a sense
that allows us an enhanced, more accurate apprehension of the world, which thus allows
for the construction of what we perceive as “reality.” This is also how I usually explain to
my design students why we feel the urge to touch an object, even though the linguistic
expression to request such an action is “Can I see?” In fact, we make this request as we
stand extending our hand, expecting to grasp the object to determine its Cartesian existence
in time and space. To touch, I argue, is to accept the existential reality of an object and to
bestow the object the potential for carrying meaning. As I will elaborate later his
observation is fundamental to understanding one of the conceptual constituents of an
ICEVORG, and the role of this seemingly secondary principle (since we take touch for
granted) becomes important to validate and accept today’s electronic technology as
integral to the fabric of reality.
Based on the fact that I wanted to experience Europe using a phenomenological
approach, as soon as our trip began, I decided to touch, smell, taste, and hear everything
that seemed to me to be real. This was especially true for those instances where I could
verify –though it was remarkably difficult to rely on the tour guides-= the authenticity of
the objects we were directed to see and/or to admire (see Figure 10). Among the students
who joined the course, I quickly became the “weird art prof” who hugs trees and collects
rocks, dust, leaves, and seeds. I was the “weird art prof” who did these things in addition to
maintaining a constant flow of digital captures and drawings in a notebook I took with me
to represent my “blank slate.” Interestingly enough, I made a key observation in the
construction of ICEVORG inside a crowded Sistine Chapel surrounded by guards who
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relentlessly repeated, “NO PHOTO!!! NO PHOTO!!! NO PHOTO!!!” The corridor
leading to the Sistine Chapel was basically the entrance to the secret cave of Ali Baba and
the Forty Thieves, as described in the world-renowned work of fiction One Thousand and
One Nights. In the story, the character Ali Baba13 discovers, by mere coincidence, the
secret words necessary to access the cave where loot is stored. As described in the tale,
upon paying the sixteen-euro fee that will “open sesame” the place, I walked inside the
cave and found myself appalled when I encountered such an enormous pillage blessed by
the Holy Catholic Church in the name of their Almighty. The first thing I noticed
was…everything! Even though the place was well-kept and well-organized, the amount of
artwork, overpriced souvenirs, brochures announcing promotions and sales, and people—
so many people—created a flood of information to my sensorium. People were taking
pictures in spite of the constant warning—pictures ad nauseam! Everybody was moving
with the urgency of paranoiac squirrels with too much caffeine. Everyone felt the urge to
capture every special shot to nourish their gargantuan digital collections, never be seen
again by human life, yet treasured as undeniable proof of their visit to the headquarters of
Alighieri’s Heaven (pun intended).
There was a moment when I got so upset by the situation that I seriously thought
about addressing a letter to the Vatican suggesting that no cameras should be allowed
inside the space so the experience could be a bit more solemn, more respectful, and more
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Ali Baba (Arabic:  ﻋﻠﻲ ﺑﺎﺑﺎʿAlī Bābā ) is a character from medieval Arabic literature. He is described in the adventure

tale of Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves ()ﻉعﻝلﻱي ﺏبﺍاﺏبﺍا ﻭوﺍاﻝلﺃأﺭرﺏبﻉعﻭوﻥن ﻝلﺹصﺍا.
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memorable. It was God’s territory after all. I did not address the Vatican. Writing this
correspondence remains a task on my never-ending to-do-list since I left God’s golden
prison. Was I the only one having difficulties absorbing it all? Was my ADHD playing a
major role in terms of how overwhelmed I was feeling? I therefore began to wonder how
my brain worked when it was subjected to an overexposure of that level.
The sensorium is defined as the sensory apparatus or faculties considered as a
whole. In his audio lecture series entitled Philosophy of Mind: Brains, Consciousness, and
Thinking Machines, Grim (2008) explains that the function of the sensorium is to capture
what he describes as “sense-data,” or raw information from the environment. Sense data,
he explains, contain no meaning; each unit of sense datum exists not as a material object,
but as a sense impression perceived by one or more of our senses. As explained in the SEP:
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2004), sense data are the alleged mind-dependent
objects that we are directly aware of when we perceive them, and that have exactly the
properties they appear to have. This notion is relevant to my project insofar as I argue that
the idea of sense data, or raw data, is directly related to the idea of using phenomenology
to make sense, to understand, and to ultimately construct the reality we choose to
experience on a daily basis. Many philosophers reject the notion of sense data, claiming
that perception gives us direct awareness of physical phenomena rather than “mere mental
images.” However, when I use the term “sense data” for developing the concept of
ICEVORG, I must say that I abide by the standard definition of sense data, which defines
it as a sense impression, or a stimulus to one or more of the senses that is imbued by the
following characteristics:
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1) Sense data are the kind of thing we are directly aware of in perception;
2) Sense data are dependent upon the mind;
3) Sense data have properties that perceptually appear to us.
According to the SEP, there is consensus in the world of philosophy when it comes
to accepting that perception “makes us aware of something.” Whether that something is
translated into direct or indirect awareness, however, continues to be debated among
scholars (Jackson, 1977). Sense data make us aware of something by means of sensory
stimulation. In order to be able to codify and decode the sensory input we receive, we need
a mind to do it in the same way a car needs an engine to be able to convert gasoline into
energy, and subsequently motion. Things cannot exist unperceived. Intellectually grasping
the concept of “existence” in tandem with that of “awareness” is key to understanding the
concept of ICEVORG. To summarize, what I identify as sense data is strictly in alignment
with the definitions put forth by the SEP (2011), which states that sense data are also
sometimes called: “mental images,” “ideas,” “impressions,” “appearances,” or “percepts.”
The SEP also claims that sense data refer to the properties that perceptually appear to us as
qualities that an object possesses that make it such. As exemplified in the following: “If I
perceive a tomato, and it looks red and round to me, then redness and roundness are
properties that perceptually appear to me” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011,
para. 4). This holds true, according to philosophy, even if the sense datum is the result of
an optical illusion as a byproduct of a chemically induced hallucination, in which case I
would be experiencing a tomato-like sense datum.
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As an introductory note disguised as marginalia, I must add that for the purpose of
this study, there are two schools of thought regarding how sense data are theoretically
constructed. I will simplify them here and further elaborate on them as the discourse of my
project moves into the construction of its theoretical framework. For the purpose of my
investigation, and for further development of this project, I accept the concept of sense
data as existing “whenever a person perceives anything by any of the senses, and also
whenever a person has an experience qualitatively like perceived, such as hallucination”
(Huemer, 2011, para. 1). This stands in contrast to what other philosophic perspectives
describe as the impossibility of existence of sense data—a school of thought called “direct
realism,” and one which denies the validity of sense data on the grounds that perception is
limited to the sensorium being directly aware of physical phenomena and only physical
phenomena (Dancy, 1995; McDowell, 1994). To embrace the idea of sense data as units of
sensory stimulation that can be constructed in the physical as well as mental world is
fundamental to my argument.
Regardless of whether sense data are seen as mental constructs, physical
manifestations only, or something in between, what is undeniable is the necessity of the
sensory apparatus to process the external input that our consciousness is constantly
receiving. Considering that the sensory apparatus is made out of organic matter in constant
transformation, it is capable of failure, exhaustion, and certainly overstimulation. Macaluso
(2010) explains that every day, our brain is bombarded with a multitude of sensory signals.
Some of these signals are relevant and require in-depth processing, while others need
filtering. Selection and filtering operations are two main functions of the attention control
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system. Macaluso then explains how the brain determines the value, so to speak, of any
input (sense data), and defines how much attention for processing the information is given
at any moment. Using the filtering process, our consciousness then can define goals for
taking action involving a specific behavior (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Kastener &
Ungerleider, 2001).
According to Macaluso (2010), our motor systems generally operate toward one
spatial location a time: “We can direct our gaze toward a single position at a time, and we
typically reach out to grasp an object at a single position at a time (or maximum two, for
bimanual reaching” (p. 283). Imagine a counter on any given bar where two objects, a
glass of red wine and a bottle of beer, are placed on top. What Macaluso indicates is
basically that one cannot see the glass of red, desire to take a sip, and reach for the bottle
the beer sitting ten inches away from the glass of wine. However, what is more important
to understand in this particular context is how both elements, the glass of wine and the
bottle of beer, are perceived in a phenomenological way. From the perspective mentioned
before, both elements are units of sense data that can be experienced by the brain only
when they are grasped. By virtue of not touching the bottle of beer but the glass of wine,
the “real” phenomenological experience is only realized with the wine, while the sense
data coming from the bottle of beer remains in a world of abstract thinking. In other words,
to have a phenomenological experience, one must use the senses to activate meaning. It is
very important to recognize the existence of the space between the phenomenological
experience and the way our abstract thinking capabilities construct the notion of the
experience. Not only does phenomenological experience exist in the space in between, it is
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also capable of activating responses in the brain in the same fashion it would when the
sensory apparatus is put to use.
Comparing my experiences between the initial approach to the Sistine Chapel and
the subsequent one, I walked through the Vatican with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s
reflections on space, perception, and phenomenology, as they are found in his seminal
work The Primacy of Perception (1964). Merleau-Ponty speaks of the importance of the
structure of events, and the peculiarities of scenarios where the perception of a work of art
is constructed by the brain. He argues that a work of art changes the light of the field
where it appears, and by virtue of this, it opens a dialogue between space and object.
It changes itself and becomes what follows; the interminable
reinterpretations to which it is legitimately susceptible change it only in
itself. And if the historian unearths beneath its manifest content the surplus
and thickness of meaning, the texture which held the promise of a long
history, this active manner of being, then, this possibility he unveils in the
work, this monogram he finds there—all the grounds for a philosophical
meditation. (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 179)
The main purpose of my visit to Vatican City is to encounter the potential philosophical
meditation Merleau-Ponty (1964) describes, and as I walk toward the iconic heart of the
building, the Sistine Chapel, all I can do is fight against my own need to touch the artwork,
smell it, even taste it. However, everything is crowded with art, and sensory overload
quickly takes over. At that point, I wonder how the electronic input coming from hundreds
of cameras being activated by the push of a button affect the functioning of my brain. So
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many pieces of the very best artistic objects ever made by our species stand before me. Are
they real? It would be reasonable to argue that we assume that reality is presented to our
senses by default. It is exactly what Maurice Merleau-Ponty explains when he argues that
one needs only to see something to know how to reach it and deal with it. Remember the
glass of wine and the bottle of beer? Even if one does not know how such complex
processing of the internal machine takes place at the level of the nervous system, he says
“We only see what we look at” (p.162), and we see by the movement of our bodies
oriented in space. By assimilating what we look at, and the way our bodies interpret the
space where they are located, we construct the world, the Real, in time and space. As we
move, so does our reality. As Merleau-Ponty (1964) explains:
In principle all my changes of place figure in a corner of my landscape; they
are recorded on the map of the visible. Everything I see is in principle
within my reach, at least within reach of my sight, and is marked upon the
map of the “I can.” Each of the two maps is complete. The visible world
and the world of my motor projects are each total parts of the same
Being. (p. 163)
However, as I walk towards the Sistine Chapel, those objects and spaces that I see are
indeed within my reading distance; that is, within the distance from which my eyes are
capable of perceiving. On the other hand, the tension created by social expectations and
the context of a place filled with artwork, in addition to my desire to experience life using
more than my sight (I want to touch everything), becomes almost unbearable. What to do?
How do I resolve this internal debate? How can I attest to what I am seeing as real when I
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cannot reach out and touch the matter around me? Do I have to settle for capturing the
image of what I am seeing? Do I capture the image even though this act will put me even
further away from the possibility of touching the work of art, smelling it, experiencing it as
sense data from the perspective of phenomenology? Do I have to push myself into
accepting sense data as a mental construct? In the midst of my brainstorm, I finally arrived.
I walked inside the Sistine Chapel ready to meet Michelangelo’s God and to meet God as
Michelangelo.
Published in 1910, a text titled The Sistine Chapel, written by Paul Schubring,
describes the place as disappointing in terms of what one would expect from the Pope’s
private chapel. The simplicity of its interior is “faintly lit and almost lusterless” (p. 7) he
writes, no pillars, no gold, bronzes, marble but sparingly used, and only the pavement
showing a pattern of colored stones rich in the difference of its material. From the
perspective of this place where the Pope and his cardinals have celebrated countless church
festivals, and where new Popes become elected, it is hard to understand the restraint
associated with the place Schubring describes as “where we, more than anywhere else,
might expect a manifestation of Papal power” (p. 7). I certainly agree with his observation.
Perhaps I should argue that there is a similar disconnect between the glare simulated by
contemporary media and the actual physical place. Yet, my scholarly intention of my work
is not an attempt to describe or analyze the Sistine Chapel, but rather to provide an account
of my phenomenological experience with it.
To make what could be a very long story short, let’s fast forward to the point where
I am standing inside the Chapel, right underneath one of Michelangelo’s revered
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masterpieces, overwhelmed (again) by the number of people attempting to take pictures of
everything14. A river of people kept flowing, running really, just like whitewater hitting
stones down the stream, through the space. I don’t know where to look, and I am quite
interested in the human megaphones who keep a constant flow of “no photo” directives
coming out of their mouths using an obvious Italian accent. The place is crowded with
images, and Eric Lund, the leading professor of the course, is trying to lecture a group of
about fifteen students about the chapel amidst the chaos. I keep looking for the icon I am
here for: Michelangelo’s depiction of God reaching out to touch Adam’s hand. Where is it?
The place, for a second, stops feeling sublime as it quickly shifts to hell on earth, or at least
a sneak preview of it. I keep looking for it, but it is nowhere to be found, nowhere. To
doubt for a second was enough to face complete failure. I said to myself this is not the
Sistine Chapel containing the painting that I have seen at least one billion times in several
different media. This cannot be it. I kept walking in complete certainty that the Sistine
Chapel must be right beyond the doors at the end of that huge, crowded, noisy room. I
walked through, and by the time I realized the reality of my mistake, I was out of the
chapel. The space became modern as if I defeated time. I was facing the souvenir store and
Vatican City’s post office. Seriously? Really? Really? Really? “God is playing a trick on
me,” I said to myself. I lost my chance to see “His” hand reaching Adam, yet I was
surrounded by representations of it all over the place. Did this really just happen to me?
Yes, it did. I found myself standing in front of books, postcards, t-shirts, key chains, candy,
posters, and every possible form of paraphernalia. Here were hundreds of representations
14

These are people just waiting to be persuaded through the tacit aural sign of “NO PHOTO” as it is repeated over and
over by several guards.
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of the Real thing, endless signifiers of the signified itself. I couldn’t believe my eyes. I
missed God. What a metaphor for life. In fact, oh my God, I missed the hand of both Gods:
Michelangelo and his Boss.

Figure 11: God’s finger on print. Several images captured around the gift shop in Vatican City’s Postal Office.
Images by the author.

Once the awe and frustration of my experience diluted, I bought an overpriced
postcard (above) and shipped it to my kids, telling them that I love them from the
headquarters of the Almighty. I shipped another copy to myself, writing on this one a
summary of the unique event just described. To this day, I treasure this unique memento
that reminds me of the Sistine Chapel, and the beautiful metaphor that I was gifted by life.
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I was still confused though, confused to the extent that I got lost from my group, so I
wandered by myself.
Once again, without meaning to, I made a startling discovery. I found another one
of Michelangelo’s avatars: The Pietà, although, it was not the real deal but its avatar. I will
return to this story in the following pages. First, let us go back into the corridor and walk
again towards the Sistine Chapel. Yes! For a second time, I found my way into the river of
people flowing towards the chapel. I was not going to miss it again. God was giving this
poor creature a second chance to make peace with himself. I was raised Catholic, after all;
hence “I must have some form of advantage over other tourists,” I thought. Consequently, I
found myself in what I then knew to be the Sistine Chapel. It was the same space and the
same chaos, but on this occasion my brain had the right set of expectations and informed
my body to move through the space looking for images in the midst of a sea of paintings.
The painting I was looking to experience was not an Imax®-sized one as I expected it to
be, but one of the hundreds of paintings overpowering the architecture of the chapel. Why?
Why so many? Was it a matter of politics? What was going on?
According to Clements (1961) the painters of Siena incorporated a guild where
they declared themselves to be “the instructors of the uncouth and the illiterate” (p. 80). At
the same time, the Second Council of Nicaea15 allowed the use pictures in churches, but
stipulated that the compositions of the pictures should not be the invention of the artist, but
should follow the rules and traditions of the Church. From my perspective of designer and
art educator, I must add that this particular detail is of extreme importance, as one could
15

It met in AD 787 in Nicaea to restore the use and veneration of icons (or, holy images), which had been suppressed by
imperial edict inside the Byzantine Empire during the reign of Leo III (717–741).
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argue that churches were not only places devoted to sacred rituals of veneration, but, more
importantly, they were thresholds to Heaven as constructed by the Church. Churches,
temples, and cathedrals were meant to function as effective pedagogical tools to educate
the masses about the virtues and punishments expressed in the Holy Bible. In Clements’
(1960) words, “Even in Michelangelo’s time, almost everyone who saw his Sistine Chapel
paintings considered them automatically as sermons in pigment rather than creations of
beauty divorced from didactic purpose” (p. 80).
When I read Clements’s words in tandem with my very own experience of the
artwork housed in churches, I cannot avoid thinking about a possible equivalent in today’s
terms for laymen, or the “uncouth and illiterate,” who have become a seamless unit with
electronic means of visual representation. I observed then and there that IMAX®16
technology, which reached the public originally as a pedagogic tool, may have carried a
more sinister intention, that of depicting one unquestionable reality from a perspective that
was only possible when any layman chose to enter an Imax® “temple of science.” I am
comfortable in claiming that if during an “IMAX® experience,” as it is now promoted, an
audience member walks out after watching a documentary on the International Space
Station, he or she will claim with solid reassurance that what he or she just “experienced”
is indeed the truth. The audience member will claim this even though we most likely will
never ever have a chance to see the globe from beyond its atmosphere in “real”
phenomenological circumstances. The IMAX® illusory experience (or is it?) has already
been exceeded by the immersive discourse of 3D moviemaking, not to mention the 3D
16
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IMAX® experience. In other words, our current IMAX serves the same purpose of “truth”
delivery as the Sistine Chapel was intended to do.
To further support the argument of the Sistine Chapel as a “real” experience,
Clements explains that artists used an artistic technique known as “foreshortening,” which
has no accredited inventor. Foreshortening, to borrow a reductionist definition from the
dictionary, is to show an object or view as closer than it is or as having less depth or
distance, as an effect of perspective or the angle of vision. In Clements’s words,
Michelangelo “learned that the faces had to be made proportionally larger as the figures
were placed higher, so that the work might appear most proportionate to the eye. Such ease
in handling foreshortening resulted from the fact that ancient artists kept their
measurements in the eyes” (Clements, 1960. p. 31).
Danto (2001) writes in his article “Seeing and Showing” that the intention behind
the technique of foreshortening is to “represent the world the way it looks spontaneously to
un-instructed perception. Foreshortening, chiaroscuro, perspective, physiognomy—these
were discoveries that enable pictures to look like what they represented” (p. 5).
As Danto (2001) explains, improvements in the representational skills used to get a
better representation of reality were from that of the hand rather than from that of the eye.
The intention was to leave no room for doubt about the mediation of the Church between
earth and the power of God. The representation of images on the walls of churches had to
reach such a level of authenticity among people that no one could challenge the notion of a
parallel world that belonged to the imagination, one which was a derivative of literary
narratives from the book identified as the ultimate truth: the Holy Bible. In other words,
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the technique of foreshortening was a major breakthrough in the representation of reality.
As Danto (2001) explains,
If it is right but looks wrong, it is wrong. If it’s wrong but looks right, it’s
right. One has to conclude that foreshortening became central in the sixteenth century and then became an artistic commonplace. Tiepolo, in the
late eighteen century, foreshortened effortlessly, since, after all, so many of
his commissions were for ceiling decorations: even a drawing by him looks
as though seen from below. It had become part of the lingua franca of
realistic representation. (p. 6)
In the article “Narration in Motion,” Thomson-Jones (2012) argues that the sense of
movement used in moving images is best understood as an “experience of imagining
moving. This is in light of the fact that we are neither under a felt illusion nor in the grip of
a false belief in motion” (p. 33). Our basic ability to distinguish whether it is us or an
object before us that moves when we move is what opens the possibility for what
Thomson-Jones defines as proprioceptive illusion. The proprioceptive illusion involves
projecting one’s sense of motion onto the image itself, an illusory sense data that is
possible, she argues, in the immersive experience of an IMAX film. She states:
In a scene filmed by mounting the camera on a speeding car as the car
hurtles over a precipice, we may literally feel our chairs tipping forward as
our stomachs drop. But without the enormous and enclosing Imax screen,
actual sensations of movement may be rare. This may change with the
recent development of sophisticated 3-D screening mechanisms. (p. 34)
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In relation to my argument, I contend that the experience of visiting the Sistine Chapel was
phenomenologically equivalent to what our sensory apparatus can grasp in IMAX® and 3D
IMAX® experiences.
On a similar note, Ross (2012) claims that it was James Cameron’s 2009 movie
Avatar that promoted the popularity of this re-emerging enhanced medium. Ross refers to
Marks’s (2000) work on intercultural cinema wherein Marks theorizes a concept that she
defines as “the ‘skin’ of the screen” that produces narrative modes only in close
consideration with the interpretation of the image (Ross, 2012, p. 383).
Marks argues that 3D film technology redefines the space that traditional cinema
put in between the screen and the audience. Whereas traditional cinema is, by comparison,
equivalent to the technique of perspective developed in the past to render the
representation of space, new film projection technologies, such as IMAX or 3D film, invite
a more involved sensory response to the film’s content. Ross (2012) refers to it as “haptic
perception,” elaborating that haptic perception is “the combination of tactile, kinesthetic,
and proprioceptive functions, the way we experience touch both on the surface of and
inside our bodies” (p. 162).17
Considering all that I just explained, let me put myself back into my second
encounter with the Sistine Chapel. There I am, still a bit overwhelmed by the people, the
crowd, the environment, and the endless “no photo” announcements that rain like cats and
dogs on this April afternoon. This time, however, I take the time to explore further,
visually, and I strive to expand my phenomenological experience of the chapel. At that
17

See also Barker, J. M. (2009). The tactile eye: Touch and the cinematic experience. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press.
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point, I decided to incorporate sounds, smells, and temperature into the experience. It was
reality, after all. My eyes scan the walls from bottom to top, from top to side, from side to
top. My body walks about and spins. My neck does its job and my eyes keep “grazing” the
space, as Marks (2000) would say. I finally find it. It is the rather small painting right
above my head. It does make sense, doesn’t it? Where else could God be if not right above
my head? I have seen God, and my experience now is a phenomenological one. New sense
data had been incorporated into my consciousness as I became fully aware of the image,
the space, and the relationship among us. I have not only seen God, but something beyond,
something more transcendental: I have seen God’s avatar.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Avatar Is the Message
In the previous sections of this study, I briefly explained a few core ideas of what
an avatar is. It is now time to go into this concept in depth, and discuss the ontology of
avatars and how this construct has evolved as a result of the never-ending progress of
electronic communication technology. Having a well-defined understanding of what an
avatar is for the construction of the ICEVORG is especially important, as it will help me to
explain the role of postmodern art today, and how it is one of the few entry points into
experiencing the Real.
In her book Avatar Bodies: A Tantra for Posthumanism, Weinstone (2004)
provides a concise definition of avatar by indicating that the word “avatar” comes from the
Sanksrit “avata¯ra,” meaning the divine descending so as to assume human or animal form.
In mythology, the reason why divine entities reincarnate is to “perform tasks, in order to
establish pedagogical relationships with human beings, and as means to experience play in
duality” (Weinstone, 2004, p. 118). Weinstone claims that the avatar is a being that
participates in human life, yet remains distinct in both an evolutionary and an ontological
sense. In Hindu mythology, one of the functions of avatars is to exemplify how to live in
this world in order to eventually transcend it. When avatar is described in Tantra18 or Hindi
mysticism, it does not make any distinctions among the human, the material, the animal,
the psychic, or the divine, but instead works along syncretic gradations. In Weinstone’s
words:
18

Tantra |ˈtantrəә| a Hindu or Buddhist mystical or ritual text, dating from the 6th to the 13th centuries. Adherence to the
doctrines or principles of the tantras, involves mantras, meditation, yoga, and ritual.
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[Avatar] works along baroquely conceived gradations from subtle to gross,
expanded to contracted, involuted to evoluted, static to kinetic, active to passive. It
addresses rituals and practices to a baroque variety of cosmic expressions or
manifestations… [T]here never was a “first,” nor will there ever be a “last” cosmos,
nor will there ever be a period at which the universe will have reached a static
phase of total disintegration or total integration. (p. 77)
From this perspective, an avatar is a form of expression that breaks free from the
constraints of time and space; one could argue that it is a mere conduit of consciousness
among realities. In addition, I must add that Tantric cosmologies, as presented by
Weinstone (2004), view reality as an all-inclusive experience that engulfs everything,
“including deities, rocks, humans, words, sounds, images, gestures, powers, and
personalities, as ontologically related, modal expressions of a single, heterogeneous real”
(p. 118). An avatar, under these circumstances, refers to circulating active modalities or
expressions of reality that are present everywhere, or have the potential to transgress
boundaries that otherwise could not be penetrated due to the limitations imposed by the
ontology of a particular medium. The overarching aim of Tantric practice is “to involute
expressions such as sound, image, gesture, powers, and personality and in doing so, learn
to transit from one modality to another, accessing the intrinsic relatedness of everything”
(Weinstone, 2004, p. 118). Accordingly, I argue that an avatar’s natural state of being
renders it a two-part unity, comprised of medium and message. As such, the avatar
provides the appropriate constituents to begin a discussion about its ontology.
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In his book Interface Fantasy: A Lacanian Cyborg Ontology, Nusselder (2009)
explains the concept of “avatar” by stating that, in Hinduism, avatars are the incarnation or
embodiment of a goddess. However, to move his discourse away from a potential religious
interpretation, he continues that avatars are, more importantly, symbolic embodiments of
“the changing states someone lives through” (p. 134), “bridges” between dimensions. I am
inclined to claim that they are nothing but interpretations of the Real, where bodies cannot
exist due to spacial-temporal limitations but avatars can thanks to their ephemeral and
ethereal nature.
Avatars are made of thoughts. Nusselder (2009) asserts that a better way to
understand what an avatar is involves approaching it from the point of view of a Lacanian
ontology. For Lacan (1950), the Real represents a psychological time prior to the symbolic
(linguistic) order, and prior to linguistic consciousness—that is, prior to having awareness
of language and its potentialities. Lacan contends that language “cuts into the smooth
façade of the Real creating divisions or gaps” (Fink, 1995, p. 24). The resulting interstices
are the medium where interpretation can take place, and where other forms of symbolic life
can thrive. Lacan is “presenting the limits of language and experience as symbolic
representation in the face of the Real” (p. 134). It is the symbolic language that is capable
of creating an alternative “reality” parallel to that of the physical world. Such a reality
results from things that have not previously existed entering the process of symbolization.
For Lacan, the Real exists prior to language; it is “that which has not been yet symbolized”
(p. 25). Once language has become integrated into our consciousness, then any form of
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representation could be defined, in Lacanian terms, as an avatar (Nusselder, 2009). In
Nusselder’s (2009) own words:
Both online forms of self-representation (‘personae’) and (anterior) ‘forms’ of the
self in Lacanian theory (I see myself as…, I think of myself as…, I idealize myself
as…) can be considered avatars. We can play with these ‘forms’, reshape and
reform them in virtual space of images and of symbolic codes—which is also the
“stuff” of cyber space (remember that Sherry Turkle [1995] draws a parallel
between the virtual self of a psychoanalytic session and of online play). An avatar
in a virtual world may give a unified form to tendencies otherwise experienced as
discordant and disturbing, just as the identification with the virtual image does in
Lacan’s theory of the mirror stage. By picking an avatar, I can formalize certain
tendencies (for example eroticism, aggression, animality) that remain otherwise
dark and obscure. (p. 91).
Nusselder (2009) then explains that an avatar in a virtual world is equivalent to Lacan’s
(1950) theory of the mirror stage inasmuch as the process of discovery and identification
with the image takes place. The difference between the avatar and the mirror stage,
however, is that the avatar goes beyond the physical limitations of reflection. By selecting
an avatar as Nusselder just argued, “I can formalize certain tendencies that remain
otherwise dark and obscure” (p. 91), thus aligning with Lacan’s point that the obscure
aspect of the self comes into being in the externalization of it. It is in the avatar, Nusselder
elaborates, that one can come to recognize his or her “‘unconscious intentions’; they do not
exist as such before their ‘materialization’. Therefore, the unconscious ‘happens’ at the
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interface” (p. 135). This observation is fundamental to the conceptual framework for
ICEVORG. Since the interface, the inter-face, or the space in between, becomes a
foundational mental construct. The ICEVORG allows for the interplay among the other
components of the theory, with the idea of the “unconscious” becoming the protagonist of
my dissertation. I will elaborate more on this idea in the following pages. When
comparing these introductory thoughts to Baudrillard’s (1981) concept of simulation, it is
interesting to observe that the main difference is that, for Baudrillard, there is no limit in
interpretation because there is no Real. In revisiting Baudrillard’s (1988) words to add to
the current discourse, one finds that:
Simulation is characterized by a precession of the model, of all models around the
merest fact – the model comes first, and their orbital (like the bomb) circulation
constitutes the genuine magnetic field of events… This anticipation, this
precession, this short-circuit, this confusion of the fact with its model (no more
divergence of meaning, no more dialectical polarity, no more negative electricity or
implosion of poles) is what each time allows for all the possible interpretations,
even the most contradictory- all are true, in the sense that their truth is
exchangeable, in the image of the models from which they proceed, in a
generalized cycle. (p. 175)
In other words, avatars are not only representations of reality, projections of one’s self and
one’s consciousness, but are, following Baudrillard (1988), not models but endless “true”
representations of our very selves. I will push even further into the abyss and claim that
avatars are only representations of the self, but not the self itself. When I construct an
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avatar, it is meant to function as an agent that negotiates my consciousness between
realms. In practical terms, I am creating an enhanced clone of my persona.
My mental newborn is a hybrid entity, a mongrel being of a higher order that
belongs to multiple dimensions, an intrinsic characteristic that allows it to cross boundaries
between dimensions, between realities. In addition, the ontology of an electronic avatar is
rooted in the idea of sense data that work in the simultaneity of the dialectic between body
and mind. However, what I am proposing in this study is a reconceptualization of the
notion of avatar to better accommodate what today’s world of electronic communication
demands. As an imaginary, yet, creature, the avatar results from one’s own interpretation
of the self to adapt to a new conception of time and space. In other words, the avatar is
capable of crossing boundaries between the Real and the imaginary in a phenomenological
way. An avatar is an idea, a theoretical construct; I argue that it is made of nothingness and
the void around the nothingness. An avatar today, given the major changes in technology,
is no longer a mere bridge between worlds, but an idea that can only exist as long as there
is empty space to mediate its permanence in the mind. I want to name the theoretical
construct I am proposing ICEVORG, and claim that it is an enhanced form of avatar that
adds two key components. Those two crucial components are the medium, and more
importantly, the awareness of it. Put differently, what I am proposing is a comprehensive
self-cross-referencing notion of avatar as sense data.
When I mentioned in the previous chapter that I met “God’s avatar,” my intention
was to make a point by penetrating the barriers of language. I had to use the expression
“pun intended” to signify that what may have been perceived as a syntactical mishap was,
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in fact, not one. What I wanted to point out in claiming to have met God’s avatar has
everything to do with what I am proposing as ICEVORG. Let me go back to the Sistine
Chapel, to the moment when I realized the role of the medium in the construction of a
multidimensional re-interpretation of what an ICEVORG is.
After I missed looking at God’s hand on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel for the
first time, I had the opportunity for a second tour with a different mindset, but more
importantly, with a different set of emotions as well as a more alert sensorium. Once inside
the Sistine Chapel, I looked up and finally found Michelangelo’s interpretation of God and
Adam extending their hands, reaching out for that “touch” between the mundane and the
divine. As I reflected upon that image, I began thinking about the space between those two
fingers. The space, or void, in between images was the key factor necessary for creating
the tension for the message to come across.
On the other hand, keeping in mind that my intention was to experience the Sistine
Chapel from a phenomenological perspective, and considering what I explained before in
terms of our innate human desire to “see through touch,” my second experience at the
Sistine Chapel was a failure as well. “Why was it a failure?” you may wonder. I was, after
all, right below the artwork I so badly wanted to experience. Yet, put otherwise, my
attempt to meet the Real thing only revealed an unfulfilled relationship between my desire
to touch and the impossibility to do so. The tension conjured in my brain, and expressed
through the anxiety running through my body, attempted to simulate the experience of
touch. The resulting frustration served the purpose of making me aware of the space
between intention and desire, void and object, pleasure and pain.
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I was able to see the void and grasp the idea of what Baudrillard (1981) describes
over and over as the Real—the core conceptual space where Reality beyond simulacra can
be experienced.

Figure 12. Void Between Gods. Buonarroti Simoni, Michelangelo Di
Lodovico. Rome: Sistine Chapel: Ceiling Frescos: Creation of Adam.
1508-1512. Sistine Chapel, Vatican Palace, Vatican City. Erich Lessing
Culture and Fine Arts Archives/ART RESOURCE, N.Y. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N.
pag. ARTstor Collection. Web. 14 Nov. 2013.
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Several observations led me to the reflections shared on these pages, namely,
feeling cheated by the size or scale of that particular painting. “Really?” I thought to
myself. “That’s it? Is that the image that has been reprinted literally billions of times? Is
that ordinary image the one that has been the central subject for a never-ending flow of
scholarly analysis, advertising, production, reproduction, design and redesign, cultural
studies research, gender studies, cultural criticism, art history, religion, philosophy and
literature? Is that the single image abducted by scholars from the ceiling of the Sistine
Chapel, the universal icon meant to signify the relationship between the Western God and
men? It cannot be! It just cannot be.” However, at the same time, I realized that I was not
constructing a singular unit of sense data in my head, but rather a spinning swarm of
images going in and out of themselves. The rush of images in my head was not unlike the
conceptual image of a molecule with electrons orbiting the center. “This was a unit of
meaning,” I said to myself, “a unit of consciousness that contained many versions of
mediated reality.” To complicate matters, I was beginning to gain full awareness of the fact
that I was not allowed to touch the painting. This detail is important, as it helped me to
observe and argue that Reality today, Reality beyond Baudrillard’s (1981) simulacra, was
non-touch-dependent. Explained in different terms, if I cannot touch what claims to be the
Real thing, it is therefore accepted as Real.
Eureka! It was the space in between that made the difference, the nothingness, the
emptiness that determines the Real today—that seemingly empty space meant to be visible
only to consciousness, yet invisible to the eyes unless we become aware of it. I would then
argue that it is the void, the empty space, that mediates our presence in any given physical
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or conceptual construct, that constitutes the Real, as opposed to a mere physical
stimulation to the sensory apparatus obtained from our physical presence in a Cartesian
reality. The real is the void, the absence.
I was experiencing the concept of ICEVORG, an avatar that exists as self-crossreferencing sense data. If I removed the particular panel of artwork known as “The
Creation of Adam” from the Sistine Chapel, the experience that one would have of it today
will not be phenomenological, for in removing the work, we would remove the conceptual
construct behind the work itself. It happened to me, as I explained before. The first time I
walked through the Sistine Chapel, I did not see the image, even though I was undeniably
present in the place and fully exercising my sensorium. The lack of awareness, in my case,
speaks directly to what phenomenology identifies as the “intentional object.” Without the
mental construction of The Creation of Adam as a holistic experience working in tandem
with the architectural space, the people observing, all the other elements making the space,
and more importantly with the previous knowledge one has been fed by mass media, art
history, and media culture, this particular image could not be theorized as an ICEVORG.
The image would not be an ICEVORG because it cannot transgress boundaries between
realities, as I will later describe.
As I walk deeper into the construction and understanding of ICEVORG, I cannot
renounce my very own desire to analyze the concept of ICEVORG under the lens of the
powerful, almost archetypical, thoroughly exploited Greek myth of Narcissus. In his essay
“The Inventor of Painting,” Damisch analyzes (2010) Leon Battista Alberti’s writings on
the painter, and the role the painter played in the construction of reality in the late fifteenth
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and early sixteenth centuries—when Michelangelo painted the Sistine Chapel. Alberti was
an Italian author, artist, architect, poet, priest, linguist, philosopher, and cryptographer who
wrote extensively about theories of art in two publications, Della Pittura and De Statua. It
is here where Alberti (1804), argues that “all steps of learning should be sought from
nature,” and that the “ultimate aim of an artist is to imitate nature” (p. 53), a structuralist
definition ahead of its time. Beauty was, as Alberti understood it, "the harmony of all parts
in relation to one another” (Spencer, 1956, p. 43). He claims that at the heart of painting,
there is a divine power: “tiene in se’ la pittura forza divina” and that Art is capable of
providing “a semblance of presence to absent beings” (Alberti, 1804, p. 44).
According to Alberti, the work of art, when materialized, cannot be transformed by
adding any element or removing anything without impairing the beauty of the whole.
Beauty was for Alberti “the harmony of all parts in relation to one another” (p. 54)
For Alberti (1804), “Painting can even endow the face of the dead with a prolonged
life” (p. 44). Painting is form capable of making the gods jealous, yet also one that binds us
inseparably to them by providing us with a visible image of divinity. It operates in the two
dimensions of the planar surface, an observation that demonstrates the ability to break free
from the constraints of the medium itself and to be open to multiple interpretations. The
fact that painting exists in two dimensions also entails the addition of elements that can be
deconstructed and separated into different planes for later analysis, but nonetheless add to
the meaning and value of a work of art.
In his article entitled “The Inventor of Painting,” Damisch (1995) please include
full reference in your bibliography states that the additional elements become part of the
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projected surface, and are articulated to one another to give the illusion of a relief, or
depth, for instance. The visual construction acquires value only through a kind of
transformation or metamorphosis, in relation to the plane on which it is registered.
Damisch then references Matisse to argue that the language, the code, is “taking possession
of the surface” (p. 305). My reading of Damisch is in favor of the argument of art’s
dependency on a medium, a medium itself that is transformed by the interrelations taking
place among its elements. In other words, art is metamorphosis. It transforms all elements
around it: the space, the void, and the viewer. It also transforms its own representational
elements. Art also transforms the additional relationships emerging from the intertwined
semantics behind all signifiers (Barthes, 1964). I find Damisch’s insight into Alberti’s
theories from the time of the Sistine Chapel of great value to the development of my
discourse. Particularly relevant to my dissertation is when, in his analysis of Alberti’s
writings on Narcissus, Damisch (1995) remarks:
[F]or Alberti to take note of the power of transformation; even of sublimation –in a
word: of metamorphosis-- which is the essence of his art. Here he finds the pretext
to a fable unprecedented in the artistic literature and which takes on, in De pictura,
the value of an origin myth: ‘Consequently I had the habit of telling my friends that
the inventor of painting, according to the poets, was Narcissus, who was
transformed into a flower; for, as painting is the flower of all arts, so the tale of
Narcissus fits our purpose perfectly. What is painting but the act of embracing by
means of art the surface of the source?’ Narcissus converted into a flower… …It is
not only the final metamorphosis of Narcissus which appears relevant here, but also
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the whole fable (omnious fabula), the whole story of Narcissus… in which the hero
of the fable discovers, without initially identifying it, the object of his desire, seeing
there for a long time only fire. [NOTE: in French n’y voir que du feu – means to be
blind to something, to fail to notice something, or to be fooled by it], the same one
that burns him; until the moment when, having finally recognized the image for
what it is, his own, far from freeing himself from its influence, he sets his desire
free and awaits the final metamorphosis… the painting is anything else, in
principle, than an artful embrace of the surface, a surface that constitutes the first
and inalienable given of painting; its irreducible precondition, and – so to speak –
its ‘source’? To embrace, to take possession of it (According to the words of
Matisse), or even to measure it with two arms… the ‘one who looked’, was to hold
in hand and view in a mirror, and on which was painted the projected image
offering an exact replica of its model. (p. 306)
It is interesting to note that in spite of the great number of years separating Damisch and
Alberti, Damisch’s interpretations on Alberti’s theoretical propositions correlate directly to
the ICEVORG, especially when he describes how the source where the image is reflected
becomes an integral component of the perception of one’s self as a whole, as an
experience, as the consciousness of something (Heidegger, 1989). Embracing the medium
while keeping it invisible to one’s consciousness is fundamental to comprehending the
ICEVORG. In other words, an ICEVORG is an avatar that has the characteristics of the
object of intentionality, as described in phenomenology. As such, an ICEVORG is present
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and absent at the same time; it is both idea and object, sense data that can be experienced
through the senses without the need of a body other than the one imagined by the observer.
An ICEVORG, I want to add at this point, serves another function: that of a
threshold, door, access point, or port of entry into the world of interstices among realities.
An ICEVORG is capable of being observed only when it transgresses boundaries—mental,
physical, or both. ICEVORG cuts through dimensions to transgress boundaries. An
ICEVORG is an image that is not, a body that has none. An ICEVORG, when applied to a
person, is a representation of the characteristics of the identity of that person. Additionally,
the ICEVORG possesses the capacity for metamorphosis in order to transgress boundaries
while maintaining multiple instances inasmuch as the embodiments it can assume and the
channels by which it can move. Put differently, an ICEVORG is a conceptual hybrid
capable of multiple ontologies.
Moreover, in constructing the conceptual framework where the idea of ICEVORG
was born and raised, I must add that it is important to note that the reflecting image on the
pond that constitutes the backbone of the Narcissus myth is essentially a found object. The
water, that is, is a found conceptual object. As Narcissus finds the image/object, it becomes
the object of his desire (Moore, 1994). He wants to possess the image, to make it his own,
not because he recognizes the image as his own reflection, but because he perceives it in a
phenomenological manner, according to the narrative. The image becomes sense data that
correspond to a perceived otherness. The image is not his own but an unknown object that
Narcissus cannot reach. When he tries to reach the image, his hand breaks the surface of
the pond, dismantling the perceived object. The medium where the sense data is perceived
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goes through its own metamorphosis, from invisible yet always present, to temporarily
visible and perceivable by the senses. Narcissus’s image is, I must stress, a natural found
object, not a human-made one.
To further support the notion of ICEVORG as the main character of my current
inquiry, I refer to how Mitchell (2005) describes his theory of found objects. Oddly
enough, Mitchell suggests that found objects (images) do not have an adequate theory, and
“it may be because they haven’t felt the need for one” (p. 114). Mitchell then describes the
criteria defining a found object: 1) it must be ordinary, unimportant, neglected, and (until
its finding) overlooked; it cannot be beautiful, sublime, wonderful, astonishing, or
remarkable in any obvious way, or it would have been already singled out, and therefore
would not be a good candidate for “finding”; 2) its finding must be accidental, not
deliberate or planned.
What I am trying to do here is draw a parallel between the image reflected on the
mirror of water in the Narcissus myth, and the reflected image as found object. The found
image does comply with Mitchell’s (2005) principles in that it is unexpected and
overlooked, for the phenomenon of reflection was always there, neglected and
unimportant. However, the pond itself was also overlooked, as it was taken for granted.
The pond, just like the water that fills it, was always there. It is the combination of image
and surface, reflection and awareness of the medium where it takes place, that procures the
ideal context for the birth of the ICEVORG. In addition, the conceptual reflection that led
me to propose the ICEVORG as a valid theoretical construct was, interestingly enough,
also found by accident. It revealed itself to me. Mitchell’s words transform my experience
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into a more meaningful and relevant one as he elaborates on his theoretical construct of a
found object. In his words:
One doesn’t seek the found object, as Picasso famously remarked. One finds it.
Even better: it finds you, looking back, looking back at you… The secret of the
found object is thus the most intractable kind: it is hidden in plain sight, like Poe’s
purloined letter. Once found, however, the found object should, as in surrealist
practices, become foundational. It may undergo an apotheosis, a transfiguration of
the commonplace, a redemption by art. In the readymade, it may take on a new
name-the urinal becoming a “fountain.” If it really works, however, we have a
sneaking suspicion that the transfiguration was a trick, a comic ruse engineered by
a deux ex machine; and the plain old thing with its homely, family name is still
there, blushing and smirking at us in the spotlight of aesthetic attention, or (better)
ignoring us totally. (p. 116)
Here, Mitchell (2005) adequately describes how I came across the notion of ICEVORG as
an object that I desired to possess—in this case, via Michelangelo’s image and its meaning,
despite being unable to reach it not once but twice. From then on, I wanted to have that
image, to make it my own, and to be it. However, it was not until I came across another
one of Michelangelo’s masterpieces that I finally assimilated what the images were saying,
what they wanted.
As I walked into Saint Peter’s Cathedral, the heart of the Catholic Church, I saw it.
I saw her. And she looked back at me. Michelangelo’s The Pietà was there: sublime, in
front of me. It was so delightfully beautiful, so intense, and so inviting to be admired, yet
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so far away. I began to feel the urge to see it, to approach it, and embrace the work of art.
This piece of art was not that far away, and certainly not elevated above my head (as was
the case with The Creation of Adam), but the crowd was there, and it was that: a crowd.
So, I decided to investigate around the cathedral until I had a better chance of a clear view.
While walking outside to get some air (having lost my group again), I found myself in an
area of the building where I found another Pietà. This one, however, was sitting in
oblivion, alone, almost forgotten, yet perfect as well. I could even touch it and I did. When
my eyes scanned for more information, I found the following inscription: (figure xx) Cast
of the Pietà by Michelangelo 1475-1584. The original, commissioned of Michelangelo by
Cardinal Jean Bilhéres de Lagraulas in 1497 and completed in 1499, is displayed in the
Chapel of Pietà in the Basilica of St. Peter in the Vatican. The plaster cast was made in
1975 by the Restoration Laboratory of stone and casts of the Vatican Museums. Inv. 50661
It was a copy, a plaster cast. It was a great example of Baudrillard’s (1981)
metaphor of the territory, and how the map replaces what once was real. Returning to the
discussion of what a found object is and what it does, I argue that this object, this Pietà,
found me. It was a great point of entry into the theoretical observation that helped me
construct and reinforce the concept of the ICEVORG. Along these lines, Mitchell (2004)
elaborates upon his theorization of found objects by indicating what a found object is not.
In a dialectical reflection, he writes that a found object is an element capable of theoretical
analysis:
[A found object is not] the sought object, the desired object, the sublime or
beautiful object, the valued object, the aesthetic object, the produced, consumed, or
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exchanged object, the given or taken object, the symbolic object, the feared or
hated object, the good or bad object, the lost or vanishing object. These are the
special objects singled out for theoretical attention by critical theory and by
psychoanalysis. They are the objects we care about in advance, the objects we are
looking for, the objects of theory. (p. 116)

Figure 13: Touchable Virgin. Cast of the Pieta by Michelangelo (1475-1564)
Plaster cast made in 1975 by the Restoration Laboratory of
stone and casts of the Vatican Museums. Sitting on an aisle inside the Vatican.
January 2011. All the images captured by the author.
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The function of a found object is precisely the one that finding this copy of the
Pietà served. It helped me observe what was invisible before, yet in front of my eyes. The
key observation happened as I walked back to see the “real” Pietà. When I finally arrived
to the scene of the crime, so to speak, the crowd had dissipated, and I had a clear view of
Michelangelo’s masterpiece (below). The popular expression “so near yet so far” became a
phenomenological experience.

Figure 14: So Near Yet So Far. The Pietà by Michelangelo (1475-1564) Commissioned of Michelangelo by Cardinal Jean
Bilhéres de Lagraulas in 1497 and completed in 1499, is displayed in the Chapel of the Pietà in the Basilica of St. Peters in
the Vatican. January 2011. All the images captured by the author.
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The previously found object, the one I could reach out and touch with my very own
hands, validated my desire to get closer to what was identified as the original Pietà. It was
in that moment that I experienced a strong desire and intense anxiety in the space that
separated me from the artwork. The space between this particular object of desire and my
physical body was too much, and the emptiness filled with transparent air was preventing
me from fulfilling the desire that I so desperately sought after. I wanted to touch that
sublime, beautiful, valued, symbolic, feared, hated copy that was, in Mitchell’s (2004)
words: “discovered,” “revealed” “reframed” (p. 117). The presence of the copy and its
accessibility became essential elements to validate my theoretical observations by
opposition.
It was then and there that I understood that what validates the original was the
replica, and the void between the two. The impossibility of a phenomenological experience
followed by a sensorial one was a memorable fact. Although, when we talk about medium,
unavoidably, we also have to talk about McLuhan (1964) and his famous aphorism “the
medium is the message.” His dictum became as relevant and present as blood is in water is
for sharks, however it also became a “glitch” inasmuch as a non-controllable entity open to
interpretation. Even McLuhan himself eventually said it was a “fallacy” adding aura to his
now transcended aphorism or as I will explained later on, adding aura to his ICEVORG
capable of media transgression through the strange loop approach.
With respect to McLuhan’s theory, Mitchell (2005) refers to the theoretical plane
from which McLuhan developed his discourse on the medium as “meta-medium” (p. 203).
Mitchell names McLuhan “the great avatar of media theory” (p. 203), and describes the
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role of media and the construction of identity regarding the author of the ideas as a
“fallacy” or “glitch” inserted into the media stream. This insertion aims to understand the
role of media in the process of semiotic/value construction, as well as the lack of complete
control that our own constructions possess. In Mitchell’s (2008 not in your final
bibliography) words:
If even the inventor of media studies, the great avatar of media theory who became
a media star in his own right, is capable of slipping on a figurative banana peel,
what lies in wait for the rest of us who think we have a right to our opinions about
media? How can we hope, as McLuhan promised, to “understand media,” much
less become experts about them? (p. 2)
The lives and loves of images, it seems clear, cannot be assessed without some reckoning with
the media in which they appear. The difference between an image and a picture, for instance, is
precisely a question of medium. An image only appears in some medium or other—in paint,
stone, words, or numbers. But what about media? How do they appear, make themselves
manifest and understandable? It is tempting to settle on a rigorously materialist answer to this
question, and to identify the medium as simply the material support in or on which an image
appears. But this answer seems unsatisfactory on the face of it. A medium is more than the
materials of which it is composed. It is, as Mitchell (2008) wisely insisted, a material social
practice, a set of skills, habits, techniques, tools, codes and conventions.

Mitchell refers to the idea of avatar as a combination of media, author, context, and
intention. He describes the relationship established among the elements as initially part of
logical systems or structures that subsequently expand to fully developed environments
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where “images live, or personas and avatars that address us and can be addressed in turn”
(p. 203). For Mitchell, the lives of images cannot be assessed without considering the
media in which they appear.
To further this thinking, Mitchell (2008) explains what he considers to be a key
element to understand images. He indicates that the difference between a picture and an
image is defined by the medium. My interpretation of Mitchell with respect to the
difference between picture and image is as follows: picture is the phenomenological
manifestation of stimuli presented on a medium. Image, on the other hand, refers to the
theoretical construct that stands in proximity to the idea of sense data—the whole
experience that combines meaning with physical stimuli and presence. From this vantage
point, Mitchell contends that the difference between image and picture is a question of the
medium and its relationship to the elements that it supports, as said relationship is
accompanied by complex semiotic underpinnings. In his words:
An image only appears in some medium or other in paint, stone, words, or
numbers. But what about media? How do they appear, make themselves manifest
and understandable? […] A medium is more than the materials of which is
composed. It is a material social practice, a set of skills, habits, techniques, tools,
codes, and conventions. (p. 203)
A medium in relationship to avatars is not limited to the purely operational relationships
established among the parts and the whole. Quite the opposite, the medium here reaches
out to incorporate the way these relationships are perceived by outside observers, observers
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who arrive with a fresh mind into the discourse and the social practices involved in
understanding these relationships.
More importantly, I emphasize an expanded conceptual framework for the medium
since I see the medium as the fertile ground where avatars-m can exist and thrive. The
ICEVORG exists as a comprehensive theoretical construct that incorporates the medium,
image, and the social practices that their inter-relationships procure. Mitchell (2008)
further clarifies my conception of avatar as medium in the following:
A medium just is a “middle,” an in-between or go-between, a space or pathway or
messenger that connects two things-a sender to a receiver, a writer to a reader, an
artist to a beholder, or (in the case of the spiritualist medium) this world to the next.
The problem arises when we try to determine the boundaries of the medium. […]
Defined more broadly, as a social practice, the medium of writing clearly includes
the writer and the reader, the medium of painting includes the painter and beholderand perhaps the gallery, the collector, and the museum as well. If media are
middles, they are ever-elastic middles that expand to include what looks at first like
their outer boundaries. The medium does not lie between sender and received; it
includes and constitutes them. (p. 218)
Mitchell means that ICEVORGS are conceptual constructs that include the idea of image
as representation of one’s Self, but they also expand to engulf, embrace, and make part of
its sense data the medium itself. For the purpose of proposing ICEVORG as the key player
to access what is left of reality today, beyond Baudrillard’s (1981) simulacra, it is
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important to understand the role of ICEVORG as medium, message, and everything in
between.
An ICEVORG, therefore, is a phenomenological experience. It is a dynamic
construct that moves through texts in full orchestration with one’s mind. It is a reflection of
one’s Self, and the medium where such reflection occurs. It is more important to bring into
the discourse not the constituting elements themselves, but the interstices among them,
which thrive in the medium. These interstices are originally invisible. As our
consciousness becomes aware of them through phenomenological apprehension, they
become sense data that inform our brains of the full meaning of the experience. It is only
when those spaces become visible that we can begin to construct an idea of what lies
beyond simulacra.
When I finally had a chance to experience the elements that lay between my eyes
and The Pietà in Saint Peter’s Basilica, I could see those a priori invisible elements. There
is the real thing, the artwork, the sublime, and the beautiful. (see Figure 15 on next page)
Departing now from the interstices among the elements, I could observe that when
I was in front of the masterpiece, I could not touch it. There I found it: a medium inside a
medium that is, in turn, inside a medium and therefore must be real. Why is there an
invisible medium in between reality and my phenomenological body? The answer is
simple and brings Baudrillard’s (1981) words full circle: I have no access to the medium.
We do not have access to the medium. It is not reachable. That is what makes an
experience real: the tension, and the undeniable presence of an ICEVORG.
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Figure 15: Visual Approach to The Pietà. Series of images meant to visualize the membrane between the
real object and the observer. Artwork by Michelangelo (1475-1564) Commissioned of Michelangelo by
Cardinal Jean Bilhéres de Lagraulas in 1497 and completed in 1499, is displayed in the Chapel of the Pietà
in the Basilica of St. Peters in the Vatican. January 2011. All the images captured by the author.
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Stated otherwise, I see the glass; the glass is the medium that validates the
experience of The Pietà, allowing me to deem it Real. The glass represents the tension, the
desire to possess; it is the urge to touch that generates the perception of the Real, thanks to
the ICEVORG.
As I lift my hand and block the image, it all makes sense. Reality is what I cannot
touch, what is protected by endless layers of media. Reality is protected by the void, the
space, the interstices, between my consciousness and the object that I desire to touch. The
interstices are invisible until I become aware of them. When I do become aware, when I
choose to see them, they become visible and the ICEVORG more real; it is sense data
embodied, a phenomenological experience impossible to deny. To further elaborate on the
role of the invisible interstices that comprise the ICEVORG, I turn to McLuhan. In his
seminal text Understanding Media: The Extension of Man, McLuhan (1964) McLuhan
describes the medium by way of a metaphor of an airplane breaking the barrier of sound,
and by virtue of this action, turning the invisible sound waves into visible manifestations
on its wings. The temporary threshold becomes the essential tool to generate awareness.
The threshold activates consciousness to reveal new and opposite forms of a medium, as
both receptacle of content and as content itself. Now I can discern a parallel between the
ICEVORG and McLuhan’s work when he describes how the message transitions from a
fragmented sequence in filmstrip to transcend its mechanical structure, thus moving into a
world of “organic interrelation” (p. 154). By speeding up the sequencing, McLuhan
explains, we – the audience – get carried from “the world of sequence and connections into
the world of creative configuration and structure” (p. 12). We are able to see the transition
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from parts to whole, which in turn reveals the presence of the medium, and therefore the
illusory nature of the image. Likewise, the phenomenological experience of the ICEVORG
reveals the complexity behind the construct, and, as a result, the sense of the Real beyond
Baudrillard’s (1981) simulacra.
In expanding upon the medium as message and the message as medium, McLuhan
(1964) explains another aspect that I deem relevant to an adequate framing of what an
ICEVORG intends to be. He argues that “the ‘content’ of any medium is always another
medium,” and interestingly enough, he supports his argument with a reflection on how
light [as in energy] is, for him, “pure information” (p. 13). McLuhan thus implies that pure
information is a medium without a message. I find his reflection interesting inasmuch as an
ICEVORG stands in direct opposition to pure information. An ICEVORG is a theoretical
construct resulting from the relationships established among the multilayered and crossreferenced sources of information that constitute it. An ICEVORG’s nature entails the
multiplicity and plurality of meaning in constant transformation and interrelation. In the
same way a molecule exists as a cohesive whole due to the relationship among its parts,
and the maintenance of elements in constant motion, an ICEVORG is a complex
theoretical construct made up similarly of parts in motion. One of those parts corresponds
to the visual representation of the Self, but the remaining parts/layers/components are
references to other sources of information that are in constant transformation as well.
An ICEVORG is the medium that has not one but as many messages as needed to
accommodate itself to any specific context in order to provide a phenomenological
experience to the subject it signifies. Being that the nature of the ICEVORG is organic and
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transforming, it relates to McLuhan’s observations on the speed at which a message
moves: “the ‘message’ of any medium or technology is the change of scale of pace or
pattern that it introduces into human affairs” (McLuhan, 1994, p.8)
One key component of the ICEVORG is the idea of reflection of the Self and the
interstices in between medium and subject. That said, I want to take the notion of
ICEVORG a step further by contrasting it with what McLuhan (1994) claims about the
myth of Narcissus. McLuhan describes the myth as a human experience and reminds us
that the name itself, “Narcissus,” means “narcosis” or “numbness.” He continues that the
image became an extension of Narcissus that was deemed invisible until he became aware
of it. For Narcissus, the reflection was another person, not him. That “error” in perception
is what made Narcissus numb to his own presence, McLuhan suggests. We experience the
polysemic nature of the ICEVORG by means of the same numbness, though identification
with the construct persists, nonetheless. To express this thought in a different way, we see
the ICEVORG as a container of ourselves, but as an enhanced extension, an augmentation,
an improvement. As we see the ICEVORG as such, we become what McLuhan calls
“closed system” (p. 42). By “closed system,” McLuhan means that the medium – the
mirror, the reflection, the pond, and so forth– becomes integral to its operator – the subject,
the human, the Self. They fuse into a whole system that self-perpetuates as long as there is
constant feedback, similar to that of a mirror, or the pond, or any other medium that makes
us numb.
According to McLuhan (1964), the Narcissus myth points out “the fact that men at
once become fascinated by any extension of themselves in any material other than
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themselves” (p. 42). This inconspicuous detail in the myth becomes germane to the
conceptual framework of the ICEVORG. As McLuhan suggests, we as a society have
interpreted the myth of Narcissus incorrectly when we assume that he fell in love with
himself. One can indeed offer a more sound interpretation. The more sound interpretation
affirms that Narcissus fell in love with otherness; he never saw himself, but rather thought
the image was that of somebody else. As McLuhan puts it,
[T]he wisdom of the Narcissus myth does not convey any idea that Narcissus fell in
love with anything he regarded as himself. Obviously he would have had very
different feelings about the image had he known it was an extension or repetition of
himself. It is perhaps, indicative of the bias of our intensely technological, and
therefore, narcotic culture that we have long interpreted the Narcissus story to mean
that he fell in love with himself, that he imagined the reflection to be Narcissus! (p.
43)
McLuhan’s observation of the unconscious and conscious awareness of the role of the
medium and the messages contained in it thus informs the theoretical framework for the
ICEVORG. An ICEVORG is not only a projection of the self as a simulated physical
phenomenon – as in a reflected image on a mirror – but a more comprehensive one that
pretends, expects, and hopes to be more inclusive. To better illustrate, let us go back into
Saint Peter’s Basilica and stand in front of the Pietà one last time. Do I consider
Michelangelo’s masterpiece an ICEVORG? If so, why do I consider The Pietà an
ICEVORG?
No, I don´t. Michangelo’s Pietà is not an ICEVORG, and here is why:
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1.

The Pietà is an avatar inasmuch it is a representation of a physical reality.
It simulates a real situation—in this case, human bodies in a dramatic
composition with intention and agency (more on agency later).

2.

The work of art is defined as a real object, one that needs to be protected
behind a conceptually invisible medium that escapes our consciousness
and can be brought into it by means of phenomenology—awareness.

3.

As in the Narcissus myth, the work of art is a reflection of who we could
be if improved, augmented, or bettered. I must add that one does not need
to be an artist or a cultural producer in order to project and reflect oneself
as a human into the work of art. The mere fact of sharing the same status
of “human” with the author is enough to trigger the reflection. If a human
can do that, I could do that, given the talent, the circumstances, and the
means.

4.

The cultural product/construct offers a phenomenological experience. It
is sense data. What this means is that when I experience the work of art,
my brain creates a specific unit of meaning, of sense data, to associate
with the sensorial experience and store it as codified meaning. I can
access this meaning in the form of memory, to compare and contrast with
other experiences.

5.

It is capable of cross-referencing multiple layers of complex meaning.
These meanings range from academic analyses of the work itself to
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endless transformations from medium to medium that serve as platforms
for reinvention, reinterpretation, and critical analysis.
6.

It exists as reproduced and reproducible image in a plethora of media,
and therefore as sense data.

7.

It never dies. It is immortal because it has expanded its own
representation beyond the limits of its physical appearance into the realm
of a digital being (Kim, 2001). As such, it is subject to a potential digital
eternity as it is cross-referenced in multidimensional media.

8.

It does require an inconspicuous intermediating substrate to protect it.
The intermediation that I am referring to may range from operative
aspects in the handling of the artwork to physical walls and specialized
containers and/or spaces.

However, the most fundamental aspect of what constitutes an ICEVORG, for the
purposes of my dissertation, is that it requires a cyborg to inhabit. I will explain this in a
more precise way in the following chapters. An ICEVORG is, to follow and expand upon
the work of McLuhan (1964), not necessarily an extension of the body but it has a body.
An ICEVORG, more importantly, is an extension of the Self as perceived by the other, as
well the perception of the Self as perceived by oneself from the perspective of “otherness.”
As an augmented version of the Self, it demands a never-ending desire to keep improving,
keep getting better, to top itself. By pursuing the endless path of improvement, it maintains
its relevance and transformation. An ICEVORG’s nature could be explained, I argue, by
McLuhan’s account of “auto-amputation,” which he employs to describe the act of
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depending on another medium to perceive one’s self as whole, and to acquire some sense
of balance as a human being. McLuhan explains that we use invention and technology to
extend various parts of our bodies in order to feel adequate given the speed at which
society moves today. When we “amputate” our consciousness and expand it, we are
creating augmented versions of our bodies that affect the way our brains work; we push
our brains into a more accelerated state to adjust to the pace of the world as it is thrust
forward by electronic communication (McLuhan, 1964, p. 42).
This is the crux of the Narcissus myth for McLuhan—the idea that by attempting to
control the way our reflection is constructed, we create a conceptual amputation of the
Self. However, as we recognize that our identity is no longer contained in our own body,
we can no longer recognize ourselves. On this matter, McLuhan (1964) writes:
This is the sense of the Narcissus myth. The young man’s image is a selfamputation or extension induced by irritation pressures. As counter-irritant, the
image produces a generalized numbness or shock that declines recognition. Selfamputation forbids self-recognition. (p. 43)
With McLuhan’s words in mind, I argue that an ICEVORG is a form of resistance
against the self-initiated amputations that occur when our identities move from medium to
medium. It is the discovery of those invisible layers between objects and meanings that
work as the central nervous system, the backbone, of an ICEVORG, as I will explain in
chapter six, where I theorize at full speed the construct I am attempting to conjure into life.
Without the invisible interstice sitting on the other side of our awareness, an ICEVORG
could be defined as anything else: an icon, a symbol, an index, an image (Barthes, 1977).
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In other words, without a mediating interstice, an ICEVORG cannot become the door into
the observations of what is left of the order of the Real.
In order to accentuate and finalize – for the moment – the idea of what an
ICEVORG is, I will go back to the moment where I became aware of what was previously
invisible to me: the glass preventing my body from having a full phenomenological multisensory experience of the Pietà. As I raised my hand in front of the artwork, all the layers
became visible.
The tempered glass forces a space in between. There is a fence in front of the glass.
There are endless flashes from tourists’ cameras bouncing off the glass, lights, and other
elements around the work of art, and the people around it, and me.
Yet to be an ICEVORG, as explained, the work must be a container of layers of
meaning expressed in different media. The sense data codenamed “Pietà” must be capable
of moving from medium to medium without losing meaning. I found the solution to this
scholarly riddle in my research when I discovered that the additional medium that I refer to
as the “interstice,” the hidden layer signifying the amputation of the object from the Real,
was not there in the past. The tempered glass that “protected” the piece, and by virtue of
this action, created a door to access a post-simulacra reality, was not there before. It was an
addition resulting from an attack to Michelangelo’s masterpiece. That was it! I found the
missing link for validating the conceptual framework that defines an ICEVORG.
In the article “The Attack on the Pietà: An Archetypal Analysis,” Teunissen and
Hinz (1974) detail how on May 21 of 1972, the Hungarian-born émigré to Australia,
Laszlo Toth, battered with a hammer “one of the greatest art treasures of the western
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world, the Pietà, which depicts the Virgin Mother looking down upon the broken body of
her Son lying in her lap” (p. 43). The assailant, they explain, first struck at the resigned left
arm of the Madonna, then her eye, nose, and folded veil. It was a two-minute attack,
followed by an eight-hour questioning session, where Toth asserted, “I am Jesus Christ.”
The news traveled across the globe, and raised concerns in the art world regarding the need
for greater protection of artifacts of cultural heritage.
But at the same time, the attack makes room for intellectual inquiry about the value
of the work of art, the originality, and above all, the relationship between what may be
perceived as the “real” object to be observed, revered, and even fetishized. On May 22,
1972, a day after the incident, the New York Times published an article on the attack
(Knight, 1972). The article features interviews with experts in the field, who confirm the
possibility of a repair, but at the same time, agree on the transformation to which the
masterpiece was subjected, and the impossibility of returning it to its original state.
According to Knight, Sheldon Keck, a professor of art conservation at the State University
College at Oneonta, New York, said that “while the pieces could be reassembled, the joints
might deteriorate in time,” adding that “the fingers have been repaired before, I don’t know
when, but the Pietà was X-rayed when it was brought here for the 1964 World’s Fair, and
they found metal pins holding the fingers in place” (p. 2).
Even though this detail may seem irrelevant, it relates to the conceptualization of
the notion of ICEVORG in that a new invisible layer added to the representation confirms
the originality of it. This added layer, I mentioned, is inconspicuous, until revealed. In this
case, an x-ray machine revealed the presence of human intervention in the artwork.
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Figure 16: The Attacker. The famous Pieta by Michael Angelo which was severely damaged on May 21, 1972
by Laszlo Toth a fanatic Hungarian born Australian judged insane and confined to mental hospital for 2
years. now entirely restored and back in St Peter Basilion at the Vatican, protected by glass window to
prevent further damage. Pope Paul VI has come down to the Basilica to see it and pray before the Pieta.
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I find this to be an important component to reinforce the idea of an ICEVORG. The
metal wires used to create the illusion of being untouched indeed provide evidence of the
originality of a work that once was unique, untouched, and sublime. Yet, following the
philosophical discourse of Baudrillard’s (1981) simulacrum, I want to argue that the
original work of art has become an enhanced version of itself. It has surpassed its original
state by means of destruction. It is then the act of destruction that provides an additional
piece of sense data towards the recognition of this particular work of art as “Real” beyond
reality. Knight (1972) concludes his article by quoting Thomas P. F. Hoving, then director
of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, who indicates that “while the pieces can be
reassembled, he feared that the subtleties of Michelangelo’s work might be marred,” and
finally adds, “Something with that extraordinary tense balances between details would be
rather seriously affected by any damage” (p. 2).
In an attempt to better understand this particular incident and how it affects the
perception of Michelangelo’s Pietà, as an ICEVORG, as phenomenological experience, I
would like to add Baudrillard’s (1987) perspective on art: “[a]rt is profoundly seduction,
and although I have spoken enthusiastically about seduction. I do not want to fall prey to
the seduction of art” (p. 98).
By referring to art as “seduction,” Baudrillard (1987) is speaking in terms of
simulation and simulacra, reflecting a more skeptical, critical, and paradoxical position to
question the role of art in the construction and perception of Reality. In doing so, he is
departing from the recognition that a work of art is a representation of reality, but instead
never reality itself; it tends to disappear, given its conceptual and material temporality. For
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Baudrillard “art is engaged in the process of its own disappearance” (p. 99). His words
here can be interpreted both metaphorically and literally. As long as it belongs to the
physical world, any work of art is (and in actuality, this observation is also applicable to
the world of electronic code) subject to deterioration over time, and hence disappears. In a
more metaphorical sense, the vanishing act described by Baudrillard has to do with the fact
that a work of art, especially a masterpiece such as The Pietà, disappears inasmuch as it
becomes a commodity with symbolic value. Following Baudrillard’s views, by virtue of
becoming a commodity, a work of art, to avoid complete alienation, turns itself into an
absolute commodity. In a very classically Baudrillardian fashion, I argue that he turns the
semantic structure of a term and folds it inside out to reveal its meaning, just like the
reflection in the mirror once one stops seeing oneself or the mirror, but everything in
between as a whole. In Baudrillard’s words:
An absolute object is one with no value and indifferent quality, avoiding objective
alienation by making itself more object than the object – giving it a fatal quality…
we find ourselves in a realm that has nothing to do with value, only the fantasy of
absolute value, the ecstasy of value. This is not only true on the economic level, but
on the aesthetic level as well. We are in the jungle of fetish-objects, and the fetish
object as everyone knows, has no value in itself, or rather it has so much value that
it cannot be exchanged. This is the point we have reached in art today, and this is
the superior irony… a superiorly ironic commodity because it no longer meant
anything. (p. 101)
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When a work of art has turned into fetish, that is an object desired by all, thus suggesting
its possession as the ultimate achievement of power, it has transcended its own limitations
and now is capable of the transgressing boundaries defined by every medium. The object
then, in this case The Pietà, has taken on, according to Baudrillard’s (1987) perspective on
art, the characteristics of shock, strangeness, surprise, and even self-destruction. The art
object as a fetish “must work to deconstruct its traditional aura, its authority and its power
of illusion to stand out in the pure obscenity of commodity. It must destroy itself as a
familiar object and become monstrously unfamiliar” (p. 101).
In interpreting Baudrillard’s (1987) words, I find myself compelled to claim that he
is writing at a conceptual level. I hold that the act of destruction and disappearance he
refers to describes the transformation of the art object from a representation made out of
physical matter to a realm of abstract thoughts. In other words, as an art object, The Pietà
becomes pure sense data that can be experienced in a phenomenological way, but not only
in the original state of the text, so to speak, but as an idea that can take form in basically
any media as long as it preserves a level of recognition. The art object then becomes a
story, a narrative that can be applied with an intertextual approach. By vanishing as a
physical object and assuming the conceptual framework of an ICEVORG, the art object is
no longer limited by the constraints of a single narrative or imprisoned by its marble cage.
The Pietà transcends, and now, as a story, it is capable of transgressing the boundaries
between worlds, between media, between reality and hyperreality. The art object, as a
story, as ICEVORG, in the same fashion as Borges’s ideal map replacing the original
territory, is capable of becoming more than what it originally was.

173

Figure 17: Close up of the transparent bullet-proof layer separating the observer from the observed. The theoretical observation that allowed
the birth of the notion of ICEVORG. January 2011. Digital image captured by the author. .
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CHAPTER FIVE
Avatars, Cyborgs, Doppelgängers, Agents, Apparitions, Fiends, Robots,
Ghosts, Synthespians, Ghouls, Androids, Racists, Spirits, Werewolves, Elves,
Demons, Replicants, Tricksters, Vampires, Monsters, Angels, Ogres, Zombies,
Gods, Deities, Chickens, Chupacabras, Aliens, Scholars, and the Kitchen Sink.

An avatar and a cyborg walk into a bar… they are in the midst of a great scholarly
discussion about the differences between humans and demons when a vampire interrupts
them; he asks: Has Baudrillard returned from America with my crucifix? There is no joke,
implicit or explicit. There is no punch line; we are the joke. As Baudrillard (2001) says, “in
the fragment, there’s the residual element – what still remains of what has been lost…
…[T]he fragment is a deliberate practice, the fragmentary is a rejection of totalization” (p.
28). For Gane (2010), when Baudrillard describes these residual elements he describes a
rupture into pieces that are different in nature. “Baudrillard includes the spiral of the
fragment and the fractal (F). The fragment belongs to the symbolic order, but the fractal
belongs to the semiotic or networked order. There is a whole range of phenomena that
Baudrillard identifies as fragments – including the aphorism, the witticism, the joke, the
anagram, the singularity” (Smith, 2010, p. 81).
For Baudrillard (2001), the conceptual places left within a language (or reality)
assist in the construction of symbolic language. Baudrillard emphasizes this idea by
claiming that “although there might be some characteristics that are shared between
fragment and fractal, such as ephemerality and instantaneity, the difference is fundamental
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in the sense that a fragment creates a whole symbolic space around “ (p. 28). When reality
is shattered into a billion pieces, and some pieces into another billion pieces, the resulting
empty space constitutes yet another piece of the never-ending puzzle of life. The sum is
greater than the parts, and we are left to decide which one of them came first. In
Baudrillard’s words:
I’ve been through totalities [les ensembles] myself and, in this sense, the fragment
is a product of this passage through totalities [realities]. It isn’t a formal, aesthetic
option. The fragmentary is the product of a resolve to destroy a totality and the will
to confront emptiness and disappearance. (p.28)
In commenting about fragmentation, a universal question comes to mind: Which
came first, the chicken or the egg? McLuhan (1964) responded to this perennial universal
question in a way that helped me to better understand the difference. To explain how
mechanization affects the growth of the economy, McLuhan talks about the endless
process of fragmentation used to increase production speed, and how speed, in return,
affects society by defining its different systems of serial mechanization. He argues that by
putting parts into a line of production with no causality established among them, we are
removed from understanding the concept of change. He uses this argument to describe how
a medium, in this case electricity, due to its high speed (beyond what our sensory apparatus
can consciously perceive), precludes the possibility of understanding the sequencing of
events:
[T]here is no principle of causality in a mere sequence. That one thing follows
another accounts for nothing. Nothing follows from following except change. So
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the greatest of all reversals occurred with electricity, that ended sequence by
making things instant. With instant speed the causes of things began to emerge to
awareness again, as they had not done with things in sequence and in concatenation
accordingly. Instead of asking which came first the chicken or the egg, it suddenly
seemed that a chicken was an egg’s idea for getting more eggs. (p. 12)
In my own reading of McLuhan’s (1964) observation, I find the notion of avatars and other
human-created monsters in direct connection to sequencing and speed without
concatenation. It is the dismemberment of the parts that constitute an avatar—that allows
speed to generate interstices between the media I have mentioned in my preceding
arguments. When I apply McLuhan’s claim that “nothing follows from following except
change” (p. 12) to the emergence of avatars in cyberspace, virtual worlds, and electronic
social media, it informs and nurtures my own discourse, particularly as it concerns the
notion of ICEVORG.
It is the speed of light that procures the frenzy evolution. Our wholeness as
individuals, based on the concept of “I,” was a given before electronic communication and,
more specifically, before hypertext. When the idea of “I” was deconstructed and turned
into hundreds of smaller parts, each one of them kept a bit of the original recipe, but still
proposed an augmented reality when combined in different contexts. To be “I” after
computers were introduced into our collective consciousness was a concept that evolved
from the analog individual to an augmented human construct that complied with
Baudrillard’s (1981) order of the Hyperreal. More than reality, the territory – the self – was
covered by the exactitude of its replica, yet bettered. To be “I” now means to be the owner
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of a shattered identity similar to a mirror smashed into hundreds of little parts, with each
one containing a representation of the whole, but never all of it at once. To be “I”
nowadays is to be an email, a Facebook® profile, a Twitter® account, an Instagram®
creature, a cell phone number, an avatar, another avatar, and another, and another. “I” is
represented by endless iterations constructed in sequence and concatenation to adapt and
evolve in today’s new media. We are neither the chicken nor the egg, but everything in
between.
Every representation of our “I” that we birth to inhabit new media, and we discover
in our path, is a mental creature meant to reflect upon another Narcissus pond. We then fall
in love not only with the image, the avatar, we create to reflect on the surface of the
medium, but with the medium itself. I want to argue that we are, after all, fooled into
believing that the avatar we create is a representation of our very own selves, and as such,
a valid extension of our identity. I will elaborate more on this notion when I introduce the
role of postmodern art and its relationship to Baudrillard’s (1981) philosophy of simulacra
in the next chapter.
On the other hand, it is in the best interest of my project to make sure that the
conceptual framework that I am using to construct the concept of ICEVORG is not
confused with other related conceptual constructs, such as the cyborg, doppelgänger,
replicant, or a normal avatar itself.
Moreover, I must clarify that, in order to conclude the previous chapter, I
constructed my discourse to favor the argument that an avatar is an object of desire, a
fetish, and that this object becomes disassociated with a physical body. This basically
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means that an ICEVORG no longer needs a particular body to exist, but only a medium to
be. That being said, I would like to focus on foundational texts that will ultimately help me
synthesize the definition of ICEVORG, and to distinguish my proposed construct from
other forms of identity representation that abound in scholarly discourse today.
According to one of the most respected and referenced scholars in media studies,
Haraway (1991), a cyborg is a hybrid organism that combines fact and fiction. In her book
Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, Haraway elaborates upon the
concept of the cyborg. She gives special emphasis to the political aspect of her theoretical
construct as it relates to feminism, and the construction of identity in light of today’s
technological progress. In addition to a cyborg being a hybrid organism, Haraway argues
that a cyborg is, more specifically, brought to life as a political object by the technological
progress of society. It is a creature birthed in social relations, and constructed under
oppression as an optical illusion to give structure to what Haraway argues is the experience
of being a woman in modernity.
However, as Nusselder (2009) explains, the term “cyborg” was not coined by
Haraway,. On the contrary, Nusselder claims that NASA scientist Manfred Clynes coined
the term “cyborg” in 1960 by combining the terms “cybernetics” and “organism.” The
term “cyborg” was initially meant to signify an organism capable of unconscious existence
as an “exogenously extended organizational complex functioning as an integrated
homeostatic system” (Clynes, 1960, p. 27). Yet, 50 years of scholarly development on the
subject has expanded the meaning of the term to refer to humans’ dependence on
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technology, so that we “think that all who enter cyberspace become cyborgs because they
depend on machines for their online life” (Jordan, 1999, p. 4).
On the other hand, Haraway (2004) discloses to her readers that her seminal text A
Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s was the
first paper she wrote on a computer. She claims that the paper was politically charged so as
to be understood as a remaking of structures while challenging them. As Haraway says,
“part of remaking ourselves as socialist-feminist human beings is remaking the sciences
which construct the category of ‘nature’ and empower its definitions in technlogy” (p. 43).
Her quest was to shake the establishment by proposing new forms for seeing old structures.
In her words:
By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras,
theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short we are cyborgs.
The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics. The cyborg is a condensed
image of both imagination and material reality, the two joined centres structuring
any possibility of historical transformation. In the traditions of ‘Western’ science
and politics – the tradition of racist, male-dominant capitalism; the tradition of
progress; the tradition of the appropriation of nature as resource of the production
of culture; the tradition of reproduction of the self from the reflections of the other
– the relation between organism and machine has been a border war. The stake in
the border war have been the territories of production, reproduction and
imagination. (p. 150)
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Haraway’s paper combines elements that are, in her words, “true and necessary
simultaneously” (p. 3) to escape unkind origins written about how to think , critique, and
remember war and its offspring. Such motivations led her to claim the cyborg as a
“cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as
well as a creature of fiction (Haraway, 1985, p. 65), the cyborg is an entity that contests the
dualism of nature/artifice, organism/technology and self/Other” (as cited in Toffoletti,
2007, p. 21).
In interpreting Haraway (2004), Toffoletti (2007) argues that Haraway purposefully
confuses the categories. She claims that nature, culture, organism, and machine intertwine
to challenge the myth of original unity and “its intimate associations with the natural” (p.
21). More importantly, Toffoletti claims that, in her reading of the cyborg, she has found
that it provides “new modes for conceiving both social and bodily realities and the
universal notion of women’s shared experience” (p. 20). Toffoletti argues that the
conceptual framework that has given rise to the cyborg is of primordial importance for the
construction of posthuman theory. A posthuman theoretical construct such as the cyborg,
she argues, “exhibits a confusion of fact and fiction, science and technology, the virtual
and the actual” (p. 21). The confusion Toffoletti describes is directly related to the
interstices that assisted me in the construction of the idea of ICEVORG, which will, in
turn, help me construct the notion of experiencing the Real through postmodern art.
Haraway’s cyborg, Toffoletti continues in her analysis, “disavows identity” (p. 21), and by
virtue of this action, women are able to refigure bodies and identities outside of Self/Other
relations. I will revisit the notion of cyborg when I later reference the work of French
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postmodern/posthuman artist Orlan, who is meant to serve as one of the two case studies to
better illustrate the function and mechanics of the ICEVORG.
For the time being, the most important aspect to note in Haraway’s (1991) cyborg
is that it is a key player in the construction of a contemporary philosophy known as
“posthumanism” (sometimes called “transhumanism”), which represents a field of inquiry
and set of practices that, in light of the critique of humanism, does not ask what a person is
but rather, “How is a person?” Such a question redirects focus from the intentionality of
the function of a person in society to the abstract idea of what an individual could be once
the embodiment where the self is constrained and contained transforms into an entity based
on processes, performances, and decentralized agents. This transformation, according to
Haraway, moves towards ontological and epistemological transcendence, preventing
violence by undermining notions of superiority by virtue of physical gender, class, and
race (Weinstone, 2004).
Therefore, what is important to note is that the cyborg is conceived of as a hybrid
entity, existing as a body, yet “body and identity are redefined so that the sanctity of
human essence and identity are replaced by the multiple configurations, interconnections
and embodiments between organic and technological systems that define the posthuman”
(Toffoleti, 2007, p. 148). Cyborgs are hybrid creature consisting in the combination of
machine/technology and body (Haraway, 1985). The relevance of the cyborg to
postmodern philosophy is based on precisely this principle of hybridity among realities
that converge into a single conception of Self, but still exist in different media that may be
sharing space (as found in the case of augmented reality). When we talk about Haraway’s
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cyborg, Weinstone (2004) explains in her text Avatar Bodies, we are talking about
“networked” selves, about virtual surgery, about reproductive technologies, life
preservation, cyborg anthropology, virtual gaming, even ATM banking, inasmuch as these
represent shared space in different media.
In other words, a cyborg must be embodied; there cannot be a cyborg without a
body. A cyborg is dependent on the embodiment of technology to coexist as two entities
sharing a single space. They cannot be separated without dismemberment, without
disruption of the established relationship. The superiority of technology is intertwined with
the inferiority of our decaying bodies. However, at the same time, the boundaries between
the realities that once separated body and object are still present. The key to full
comprehension of the cyborg is to interiorize the simple fact that, in today’s society, we are
already cyborgs. No longer considered optional, cyborgs in society are reaching the level
of naturalization. We are born cyborgs and die cyborgs, as the concept is not limited by the
physical world. We are cyborgs when we drive, watch a movie, wear glasses, insert breast
implants, or become dependent on any social network by means of a cell phone.
After I was reconstructed from the accident on highway 95, and my skull was
repaired with what the doctor called “cement bone,” I came to realize that I was indeed a
cyborg. I am a hybrid creature created by the high-tech components integrated into my
body. Interestingly enough, the definition of a cyborg as a constant separation of two
realities integrated in one cohesive construct was made evident a few years ago when
“something happened” inside my skull. According to my family doctor, an internal stitch
holding together the edges of the surgical incision made to repair my fractured skull
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decided to give up. My eye was badly swollen. I looked awful, but felt fine. After x-rays
and CAT scans, I was called back to the operating table for a tune up to restore my current
state to its previous “natural” state of being. I am therefore, by definition, a cyborg. I am a
hybrid of man/machine, nature/technology, and reality/fiction. To make matters more
interesting, my cyborg status does not end at the mechanical level, but extends to the
neurochemical. Every time I need to write, focus, or attempt some level of concentration, I
have to take a little chemical widely known under the commercial brand name of
“Ritalin.”19 In theory, once inside, this high-tech chemical becomes one with my mental
functions, thus procuring a better version of my Self. In addition, I take a daily low dose of
aspirin to balance my inherited high cholesterol, Fluoxetine20 to alter my clinically
diagnosed depression, and my daily pill of statin21. I wish I was a cyclops, but I am not; I
am a cyborg.
When Haraway (2004) touches upon the subject of the relationship between
technology and the body, she talks about it in terms of what she describes as
“technological determinism,” arguing that it is “one ideological space opened up by the
reconceptions of machine and organism as coded texts through which we engage in the
play or writing and reading the world” (p.11). She refers to a concept, the “textualization of

19

methylphenidate |ˌmeTHəәlˈfenəәˌdāt| noun. A synthetic drug that stimulates the sympathetic and central nervous
systems and is used to improve mental activity in attention deficit disorder and other conditions.
20

fluoxetine |flo͞ oˈäksəәˌtīn| noun. A synthetic compound that inhibits the uptake of serotonin in the brain and is taken to
treat depression. Also called Prozac.

21

statin |ˈstatnˈstætɪn| noun. Any of a group of drugs that act to reduce levels of fats, including triglycerides and
cholesterol, in the blood.
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everything,” a concept that will acquire more importance as my discourse evolves and
walks into the case studies of the next chapter. The textualization of everything is an effect
proper to poststructuralist and postmodernist theory, where the construction of meaning is
subject to constant revision and the search for validation. It is within the purview of
postmodernism that Haraway’s cyborg comes into being to “subvert myriad organic
wholes” by means of “destroying ‘man’ by the ‘machine’ or ‘meaningful political action’
by the ‘text’” (p. 11). Put otherwise, the politics of self are disrupted by the appearance of
the cyborg in the fabric of daily life. It is, to make things clearer, what I just described as
my daily routine of ingesting chemical microprocessors to adjust the nature of my
consciousness to turn me into what a given society determines a “normal” human being.
From Haraway’s perspective, her cyborg is not only possible, but relevant to society and
its future, as it goes hand in hand with the development of technology, and more
specifically, with the development of nanotechnology:
Modern machines are quintessentially microelectronic devices: they are everywhere
and they are invisible. Modern machinery is an irreverent upstart god, mocking the
Father’s ubiquity and spirituality. The silicon chip is a surface for writing; it is
etched in molecular scales disturbed only by atomic noise, the ultimate interference
for nuclear scores. Writing, power, and technology are old partners in Western
stories of the origin of civilization, but miniaturization has changed our experience
of mechanism. (Haraway, 2004, p. 153)
While Haraway’s work dates back to the 90s, the industry and size reduction of technology
have evolved in such a dramatic way that her words remain integral to the development of
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theories and cultural criticism in technology, and in literary, media, art, and design studies
as well. Along the lines of the evolution of technology, Milburn (2008) quotes K. Eric
Drexler (1991), a key figure in the emerging field of nanotechnology, as summarizing the
goal of the field as “thorough and inexpensive control of the structure of matter” (p. 10).
Drexler is essentially stating, in less complex terms, that nanotechnology is the practical
manipulation of atoms; it is engineering conducted on the molecular scale. In addition,
what I find to be the most interesting is Milburn’s account of how nanoscopic machines,
often called “assemblers” or “nanobots,” will soon be used to construct objects on an atomby-atom basis. He writes:
Modeled after biological “machines” like enzymes, ribosomes, and mitochondria –
even the cell – these nanomachines will have specific purposes such as binding two
chemical elements together or taking certain compounds apart, and will also be
designed to replicate themselves so that the speed and scale of molecular
manufacturing may be increased. (p. 261)
In reflecting on Haraway’s (1985) work, Milburn (2002) focuses on how her discourse
positions the boundary between science fiction and social reality as an optical illusion.
That illusion, the undefined space between worlds, between texts, is what “gives rise to a
‘cyborg’ epistemology threatening humanistic borders” (Haraway, 1991, p. 149). Milburn
asserts that Haraway’s discourse suggests that cyborg fusions and science technologies
transfigure embodied experience, therefore “enabling the appearance of a posthuman
subject” (p. 270).
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More importantly, Milburn (2002) argues that nanotechnology is a conceptual
territory where the ontological transgression of boundaries takes place and spreads,
resulting in the “posthuman condition”—a concept that is integral to the development of
ICEVORG as a port of entry to the Real. On the posthuman condition, Milburn (2002)
writes:
Nanotechnology is an active site of such cyborg boundary confusions and
posthuman productivity, for within the technoscapes and dreamscapes of
nanotechnology the biological and the technological interpenetrate, science, and
science fiction merge, and our lives are rewritten by the imaginative gaze—the new
“nanological” way of seeing—resulting from the splice. The possible parameters of
human subjectivities and human bodies, the limits of somatic existence, are
transformed by the invisible machinations of nanotechnology—both the
nanowriting of today and the nanoengineering of the future—facilitating the eclipse
of man and the dawning of the posthuman condition. (p. 270)
Haraway’s (1991) thoughts reinforce the notion of the posthuman condition in a more
lyrical way, as she writes that our best machines –and I argue that nanobots are indeed the
best machines we, humanity, currently have as even a concept—are “made of sunshine;
they are all light and clean because they are nothing but signals, electromagnetic waves, a
section of a spectrum” (p. 153).
Haraway (1991) then ventures deeper into the world of political discourse and
challenges us—her readers—to see cyborgs as political entities capable of social
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resistance. She does this by referencing, to my surprise, none other than Baudrillard (1984)
himself. She writes:
Cyborgs are ether, quintessence. The ubiquity and invisibility of cyborgs is
precisely why these sunshine-belt machines are so deadly. They are as hard to see
politically as materially. They are about consciousness or its simulation
[Baurdillard, 1984]. Ultimately the “hardest” science is about the realm of greatest
boundary confusion, the realm of pure number, pure spirit, C31, cryptography, and
the preservation of potent secrets. The new machines are so clean and light. Their
engineers are sun-worshipers mediating a new scientific revolution associated with
the night dream of post-industrial society. There might be a cyborg Alice taking
account of these new dimensions. (p. 154)
Haraway (1991) makes reference to Baudrillard (1984) in her work to argue the concept of
consciousness as being simulated, and that by virtue of the transgression of boundaries
offered by yet another simulation (that of the medium), we are—as humans—capable of
moving beyond the limitations of our bodies. As we engage in said conceptual
movements, we become inhabitants of the Hyperreal. This is an imaginary, yet very real,
place, where boundaries are limited to the capabilities offered by technology to replicate,
improve, and erase realities through subtle and gradual replacement. To enhance my
argument, I return to the words of Milburn (2002) in his article on nanotechnology:
The birth of nanotechnology as a scientific discipline provokes the hyperreal
collapse of humanistic discourse, puncturing the fragile membrane between real
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and simulation, science and science fiction, organism and machine, and heralding
metamorphic futures and cyborganic discontinuities. (p. 285)
The point that Milburn (2002) arrives at is precisely the point that I am trying to make: that
it is there, in that “fragile membrane between real and simulation” (p. 285), where
ICEVORG is born, and where it is nurtured by technology and fed by a never-ending flow
of hypertext. As I will now suggest and elaborate upon later, the parallels between the
notion of cyborg and the conceptual framework I have been constructing to support my
own proposed creature, secularly baptized as “ICEVORG,” are only the beginning, though
their differences are clear and will be evident as I continue to construct my discourse.
To finalize this rather succinct description of what a cyborg is from the perspective
of its main scholar and creator, I must bring Haraway (1985) to the surface of the page
once again, so that she may provide an appropriate sense of closure. The most relevant
aspect to be adopted from Haraway’s cyborg to feed and nurture my concept of ICEVORG
is found in one of her more elaborated descriptions, where she says: “my cyborg myth is
about transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities which
progressive people might explore as one part of needed political work” (p. 154). However,
from my perspective, Haraway foretells of a future that is already part of our present, and
the role that cyborgs play in the development of society has been ratified by the fact that
once a person becomes a cyborg, he or she is subject to surveillance and control by the
political powers in various ways. She expressed these same concerns by identifying a
duality in the nature of her cyborg. Haraway argues that by embracing that potential new
form of hybrid existence, we may be able to not only search, but construct our new
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meanings, enjoy joint experiences with other animals and machines that claim multiple
identities. But, at the same time, as cyborgs, we are subject to what Haraway describes as
“the final imposition of a grid of control on the planet,” which leads her to issue a final call
for the search of new “more potent myths for resistance and recoupling” (p. 154).
I find it quite important to understand Haraway’s (1985) idea of the cyborg as a
medium as well as an agent. Once the cyborg is inside us, especially in the form of
awareness, we coexist with a theoretical creature that is committed to partiality, irony,
intimacy, and perversity, as Haraway suggests. Cyborgs are no longer bound by the
limitations of the public-private duality; they are both public and private to the extent that
they establish a new form of public privacy that is not visible to the naked eye, but is to the
awareness of the construct. Cyborgs are mingled with daily life. Once created, the cyborg
is a self-sustaining conceptual entity capable of reformulating the structures of culture and
nature. The rules of the game, so to speak, transform the combination of machine and
human in a complex unity of meaning that does not necessarily have a specific category
where it can be inserted. In Haraway’s words:
The cyborg defines a technological polis based partly on a revolution of social
relations in the Oikos22, the household. Nature and culture are reworked; the one
can no longer be the resource for appropriation or incorporation by the other. The
relationships for forming wholes from parts, including those of polarity and
hierarchical domination, are at issue in the cyborg world. Unlike the hopes of
22

An oikos was the basic unit of society in most Greek city-states. It included the head of the oikos (usually the oldest
male), his extended family (wife and children), and slaves, all living together in one domestic setting. Large oikoi also
had farms that were usually tended by the slaves, which were also the basic agricultural unit of the ancient economy
(“Oikos,” 2015).
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Frankenstein’s monster, the cyborg does not expect its father to save it through a
restoration of the garden; i.e., through the fabrication of a heterosexual mate,
through its completion in a finished whole, a city and cosmos. The cyborg does not
dream of community on the model of the organic family, this time without the
Oedipal project. The cyborg would not recognize the Garden of Eden; it is not
made of mud and cannot dream of returning to dust… Cyborgs are not reverent;
they do not remember the cosmos. (p. 10)
I find this last quote ideal to describe the power inherent in the cyborg today, and how it
relates to our new human condition, as procured by the rampant progress of electronic
technology—a transformation that helps form and sculpt the notion of posthumanism.
According to Weinstone (2004), the cyborg “is perhaps the exemplary figure of
posthumanism,” a figure that disrupts the notion of a stable, autonomous, uniquely human
self. However, a cyborg is “never a hybrid of two or more people” (p. 175). Relatedly,
Hayles (1993) conceives of a cyborg as a virtual puppet, comparable to the notion of avatar
in cyberspace, which has the potential to become more than a puppet representing a
conceptual zone of interaction open to the subject of realization of the Otherness.
Posthumanism asks “How is a person?” rather than “Who is the person?” since we are no
longer subject to the constraints of the physical world in becoming and constructing a
sense of identity.
Weinstone (2004) describes a very important moment in contemporary history
when cultural theorist Ihab Hassan delivered the keynote address at the International
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Symposium on Postmodern Performance23 in 1976, the same year that Derrida’s Of
Grammatology24 was made available in English. Hassan opened by announcing the
“eclipse of the postmodern by the posthuman” (Weinstone, 2004, p. 8). It was Hassan who
first explicitly identified the cyborg with the posthuman. Hassan described the posthuman
as a Promethean construct, split by language and brought to life by technology; it “obeys
only the law of change, and [is] charged with the Nietzchean task of evolving humankind
beyond humanism” (p. 8). Hassan argued that times have evolved in such a way that we
need to understand that the human form, including human desire and all its external
representations, may have changed radically, and thus must be re-visioned. He notes, “We
need to understand that five hundred years of humanism may be coming to an end, as
humanism transforms itself into something that we must helplessly call
posthumanism”(Weinstone, 2004, p.843).
In his book The Idea of the Post Modern: A History, Bertens (1995) explains that
even though Hassan no longer plays a significant role in the debate on postmodernism, his
contributions were vital to keeping the debate alive in the early 1970s. He was, Bertens
argues, the scholar who promoted the terms “postmodern” and “postmodernism.” “There is
virtually no article or book on literary postmodernism published between the mid-1970s
and mid-1980s that does not refer to Hassan’s work,” Bertens writes (p. 36). Moreover,
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(French: De la grammatologie) is a 1967 book by French philosopher Jacques Derrida that has been called a
foundational text for deconstructive criticism. It is one of three books, the others being Speech and Phenomena (French:
La voix et le phénomène) and Writing and Difference (French: L'écriture et la différence), which Derrida published in
1967 and which established his reputation. Of Grammatology discusses writers such as Claude Lévi-Strauss, Ferdinand
de Saussure, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Étienne Condillac, Louis Hjelmslev, Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, Roman
Jakobson, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, André Leroi-Gourhan, and William Warburton. The English translation by Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak was first published in 1976.
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according to Bertens, Hassan added another important element to his idea of postmodernity
by incorporating the claim that postmodernity was not simply a cultural shift but “it also
involves a new relationship between human kind and their environment” (Bertens, 1995, p.
41). Hassan (1971) argues “that we are witnessing a transformation of man more radical
than anything Copernicus, Darwin, Marx, or Freud ever envisaged” (p. 567). In his article,
Hassan challenges us to have a response of our own –a very postmodern attitude, indeed—
as readers and writers of literature. “How shall we respond to these new realities? Should
we sever ourselves from the sources of imagination and change in our time?” Hassan asks
(p. 568). Bertens explains that what Hassan (1983) refers to in his philosophical pondering
is the notion that consciousness has absorbed the deconstruction of the world due to
technology, marking an imminent and unavoidable shift of paradigms towards the
“emergence of human beings as language animals, homo pictor, or homo significans,
gnostic creatures constituting themselves, and increasingly their universe, by symbols of
their own making” (p. 10).
Hassan’s (1983) words are prescient. They foretell the future of society in that
media shapes the languages of self and society in advanced capitalist states to engender the
posthuman condition. Given the historical circumstances in which Hassan (1983) was
writing and the technology of his time, he describes encyclopedias as data banks, which
could become “nature itself” for the postmodern human. In describing the role of media,
Hassan says:
Media of course, may derealize history even as they disseminate it around the
world, often as kitsch or entertainment. But media also project mind to the edge of
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the universe or into the ghostly interstices of matter, and so favor another type of
immanence, which scientists since Heisenberg25 have recognized as human
participation or intervention in nature. Daniel Bell26 perceives this as the emergent
stage of cultural development, implicating human beings in the recreation of reality
and confronting post-Kantian epistemologies with the enigma of artificial
intelligence. (p. 10)
By “post-Kantian epistemologies,” Hassan (1983) is referring to Kantian ethics, which
essentially argues that people are ultimately rational beings, and rationality is the ultimate
goal. That said, Hassan implies that artificial intelligence is a contradiction, due to its lack
of rationality. In other words, why would we –as human beings—feel the desire to create a
machine capable of destroying its creator? On the other hand, and from a more abstract
point of view, I can observe Hassan’s theories implemented in electronic encyclopedias,
such as Wikipedia. Wikipedia’s existence is founded upon the destruction of a single
author, either as a person or as an institution, an effect that has led the posthuman creature,
meaning each and every one of us, to perceive and accept Wikipedia as a natural
occurrence. Accepting Wikipedia as natural, in turn, makes the concepts of revision and
history disappear from our collective consciousness, thus pushing the electronic construct
into the Real of Baudrillard’s (1981) simulacra. In other words, Wikipedia is a cultural
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Author’s note: Werner Karl Heisenberg (5 December 1901 – 1 February 1976) was a German theoretical physicist and
one of the key creators of quantum mechanics.
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Daniel Bell (May 10, 1919 – January 25, 2011) was an American sociologist, writer, editor, and professor emeritus at
Harvard University, best known for his seminal contributions to the study of post-industrialism. He has been described as
"one of the leading American intellectuals of the postwar era." His three best known works are The End of Ideology, The
Coming of Post-Industrial Society, and The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism.
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phenomenon that is constantly erased by a new territory that replaces what it was a
moment ago. Good analysis. As Baudrillard (1981) would argue, it is a reality that replaces
itself with another reality every second. Hassan (1983) would identify it as an element in
perpetual change that has “led to the ‘disappearance of a sense of history’ in the culture, to
a pervasive depthlessness, to a ‘perpetual present’ from which all memory of tradition has
disappeared” (p. 155).
To explain this phenomenon of erasure, Bertens (1995) presents Frederick
Jameson’s27 (1991) two features that provide a conceptual framework for
postmodernism—both of which are constructive for the current discussion on cyborgs. The
first of Jameson’s concepts is “pastiche,” and the second is “discontinuity.” The principle
of pastiche is, according to Jameson, radical fragmentation that renders nothing but
stylistic diversity and heterogeneity. Pastiche is parody without laughter, without the
satirical impulse, without reference to what once was perceived as normal. Pastiche in the
age of total eclecticism is “all that remains of a parody that has lost its former function”
(Bertens, 1995, p. 114). Jameson is describing a work of art, and the exhaustion to which
art has been subject in the postmodern era. The artist, he argues, “is condemned to lifeless
imitations and permutations, that is, to produce art that is essentially about art itself, and
more specifically about its own failure” (Bertens, 1995, p. 116). There is a reason why I
am introducing the term “art” into my discourse here; it is because from this moment on, I
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(born 14 April 1934) is an American literary critic and Marxist political theorist. He is best known for his analysis of
contemporary cultural trends—he once described postmodernism as the spatialization of culture under the pressure of
organized capitalism. Jameson's best-known books include Postmodernism: The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, The
Political Unconscious, and Marxism and Form. Source: Wikipedia.
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am going to shift my focus from the discourse on cyborgs as physical hybrid entities back
to avatars, which are artistic representations of the person, and ultimately, of the Self. I will
then shift again to the ICEVORG, making it the main character of my discourse. That
being said, I must complete Jameson’s (1983) thoughts on pastiche as a fundamental
manifestation of postmodern, and therefore, posthuman thinking. Pastiche can be observed,
Jameson contends, in what he describes as “nostalgia films” (Jameson, 1998, p. 130),
historical films that are, paradoxically, utterly ahistorical. For Jameson, these types of
films are “invading and colonizing even those movies today which have contemporary
settings: as though, for some reason, we were unable to focus on our own present, as
though we have become incapable of achieving aesthetic representations of our own
current experience”(Jameson, 1998, p. 117).
This observation then leads Jameson (1998) to present the second feature of
postmodernism, as he sees it, discontinuity. He describes the second feature in terms of “its
peculiar way with time,” or as a language of disorder, resulting from the subject’s failure
“to accede fully into the realm of speech and language” (Jameson, 1998, p. 118). With
respect to Jameson’s second feature, Bertens (1995) explains that language gives us our
experience of temporality, human time, past and present, memory, and the persistence of
personal identity. Such deconstruction of the perception of time leads to an absence of the
experience of temporal continuity. This side effect of postmodernity condemns us to live in
a perpetual, always discontinuous, present. We can no longer live a life where temporal
sequencing is taken for granted, and, I want to argue, we find ourselves in need of breaking
free from our bodies. We do it by means of art, of visual representation of our bodily
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presence. By breaking free from the constraints of a uni-corporeal existence, we can adjust
to feel adequate and exist as a coherent whole in the postmodern era. In other words, we
must be posthuman to exist in posthuman times. My argument may be validated by
Jameson’s description of postmodernism. He explains postmodernism in the following
terms: “the transformation of reality into images, the fragmentation of time into a series of
perpetual presents” (Jameson, 1998, p. 125). Here is where I conclude the subject of the
cyborg, for the simple reason that it requires a body to be. No body equals no cyborg. But,
postmodernism does not end in the limits of the body; rather it begins where it ends.
However, in order to understand cyborgs and how they influence my dissertation
work, another related concept must be put on the scholarly table. That is the concept of
avatar in relation to cyborgs, and how it leads to the construction of ICEVORG. I have
described the avatar as a concept that negates the cyborg by absorbing its theoretical
elements and dismissing the body itself. Our need to go beyond the hybridity offered by a
cyborg has moved us into the Real of the avatar. I have introduced the basic idea of what
an avatar is in previous pages, and to add to what I have already said on this concept
fundamental to the construction of ICEVORG, I must state that an avatar is not a cyborg.
There is a concise and precise distinction between the two: A cyborg has a physical body,
whereas an avatar does not need one to exist, nor does it need a fixed medium to support it,
rather just a collection of media. Additionally, avatars, as I will explain in the following
pages, have already become integral components in the fabric of the postmodern and
posthuman culture.
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“Avatars are Not Vampires,” Said Little Red Riding Hood to the Imaginary Wolf
Avatars, as argued before, are visual representations of humans; they are forms of
expression that break free from the constraints of time and space. The avatar is a being that
participates in human life, yet remains distinct in both an evolutionary and an ontological
sense. I have previously asserted that avatars may serve the role of conduits of
consciousness among realities (Gregory, 2013; Villaverde & Roymieco, 2013). My
intention in the following pages is to contrast the conceptual framework supporting what a
cyborg is with what avatars promise to be, and the features they deliver to us, their
operators. It is important to understand that both concepts, cyborgs and avatars (which
evolves into ICEVORG), thrive in the deconstructed atmosphere of postmodernity and
posthuman theory. It is the endless fragmentation, and the possibility of disrupting the
linearity of time and space as proposed by postmodern philosophy, that provides fertile
ground for bringing avatars into the discourse of contemporary society (Nusselder, 2009).
To get a good grasp of the avatar today, from both the scholarly and popular culture
perspective, we must begin in the darkness of a movie theater, where the relatively fresh
idea of the avatar was introduced into the stream of collective consciousness. I am talking
about the film that bears the name avatar itself. Avatar was written, directed, and produced
by James Cameron, and distributed by 20th Century Fox. With a massive budget of 300
million dollars, a production time of 15 years, and generating nearly 3 billion dollars in
profits, Avatar continues to be the record-holder in terms of sales around the world (Box
Office Mojo, 2012). Cameron’s Avatar continues to hold the world box office record with
$2,783,918,982 dollars in sales. Taking into consideration that the average price of a ticket
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in 2012 was $7.96 (Tuttle, 2013), one can “guesstimate” that at least 400 million people
became aware of what the term “avatar” refers to in a matter of just a few years. The figure
I am introducing is a very poor calculation from a scientific standpoint, and it does not
account for the fact that Avatar was reported by TIME magazine as “the most pirated
movie of that year”; “It’s been revealed that Avatar was illegally downloaded from
BitTorrent28 websites a whopping 16,500,000 times in 2010”(Levy, 2010, para. 3).
In other words, Avatar was not just a movie, but also a major medium to deliver an
idea, a conceptual word, that was once limited to a higher order of intellectual
comprehension. The term “avatar” became part of the world’s cultural consciousness,
thanks to Avatar’s worldwide screening to multicultural audiences; such pervasiveness of
the term demonstrates the relevance of my discussion on avatars and cyborgs. What I find
the most interesting about Cameron’s film is that it serves as a theoretical bridge between a
cyborg and an avatar.
According to Hillis’s (2009) article “From Capital to Karma: James Cameron’s
Avatar,” the movie story makes a direct reference to Plato’s Timaeus (c. 360 BCE), where
Plato introduces the concept of the demiurge29: “Therefore, we may consequently state
that: this world is indeed a living being endowed with a soul and intelligence…a single
visible living entity containing all other living entities, which by their nature are all
related” (pp. 29-30). Hillis reads the content of the movie’s intertext as describing issues in
28

BitTorrent is a protocol supporting the practice of peer-to-peer file sharing that is used to distribute large amounts of
data over the Internet (“BitTorrent,” n.d.).
29
demiurge |ˈdemēˌəәrj| noun: a being responsible for the creation of the universe, in particular:
• (in Platonic philosophy) the Maker or Creator of the world.
• (in Gnosticism and other theological systems) a heavenly being, subordinate to the Supreme Being, that is considered to
be the controller of the material world and antagonistic to all that is purely spiritual.
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connections between networks and the spirit world. He references science fiction author
Samuel Delany who suggests that viewers are incapable of connecting to the experience of
the movie due its complex and incoherent aesthetic, delivered through CGI30 and 3D
effects. Yet the story before the audience presents somewhat more advanced creatures that
live in unison with the whole world. In his analysis of the movie, Hillis suggests that
according to Delany:
Spectators experience fluttering on the edges of a collective post-Hive Mind31
fantasy: an inverted prelapsarian vision of the individual as a networked empath
who is also already part of the tree of knowledge. Experientially, then, the film’s
outstanding special effects work synergistically with its depiction of the Na’vi as a
pre-Cartesian society, a 3D global village literally in touch and connected with the
wider sentient world they inhabit. (p. 2)
Hillis then points out how the Na’vi, the indigenous people featured in the film,
interconnect with other creatures by means of a form of physical interlinking that allows
the neurological systems to become one. This system is decoded by scientist Grace
Augustine, a supporting character played by actress Signourney Weaver. Grace is
responsible for not only developing avatar bodies, but also for understanding their
language, culture, and traditions from the inside (think cultural anthropology) in order to
accomplish a peaceful colonization—hence, the complex and intense cross-referencing
with human history and culture.

30
31

Computer-generated Imagery
Collective consciousness, the apparent consciousness of colonies of social insects such as ants, bees and termites
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In Cameron’s 2007 screenplay, we can find a key moment that I think will help me
in describing the notion of avatar that was delivered to millions of moviegoers worldwide.
It is the moment when Jake Sully, the protagonist of the fictional story, hops into the
machine that will allow him to transgress the boundaries between realties and become the
operator of the synthetic Na’vi avatar. As an aside, I must add that Jake is yet another great
example of Baudrillard’s (1981) simulacra, but with a twist that becomes central to the
development of my notion of ICEVORG. Jake Sully example is a great application of
Baudrillard’s simulacra inasmuch as he is, according to Cameron’s narrative, the identical
twin of the original avatar’s operator. The avatar’s original operator was a military-trained
human, who passed away, leaving the spot open to his brother, who is characterized in the
movie as a paralyzed man bound to a wheel chair. To be precise, according to Jake Sully’s
very own wiki page, he was born in August 24th 2126, and is a paralyzed renegade Marine
veteran who replaces Tom, his twin brother, who was killed on Earth (“Jake Sully,” n.d.).
As the movie explains, having the exact same DNA, brain, and neurological system, Jake
is capable of entering his late brother’s Na’vi avatar, which is basically a custom-made
organic machine developed by the Avatar Program on Pandora, the alien planet where the
narrative unfolds.
The relationship between Jake, his brother, and the avatar is a great example of
Baudrillard’s (1981) simulacra because, from a theoretical perspective, Jake replaces his
better self, his brother, who was much better equipped, both physically and mentally, for
the mission, yet is dead. In addition, the lack of a cyborg replicant jeopardizes the whole
avatar program, as we are told in the movie’s narrative. However, by means of a high-tech
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electronic machine that acts as a conduit of consciousness, Jake is capable of regaining a
full phenomenological experience (Heidegger, 1962) with nature. As he regains full bodily
features in a body that provides much better features than those obtained with a normal
body, let alone his paralyzed one, it does not end there. He discovers later in the movie the
capacity to enter the wholeness of the Pandora planet, making his experience, through the
use of an avatar, extend beyond Baudrillard’s simulacra.
Let me then take you through Cameron’s script, to the very moment when Jake
Sully hops into his “link” unit, making use of what narratology theorist Ryan (2005)
defines as a “metaleptic machine,” to enter into his avatar for the first time:
INT. LINK ROOM – DAY NEXT MORNING
GRACE, NORM and JAKE approach their link units.
Jake glances through a PRESSURE WINDOW. In an adjoining chamber (the AMBIENT ROOM) JAKE’S
AVATAR lies on a gurney, breathing slowly in PANDORAN AIR. NORM’S AVATAR is on a second
gurney. Both are attended by med techs in exo-masks.
Norm slips into his LINK CHAIR, expertly donning biometric sensors.
GRACE: How much link time have you logged?
NORM: Five hundred and twenty hours.
Grace looks pointedly at Jake.
JAKE: Like -- an hour.
GRACE: Tell me you’re joking.
Grace opens the hood of Jake’s link unit. Jake starts hauling himself across from his wheelchair. She reaches
to help him but -JAKE: Don’t! I got this.
Grace steps back, hands raised. He drags himself into the unit.
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Figure 18: Several screen shots from James Cameron’s movie “Avatar” from the scene where the protagonist
wakes up with his consciousness inside the artificial body of an avatar. .

GRACE: So you just figured you’d come out here to the most hostile environment known to man, with no
training of any kind, and see how it went? What was going through your head?
He meets her eyes with a defiant glare.
JAKE: Maybe I was just tired of doctors telling me what I couldn’t do.
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Grace watches him laboriously pull his inert legs into the link chair by hand.
Jake settles into the warm fluid gel packs lining the unit. It seems to enfold him. Grace adjusts his biometric
sensors, then lowers the UPPER CLAMSHELL -GRACE: Relax and let your mind go blank. That shouldn’t be hard for you.
JAKE: Kiss the darkest part of my lily white -- But the SLAMMING HOOD muffles the rest.
MAX: Initiate link.
The LINK TECH touches some controls. ON A LARGE MONITOR a 3D SCAN of Jake’s brain appears.
Regions of activity flow with complex shifting colors.
MAX: That’s a gorgeous brain. Nice activity.
GRACE: Go figure. (walking away) Alright, I’m going in.
TECH: Phase-lock at forty percent. He’s in transition.
Max watches a display showing the avatar’s nervous system aligning with Jake’s -- two ghostly networks of
light merging.
MAX: That’s it. Find your way home. ECU JAKE, inside the link unit. His eyes move under the lids, like a
dreamer in REM sleep as -- INSIDE JAKE’S MIND -- radiant streamers coalesce into a pulsing TUNNEL
OF LIGHT and --THE SCREEN FLARES WHITE -- ZZZWHAP! -- resolving into an overexposed, out-offocus image – two BLURRY FACES wearing masks, looking down.
ECU JAKE’S AVATAR -- two very intense eyes FILL FRAME, the pupils contracting. Golden irises pulse
with life.
MAX: He’s in.
TECH: Phase-lock ninety nine percent. The link is stable.
Blinking, Jake slowly sits up on the gurney. He looks down at his AVATAR BODY, touching his chest with
one hand.
MAX: Take it slow, Jake. We need to check your motor control. Try touching your fingertips together - But
Jake isn’t listening. He’s staring at his legs. He eases them off the gurney and -- HIS BLUE FEET touch the
concrete floor, taking his weight. JAKE STANDS, feeling the strength in his legs. His expression is childlike with wonder.
HIS POV -- looking down at the med techs, who seem the size of children next to his 9’ tall frame. He sees
something like a blue tentacle curl across his arm and he JERKS AROUND in alarm. HIS TAIL. As he turns
to see it, the tail sweeps instruments off a table with a crash. Jake laughs and grins at Max.
MED TECH: Easy, Jake, I need you to sit down -- But Jake takes a step, then another. The wires to the
biomonitors pull taut, and he yanks them off his chest.
MAX: Jake! Wait, we have to run some tests -- But Jake pushes past the protesting med techs, toward the
door and -EXT. AVATAR COMPOUND – DAY
Jake emerges, blinking in the morning sun. He finds himself in the AVATAR COMPOUND -- a living and
training area. Nearby, a couple of AVATARS are playing one-on-one in front of a (non-regulation height)

204
basketball net. Others go about their daily activities around the compound. Jake flexes his legs -- JUMPS -and lands a little unsteadily, but his expression is joyful. He takes a few steps and breaks into a RUN. People
are calling to him, somewhere, but he doesn’t hear them -- he’s running. RUNNING! He finds himself in the
COMPOUND GARDEN, and stops amid neatly tended rows of ALIEN PLANTS. He looks down, wiggling
his toes in the warm soil. Then inhales deeply – reveling in the alien smells -- earth, plants, the nearby forest.
He looks at his bare footprint in the soil of an alien world.
GRACE (O.S.): Hey Marine!
Jake turns at the familiar voice to see -- A statuesque FEMALE AVATAR walking toward him. AVATAR
GRACE is magnificent, with panther thighs, flat muscular stomach
and firm athlete’s breasts. She wears shorts and a T-shirt. In human years she would be about 35.
JAKE: Grace?
GRACE: Well who’d you expect, numbnuts? Think fast!
She throws him a piece of Pandoran fruit, which he catches.
GRACE: Motor control is looking good.
Jake bites into the fruit, the juice running down his chin.
NORM (O.S.): Hey, check it out.
Jake turns to see NORM’S AVATAR posing like a bodybuilder -- chest shot, back shot, bi’s.
NORM: I am a living god. (Cameron, 2009) Your quotation is very long. Do you need the entire quote? Add
a full reference to it in the bibliography.

In analyzing the script and its visual representation (note the procession of texts ala-Baudrillard (1981), I find this particular segment of the film script theory-heavy, and
therefore, worthy of additional attention, as here we can find a little bit of everything.
What I mean is that in the preceding segment of the script we can find science,
religion, mystery, drama, irony, sarcasm, even comedy. We can find a whole selfcontained play. As I mentioned before, McLuhan’s (1964) relevant reflection emphasizes
that “instead of asking which came first the chicken or the egg, it suddenly seemed that a
chicken was an egg’s idea for getting more eggs” (p. 12). I cannot help thinking that the
above scene from Avatar presents us with a similar paradox. Which was first? Was it Jake
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Sully’s brother, Tom, who was trained to operate the avatar’s body, the avatar body
designed to cover him and make him disappear? Or was the whole story created to provide
Jake Sully and his paralyzed dysfunctional body with a way to escape reality into
simulation, and therefore hyperreality? What is certain, following this narrative, is that at
an emotional level, the narrative of the story presented alludes to improvement, liberation,
and happiness. Although, said happiness may be fleeting once Jake Sully returns to the
limitations of his phenomenological reality, when he once again embodies his form of a
corporeal prison. Which was first then? Was it the avatar, or the idea of having an avatar?
For this particular story, we can point out that, if we follow the logic of the
narrative, the avatar constructed as an inanimate cyborg was first. The avatar was not only
first, but it was a simulation (synthetic, we assume) of a “real” member of the Na’vi
inhabiting the world of Pandora. However, as Jake Sully, in his human form, prepares to
transgress into the unknown, we, as silent observers, disappear from his eyes as he
relinquishes himself to the powers of technology. The cocoon that he enters is named
“link” in the movie, and serves as the mediating machine capable of deconstructing his
existence and separating consciousness from body. From a phenomenological perspective,
we can imagine the power accompanying the ability to regain control of half of one’s
body, regardless of the new container—to say nothing of the fact that the new container is,
indeed, much better than the one before.
It is also interesting to note that the movie presents us with a person who is clearly
and openly unprepared. Jake Sully is not trained to operate the complexities associated
with the avatar. Yet, the character Jake Sully does not only manage to leave his body
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behind and engage in his new container in the same fashion that an animal begins walking
as soon as it is born, but the avatar Jake Sully runs away from the constraints of
technology. Jake’s escape from technological restraint proves that endless hours of
training32 are useless as long as that internal energy, consciousness, or even spirit is
capable of establishing what seems to be a natural connection with the blue puppet to
become a spectacle in the fictive world of Pandora. In a matter of minutes, the protagonist
Jake Sully manages to convince us that he was born—as opposed to educated—to operate
the gigantic blue cyborg from its very innermost and sacred place. Interestingly enough,
the way the movie is visually constructed to support the script represents the arrival of Jake
Sully’s consciousness in the form of a gaze. The avatar suddenly opens its eyes to reveal
that the soulless creature now is alive and ready to exist at its full potential. In watching the
movie, and now in writing about it, I wonder if the way the movie is constructed places a
sense of consciousness right behind the eyes of the viewer, or if it was just me, and the “us
that makes the I” that conjured such a connection. I think Cameron’s Avatar is important to
the construction of an ICEVORG. I find it to be most significant that—in spite of the story
being undeniably fiction—Jake Sully transgressed boundaries between realities, worlds,
and stories by means of using not one, but several media. An avatar therefore, and more
specifically an ICEVORG, is a conduit, a message, and a medium—a medium that is
capable of transgressing boundaries, but resorting to the act of disappearance to do it. Put
differently, to move from reality to reality, we must live immersed, and fully participate in
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The character Norman claims to have more than 500 hundred hours, as opposed to the
single hour that Jake invested in learning how to operate the machine.
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the act of disappearance. This is crucial to comply with Baudrillard’s (1981) fourth order,
that of simulacra, and essential for understanding the sense of reality that evolves as part of
postmodernity and posthumanism. I want to argue then that to transgress boundaries, we
must be willing to disappear, and by virtue of our disappearance, be subject to an eternal
yet mediated existence. I will define this concept as “virtual immortality”; it is a concept
only possible in posthuman discourse, and it is the “reality” that we live on a daily basis.
To support this argument, I introduce the thoughts of Baudrillard (1981), where he
talks about the disappearance of human beings from the world. Baudrillard argues that we
have disappeared, rather than have become exhausted, exterminated, or extinct. He
supports his argument by explaining that the human species, unlike any other living
creature or natural phenomena, has been the only one that has “invented a specific mode of
disappearance that has nothing to do with nature’s law,” which is perhaps “an art of
disappearance” (p. 24). Baudrillard presents his argument by indicating that the real is no
longer visible, as it has been obliterated by the progress of technology embodied in media,
virtual reality, and electronic networks. He founds his claim on the reflection that the
invention of the telescope allowed us to look beyond our senses into a world that was
impossible to reach. He references Arendt to explain how the invention of a point of view
outside the natural world became alienated by technology. All of a sudden reality, as we
knew it, broke into pieces due to the possibility of seeing a new “reality” through the use
of technology that was apparently unquestionable and undeniable.
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For Arendt (1958), this alienation is the result of the use of a telescope (visual
technology) to sever our existence from the constraints of our physical presence in space
and time. In her words:
This is the moment when human beings, while setting about analyzing and
transforming the world, take their leave of it, while at the same time lending if
force of reality. We may say, then, that the real world begins, paradoxically, to
disappear at the same time as it begins to exist. (p. 255)
Arendt supports her argument by describing how the use of a tool—in this case, the
telescope—allowed intellectuals to escape the constraints imposed by physical reality. It is
important to note that she is talking about the transgression of boundaries as a process
facilitated by technology. The assimilation of what I argue to be disruptive technology
taken as factual dismantled what was considered the real. More importantly, it shifted the
power and control of the truth from the Church to science, and by virtue of the change, a
new order was created. The new order represented a new reality, where the previous one
had to disappear and reemerge evolved in order to survive. Accepting the telescope as a
form of bodily augmentation, an extension of the eye—or more precisely, the gaze, as
McLuhan (1964) would argue—is key to understanding what Baudrillard would name the
“Order of the Hyperreal,” and his famous concept of simulacra (Norris, 2004).
Furthermore, it is important to establish a clear understanding of what an avatar
provides, and how it is facilitated by technology, yet more importantly, by abstract
thinking. Cyborgs, as opposed to avatars, do not marinate?? in the concept of
disappearance. As a matter of fact, cyborgs are an undeniable form of bodily presence in

209
the physical world. As technology becomes one with the hosting body, cyborgs are—to a
certain extent—enhanced forms of humans, but ones still subject to the limitations of the
physical world.
In 1997, Kunzru interviewed Donna Haraway, arguably the mother of the scholarly
definition of “cyborg,” for WIRED magazine, where Haraway explains, once more, what a
cyborg is. The article is important in that it functions as a bridge to translate—or decode—
the complex and abstract concept of “cyborg,” as has been constructed by scholars, into
layman’s terms. WIRED helped the world better understand what seemed to be stories
pulled from the world of science fiction and inserted into everyday life. Kunzru opens his
article by referencing popular characters, such as the human-looking machine from
Cameron’s (1984) The Terminator, starring actor Arnold Schawarzenegger as an assassin
sent back in time to kill the future mother of the leader of the war against the machines,
and thus prevent his birth. Cameron presents a futuristic world where machines have
completely taken over, and are in a battle for total world domination. As appropriate as it
may sound, Kunzru makes a conceptual mistake in selecting this reference. The Terminator
is not a cyborg, for it has no human consciousness, just human flesh. In other words, the
assassin looks like a human, but has no consciousness.
The article proceeds by describing Haraway as a down-to-earth, approachable
human being who happens to declare herself a cyborg for the simple reason that, according
to her, we have already been assimilated by contemporary technology, and by merely
existing, we are already cyborgs. This idea goes hand in hand with posthuman theory. To a
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certain extent, we cannot choose to not be cyborgs. In interpreting Haraway, Kunzru
(1997) writes:
But she’s not talking about some putative future or a technologically advanced
corner of the present. The cyborg age is here and now, everywhere there is a car or
a phone or a VCR. Being a cyborg isn’t about how many bits of silicon you have
under your skin or how many prosthetics your body contains. It’s about Donna
Haraway going to the gym, looking at a shelf of carbo-loaded bodybuilding foods,
checking out the Nautilus machines, and realizing that she’s in a place that
wouldn’t exist without the idea of the body as high-performance. It’s about athletic
shoes. ‘Think about the technology of sports footwear,’ She says. ‘Before the Civil
War, right and left feet weren’t even differentiated in shoe manufacture. Now we
have a shoe for every activity.’ It’s about the ‘interaction of medicine, diet, training
practices, clothing and equipment manufacture, visualization and timekeeping.’
(para. 3)
Haraway’s words convey with a strong punch what a cyborg is: a human-made partmachine, part-network, part-human. Cyborgs are complex hybrids of meat and technology
that do not surround us, in Kunzru’s (1997) words, but “incorporate us” (para. 5). All the
networks, he says, are “also inside us” (para. 6). We transform our bodies to move beyond
the physical alteration that being a cyborg entails. By ingesting chemicals, and going to the
gym on a daily basis, we long to create and recreate ourselves. We do this to gain some
level of control in the process of creating our very own identity, our very own selves. Yet,
the selves we create and construct are not cyborgs only; they go beyond, they push forward
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into the realm of avatars and use them as a means to expand presence through
disappearance. We are no longer responsible for a single complex “self,” but for a self and
a digital self. I will argue, therefore, that the digital self is a posthuman construct that
departs from the idea of cyborg, and moves into the future, by means of ICEVORG.
It has been two years since the last time I wrote the preceding paragraph, and it has
been quite a challenge to move back into research mode. Quite a serious chunk of life
happened in between paragraphs, including but not limited to divorce, bankruptcy, and
identity deconstruction, even relocation between the hemispheres. After several years of
researching the construction of my very own avatar, I can attest to what I wrote before.
Now, I understand that the act of disappearance was necessary to let the complex ideas I
was working with root inside my brain and grow. I, as an avatar, have experienced the
transformation associated with my identity. To a certain extent, I became the subject of my
own discourse. I continue to define myself as a cyborg, a human hybrid that incorporates
flesh and technology to generate what intends to be a unit of meaning defined as person.
As I reached the final paragraphs of this chapter, my brain was a bowl of hot alphabet
soup. Now, I am ready to continue.
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CHAPTER SIX
From Avatar to Cyborg to ICEVORG
‘How come you're not at the Hilton?'
She answered him by reaching back, between his thighs, and gently encircling his scrotum with thumb and
forefinger. She rocked there for a minute in the dark, erect above him, her other hand on his neck. The leather
of her jeans creaked softly with the movement. Case shifted, feeling himself harden against the Temperfoam.
His head throbbed, but the brittleness in his neck seemed to retreat. He raised himself on one elbow, rolled,
sank back against the foam, pulling her down, licking her breasts, small hard nipples sliding wet across his
cheek. He found the zip on the leather jeans and tugged it down.

‘It's okay,’ she said, ‘I can see.’ [Sound of the jeans peeling down]. She struggled beside him until she could
kick them away. She threw a leg across him and he touched her face.

Unexpected hardness of the implanted lenses. ‘Don't,’ she said, ‘fingerprints.’

Now she straddled him again, took his hand, and closed it over her, his thumb along the cleft of her buttocks,
his fingers spread across the labia. As she began to lower herself, the images came pulsing back, the faces,
fragments of neon arriving and receding. She slid down around him and his back arched convulsively. She
rode him that way, impaling herself, slipping down on him again and again, until they both had come, his
orgasm flaring blue in a timeless space, a vastness like the matrix, where the faces were shredded and blown
away down hurricane corridors, and her inner thighs were strong and wet against his hips. – The
Neuromancer (Gibson, 2000, p. 33)

The previous chapters focused on two key concepts that I combined to construct a
new form of representation given birth in the interstices between concepts. I am mostly
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interested in those seemingly empty spaces where unexpected things can happen. The
crossing from one reality to another allows intellectual growth, but it can take place only
when humans open their minds to the unknown. Moving from reality to fiction, and from
fiction to worlds yet to be discovered, is, by far, one of the most fascinating scholarly
undertakings that we can approach. This chapter will talk about crossovers, transitions, and
unexpected turns that allow our imagination to flourish and evolve. I find text to be a
powerful tool to pursue said challenge, and images the perfect tool to complete the
journey. The function of this chapter of my dissertation is to mix, shake, and serve all
words written before this in a hot bowl of alphabet soup. I want to invite you to entertain
the idea of adding a seed of an image that wants to be. So, please bear with me as we go
for the final ride.
I wish I could see your face right now, but I am not there, even though I am
somehow present through the projection of my thoughts as words. I wish I could have been
present to see your reaction to the introductory quote from the novel Neuromancer as an
opening to the text that will follow. The reason behind what may be seen as a provocative
act is to invoke in you, readers, an emotional reaction that does not have a physical body,
only a posteriori physical manifestation. I am not interested in the specific reaction that
was caused by your reading the paragraph, but simply that there was one. Whether your
reaction was one of awe, surprise, repulsion, arousal, or any other is irrelevant. What I find
fascinating is the capability of a text to incite such a reaction. In this case, I will argue that
you just experienced what I call an “ICEVORG.”
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As I will explain in more detail an ICEVORG embodies the experience of that
indelible relationship among text, intertext, and context that finds fertile ground in
emotional response. Let me, however, go back into my story. Neuromancer is a seminal
text for cyberculture studies, but it also applies to other fields of scholarly research due to
the complex nature of its narrative. Presented to the world by William Gibson in 1984, the
novel quickly became a foundational text for analyzing and understanding postmodern
society from the perspective of literary studies. The novel’s narrative evolves to explain
how its characters live inside an electronic machine that is connected to an alternative
reality. It ultimately argues that it is inside the machine—in the infamous Matrix—where
the Real actually takes place, and where Baudrillard’s (1981) simulation takes place. We
inhabit that space using none other than avatars themselves (Stevens, 1996). Stevens even
suggests that the Matrix itself is another avatar, writing:
The characters of Gibson’s Neuromancer… and eventually the matrix itself, when
it comes to know itself, are all entities who live to one degree or another in the
machine, in cyberspace, or to use Gibson’s formulation, in the matrix of human
knowledge ‘from the banks of every computer in the human system’ (p. 51). They
are all, to put into play another of his frequently-used words, ‘personalities.’ Most
are reproductions, digital representations (or manifestations) of someone who was
already alive, already human, and in that sense already someone who thinks. (p. 15)
Stevens also observes that there are no boundaries between the machines and us, an idea
that conjures at a subconscious level an emotion similar to those uneasy feelings
experienced upon reading the introductory quote. As I continue to write the following
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pages, I can attest that my mind has grown another body. I have become my very own
ICEVORG, thanks to many years of painstaking construction. The machine has not gotten
inside of me just yet, but it soon will. Given the opportunity, I would definitely turn myself
into a cyborg, so that I could accommodate, in a better way, the ICEVORG I carry within.
However, I must concentrate and reel my discourse back to avoid falling into the rabbit
hole.
By now, the idea of what an ICEVORG is may be well-assimilated, but I think it is
important to summarize where I stand—textually speaking—to establish order inside my
wondering brain. In the last two chapters, I focused on defining what an avatar is; but,
more importantly, I focused on reinforcing the notion that an avatar is not a cyborg or any
other form of theoretical construct without a bodily presence. Even though this is a rather
simplistic observation, I find it to be an important one. However, to continue, the basic
premise stating that “a cyborg is not an avatar” must be granted theoretical validity, as it
becomes the backbone of what an ICEVORG is.
I define “ICEVORG” as a conceptual construct derived from the intertextual space
present among avatar, cyborg, medium, and message. It is a conceptual being, an illusory
presence that cannot be denied existence since it is the subject of intellectual observation.
More importantly, ICEVORG is a way to enter and experience the Real, or what is left of
it. At the same time that it serves as a port of entry into the order of the Real, it also helps
us to open our eyes to Gibson’s (1984) Matrix, or what he calls the “consensual
hallucination” (p. 5).
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It is rather important to understand the etymological origin of the term
“ICEVORG.” ICEVORG is an acronym designed to combine the letter “I,” representing
the individual and its reflection, as was explained in the previous chapters. However, “I”
also stands for intelligence, a crucial component of this particular intellectual construct;
without it, any attempt to engage in any form of more complex and elaborate thought
would not be possible. The letter “c” stands for cyberspace.
Even though the Internet is an undeniable experience for the average person, the
validity of the internet as physical territory continues to be a demanding undertaking for
the brain. To think of the Internet as a real territory provokes critical reflections on the
implications of accepting it as such, primarily due to its lack of regulation by the general
public (Cohen, 2007). Cohen explains that the “cyberspace” metaphor originated in
science fiction, and then migrated into the legal discourse via the work of academic
commentators. At that point, this conceptual space became the subject of scholar
commentary, especially as it pertained to legal matters and the law. Regulating the space
became a complicated matter, as there was no “real” space to regulate. But, at the same
time, it was impossible to deny this space’s existence, and the speed at which it affects our
daily lives.
Even though conventional wisdom now rejects the initial exceptional claim that
cyberspace is inherently freer than “real space,” the belief that it is nonetheless inherently
different has persisted. At the same time, however, court decisions in cases challenging
unauthorized access to web-based information have invoked place- and space-based
metaphors to demarcate virtual “property” (Cohen, 2007).
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Some scholars argue that cyberspace is indeed a consensual hallucination, as
Gibson (1984) describes in Neuromancer, especially when it comes to validating its status
as a metaphorical space that is applicable (or not) to the fabric of reality. But, for others,
the Internet “is simply a communication network, and the cyberspace metaphor distracts
from doctrinally faithful and/economically rational policemaking” (Cohen, 2007, p. 211).
However, the meaning that I am adopting for the construction of my proposed term,
“ICEVORG,” invokes the tradition of postmodernist cultural studies, which claims that the
use of cyberspace as metaphor produces unexpected, and even undesired, consequences in
the fields of politics and ideology. Cohen claims that interdisciplinary work (such as this
dissertation), which is based on human cognition and philosophy of mind, chooses to use
cyberspace as a metaphor because “our cognitive makeup dictates that we must” (p. 212).
Cohen suggests an imagined relationship between “cyberspace” and “real” space, one that
is expressed in the development of ideologies and desires to frame it. She then identifies
three general categories of constructed spaces to express different social and psychological
functions in the human consciousness:
Utopia are imaginary places through which their designers articulate visions of
ideal social ordering. Isotopia are constructed, whether deliberately or by force of
habit, after the pattern of existing places. The interplay between the ideal and the
real, and between the ideal and its opposite, the dystopia, are much explored topics.
The ideal and the analogous, however, do not exhaust our narratives of place. (p.
211)
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Cohen (2007) then identifies a third place, one which I am most interested in exploring
since it is here that ICEVORGs are born and thrive. To construct this third place, she refers
to Foucault (1967) and his description of a third type of place called “heterotopia,”
explaining that “he viewed [it] as peculiarly constitutive of distinct human societies” (p.
212). This peculiar conceptual space possesses the unique ability to establish a shared
space where all the other forms can coexist. Yet, while utopia exists only in the
imagination, heterotopia “are real spaces in which the ordinary rules of behavior are, in
different ways, suspended to permit the enactment of a variety of processes and rituals that
do not occur in ordinary spaces” (Cohen, 2007, p. 213).
Acknowledging “ICEVORGs” as inhabitants of heterotopia is very important for
the success of their genealogy, and their subsequent evolution as theoretical creatures.
The letter “e” stands for “emotional,” as well as for “electronic,” as in “email,” for
instance. An ICEVORG must be, I argue, the representation of an emotional state of mind.
Unlike cyborgs or avatars, it is of great importance that ICEVORGs enable an emotional
response in the viewer or observer. This aspect may be the most challenging, yet the most
sensible, aspect involved in the formation of an ICEVORG. Even though the name itself
implies ice, what I wanted to convey when I designed the term was the message that ice is
indeed an adaptable matter that once exists in a different state: liquid. The adaptability and
endless capacity of water to change shape and form is vital to the construction of the
concept of ICEVORG, and to its evolution into an embodied entity capable of crossing
boundaries. Without the capacity to adapt and transgress spaces, an ICEVORG could not
exist.
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To further develop the idea of the role of the electric and electronic component in
the ICEVORG, I must revisit McLuhan (1964), according to whom moving from the
mechanical age (Benjamin, 1910) to the electronic age has procured a radical shift in our
paradigms. We have changed our thought processes in the same manner that the system of
production and communication has changed, from the mechanized and repetitive circular
movement of the machine to the frantic and endless linear advancement of the electric
current. McLuhan continues by claiming that we are able to observe such transformation in
the time it takes us to react to messages, input, data, stimuli; yet, in spite of this fact, we
continue to think in a fragmented way, in patterns of what he calls “the pre electric age” (p.
8). In McLuhan’s words:
Western man acquired from the technology of literacy the power to act without
reacting. The advantages of fragmenting himself in this way are seen in the case of
the surgeon who would be quite helpless if he were to become humanly involved in
his operation. We acquired the art of carrying out the most dangerous social
operations with complete detachment. But our detachment was a posture of
noninvolvement. In the electric age, when our central nervous system is
technologically extended to involve us in the whole mankind and to incorporate the
whole of mankind in us, we need to participate, in depth, in the consequences of
our every action. (p. 30)
McLuhan (1964) touches on a point that helps me construct the conceptual framework for
the ICEVORG when he explains how we cannot escape our involvement in the electronic
age. This is clearly manifested in certain decisions we may (or may not) take regarding our
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position on contemporary communication technologies. What I am referring to is accepting
or denying the extension of our consciousness into the realm of the consensual
hallucination (Gibson, 1984) we call the Internet. At this point in my development of
hypertextual communication, avoiding involvement in said technology is almost
impossible, so impossible it would be difficult not to label it as a potential act of
disappearance and revelry. This act of “living off the grid” has even become the subject of
a reality TV show, which is observed with awe by those who are not a part of it. The TV
reality show “Risking It All” is produced and presented by The Learning Channel (TLC),
an American satellite and cable network focused on family matters. According to its
Wikipedia entry, TLC initially focused on educational and learning content, but by 2001,
the network began to primarily focus on reality series involving lifestyles, family life, and
personal stories. As of February 2015, approximately 95 million American households
receive TLC (Seidman, 2015). The goal of “Risking It All” is explained on its official
website as follows:
Escaping the pressures of modern society proves to be an unforgettable and lifechanging adventure as three families set out to live off the land. These families not
only unplug their smartphones and tablets, but they also give up electricity and
running water for a life off the grid in a drastic last resort to reconnect with each
other. From attempting to save their marriage to dealing with family illness to
regaining control of their relationships, each family has a different reason for
embarking on the journey of a lifetime. The three families pack up their homes, say
their good-byes to loved ones, and prepare for the challenges that come with
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trading in the luxuries of modern-day society for a self-sufficient life (TLC, n.d.,
para. 1)
Today’s viral dissemination of reality shows relates to McLuhan’s (1964)
technocratic prophesies as he explains how the flood of information, and the speed at
which we are covered by it, has created a spectacle from which there is no escape. As
McLuhan claims,
The Theater of the Absurd dramatizes this recent dilemma of Western man, the
man of action who appears not to be involved in the action. Such is the origin and
appeal of Samuel Beckett’s clowns. After three thousand years of specialist
explosion and of increasing specialism and alienation in the technological
extensions of our bodies, our world has become compressional by dramatic
reversal. As electrically contracted, the globe is no more than a village. Electric
speed in bringing all social and political functions together in a sudden implosion
has heightened human awareness of responsibility to an intense degree. It is this
implosive factor that alters the position of the Negro, the teenager, and some other
groups. They can no longer be contained, in the political sense of limited
association. They are now involved in our lives, as we in theirs, thanks to the
electric media. This is the Age of Anxiety for the reason of the electric implosion
that compels commitment and participation, quite regardless of any “point of
view.” The partial and specialized character of the viewpoint, however noble, will
not serve at all in the electric age, [i]n a culture like ours, long accustomed to
splitting and dividing all things as a means of control, it is sometimes a bit of a
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shock to be reminded that, in operational and practical fact, the medium is the
message. This is merely to say that the personal and social consequences of any
medium—that is, of any extension of ourselves—result from the new scale that is
introduced into our affairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any new
technology. [M]any people would be disposed to say that it was not the machine,
but what one did with the machine, that was its meaning or message. (p. 33)
This lengthy quote is necessary to explain several aspects of the ICEVORG. Electronic
media are the imaginary space where ICEVORGs live and thrive. Without electronic
media, it would not be possible for them, for us, to survive as electronic beings that
transgress media, and therefore expand beyond the limitations of our physical bodies. As a
matter of fact, it is interesting to observe that there is parallel reality supported by new
technologies of communication that exists right now—a reality that is far superior to the
one we lived only a century ago. However, the shift in technologies and the incorporation
of electric input has rendered a society that lives, as McLuhan (1964) explains, in constant
anxiety and depression. We must feed our bodies with daylight, and our brains with
nightlight, to maintain this crazy pace that leads to nowhere but into our minds, and into
the electric grid we call the Internet. The anxiety McLuhan mentions becomes integral to
ICEVORGs in terms of emotional input. We, as humans with augmented realities at our
disposal, have yet to learn how to negotiate the plethora of emotions resulting from the
emergence of new technologies incorporated into our old primitive bodies. We are not
quite cyborgs, but our expectations as society have long surpassed the need to be integrated
with technology.
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The anxiety brought on by the smart phone, to name one electronic medium, is
beyond comparison. It has become a phenomenological experience. We spend a
considerable amount of time checking our so-called smartphones, though that moniker is
highly questionable. The electronic theater of the absurd we carry so close to our heart has
no equivalent in the past. At no point in the history of the world have we devoted so much
time to a particular device. Books have usually been limited to a privileged segment of the
population. The incorporation of TV sets, as well as the telephone, into daily life, even into
the family, made a great impact and changed society for good. The same effect was created
by the printing press centuries before, yet the impact of cellular telephony has surpassed
that of the internet itself. The impact I am talking about, and the one that makes the “e” in
ICEVORG as important as the other constituents, carries with it a very peculiar
responsibility; the “e” component does not only refer to electric, but to emotional. The
“e,” purposefully situated in the middle of the word, sharing the space with the “v,” is the
factor that keeps our humanity protected yet vulnerable. Emotional input is what continues
to separate us, humans, from machines.
According to Miller (2012), by the year 2025, more than 5 billion people on our
planet will be using ultra-broadband, sensor-rich smartphones with capabilities beyond
those of today’s iPhones, Androids, and Blackberries:
How could such humble little devices have such power to advance our science?
[psychology] A $700 iPhone doesn’t look like much compared with a $2 million
MRI brain scanner. Yet smartphones are becoming very common, powerful, and
multifunctional all-in-one lifestyle technology, a sort of electronic Swiss Army
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knife (Barkhuss & Polichar, 2011). Worldwide, mobile broadband users (who
typically use smartphones) numbered about 370 million in 2009, 720 million in
2011, and will reach 1.8 billion in 2014; worldwide sales of new smartphone were
about 175 million in 2009, 350 million in 2011, and will reach 700 million in 2015
(Portio Research, 2011). By 2025, most of the projected eight billion people in the
world will carry smartphones. (p. 221)
Even though these devices are not designed to collect data for research, the fact that every
action is recorded in the device itself, as well as in the network, presents the possibility for
understanding emotions in the relationship that has emerged between humans and the
electronic devices that are quickly and progressively becoming augmentations of our
bodily existence. The seemingly innocuous and now ubiquitous, sleek contraption has
become the sidekick of every human, homosexual or heterosexual, young or old, earning a
living wage. The type of person possessing the device does not matter anymore, as long as
one has a pair of hands and a pocket, one can carry an extra limb that promises far superior
abilities than any of our other organs ever will.
Considering the fact that I am arguing that the “e” component in the conceptual
construct that I named “ICEVORG” refers to electronic and emotion, I find myself obliged
to incorporate a rather succinct, yet focused, definition of emotions for the purpose of my
study. To do so, I am making use of the work of Rei Terada (1999), who approaches
emotions from the perspective of comparative literature. In his article entitled “Imaginary
Seductions: Derrida and Emotion Theory,” Terada defines emotions from a philosophical
perspective by indicating that
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[t]he main stream of Anglo-American philosophy holds that emotions are both
physiological experiences and mental judgments, but that the character of an
individual emotion stems from the specific beliefs and desires involved in a given
judgment. …[E]motions are seen as blends of feelings and thoughts, and in
particular beliefs. …[M]any twentieth-century philosophers agree that, in addition
to being feelings, emotions have to be “about” something. Like intentions,
emotions take objects and entail beliefs about them. To this extent, they are not so
much sensations that happen to me as they are conceptions I express. (p. 195)
It is of interest to my dissertation to provide a clear understanding of what emotions are
because they play a major role in the formation of ICEVORGs inasmuch as they are the
main reason why we, as ICEVORGs’ parents, operators, and shepherds, give them so
much of our attention and care.
Interestingly enough, Terada (1999) draws upon phenomenology,more specifically
Husserl’s work on intentionality—to support his arguments. Husserl, as Terada notes,
asserts that emotions come into being through their intentional connections to objects. In
his own words, Terada explains:
Husserl distinguishes “feeling-acts (emotions) from “feelingsensations” such as
bodily pain. And Husserl solves the problem of our not always knowing what our
emotions are about by posting formal objects for them. If an object is vague or
indeterminate, that is no obstacle to its being a kind of algebraic object: here we are
dealing with intentional experiences. …This formal approach remains important in
philosophy today. …Philosophers like to emphasize cognitive contents in this way
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because once we grant that emotions belong to intentional discourse, we can
evaluate their suitability and hold people responsible for emotive reactions. …But
in doing so they describe a surprising consequence: the conceptual nature of
emotion itself excludes expression. Emotional conceptually opens the space of
theatricality and imagination, rendering our own emotions accessible only through
the acts of imagination and identification by means of which we feel for others. We
are left with emotion that is inherently second order. Because expression inherits a
Platonic suspicion of representation, we assume that successful emotion is
immediate; second-order emotion sounds like “emotion” in quotation marks, a
mere miming of emotion. That is why Jameson believes that Andy Warhol’s
washed-out images, suspended in a world of mediation, can no longer move us very
much. (pp. 196-197)
In applying Terada’s commentary to my dissertation, I must add that what makes us human
in today’s simulacra (Baudrillard, 1981) is the maintenance of our connection to emotions.
Emotions are, by far, an inherently human characteristic that continues to be the subject of
study, as well as the pivotal theme of cybernetics, robotics, and the entire genre of Sci-fi
literature and film. All of these fields and genres continue to tackle the idea of
incorporating emotions into the different machines we continue to design for the perennial
promise of societal betterment. Ironically, the more we attempt to inject the machine with
emotion, the further away we become, for we cannot go beyond mimicry.
In addition, and returning to the discourse on smartphones, it is important to note
that one of the causes of our anxiety, and our desire, is the ability to convey emotions, true
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emotions, using our smartphones as mechanisms of pleasure, where we can deposit our
virtual seeds to grow an electronic Self. In order to avoid sounding too shallow, I am
compelled to add Derrida’s (1976) thoughts on identity. Derrida suggests a fundamental
point of departure for the birth of ICEVORGs when he says,
I am not myself without an imaginary self that mediates me, and it is through that
self that real emotions get felt. Such emotions require an explanation that
expression cannot provide. They are neither intentional nor expressive—not
because they don’t have objects, and not because we don’t feel them on purpose,
but because whether they are directed at objects or not, and whether we feel them
on purpose or not, they take place on mental stage peopled by virtual identities. (as
cited in Terada, 1999, p. 197)
Emotions, I must emphasize, are what keep us human in the midst of the flood of
technological progress. As technology continues to evolve and spread to every possible
field, from agricultural harvesting machines to the pharmaceutical industry, a decisive
element that technology cannot reach—despite endless attempts—is the world of emotions.
Perhaps one day we will be able to design and master the technocrat Zeus, an emotional,
fully functional, and fully autonomous robot. Yet, the question remains: What for? What
would be the function of such an accomplishment? To mimic the human construct we call
God? I am much more cynical than what I am expressing in these lines, but I do not think
that pursuing the idea of creating a “flawed”—as opposed to flawless—being would be an
accomplishment at all; it would be nothing more than a demonstration of our unlimited
stupidity. That being said, I must acknowledge that we are walking on that same path,
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heading in that same direction, and the conceptual creature I am delivering with my words,
the ICEVORG, is, in a paradoxical way, my contribution to such nonsense. Good selfcritique.
Continuing the explanation of the etymology of my proposed term, the next letter
in the acronym is “v,” and it stands, once more, for two concepts. The first concept is
“visual,” and the other, “virtual.” An ICEVORG, up until this point, has been an intelligent
computational construct that exists where emotions are expressed and maintained, in the
interstices between our brain and electronic communication. The next component is the
visual construct and the virtual space.
On the relationship between image and emotion, in his groundbreaking treatise
Camera Lucida, Barthes (1980) tackles the complexities of the semiotics and semantics of
images. When he describes a photograph (I exchange the term “photograph” for “image” in
an attempt to include any form of constructed image), Barthes explains that constructed
images reproduce ad infinitum. However, the meaning itself can be reproduced only once,
and more importantly, it is never the object itself that matters, but the emotional response it
conjures in the viewer. As Barthes puts it,
In the Photograph, the event is never transcended for the sake of something else:
the Photograph always leads the corpus I need back to the body I see; it is the
absolute Particular, the sovereign Contingency, matte and somehow stupid, This
(this photograph, and not Photography), in short, what Lacan calls the Tuche, the
Ocassion, the Encounter, the Real, in its indefatigable expression. In order to
designate reality Buddhism says sunya, void; but better still: tathata, as Alan Watts
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has it, the fact of being this, of being thus, of being so; that means that in Sanskrit
and suggests the gesture of the child pointing his finger at something and saying:
that, there it is, look! But says nothing else; a photograph cannot be transformed
(spoken) philosophically; it is wholly ballasted by the contingency of which it is the
weightless, transparent envelope. (pp. 8-9)
When I apply Barthes’s reflections to an ICEVORG, I argue that the intentionality of my
proposed construct is the same as that of the photograph: to work as a conduit between
meaning and referent, between signifier and signified. An ICEVORG, just like Barthes’s
child, points to its referent. However, I must indicate that an ICEVORG does not limit its
existence to visual representation in the space and time where it exists. Unlike a physical
analog photograph, which results from the application of a particular chemical process on a
prepared concrete surface, an ICEVORG does not need physicality to exist. I must
reinforce the idea that ICEVORGs thrive in the interstices among their constituents. Those
interstices may easily be electronic, or take place inside the brain in the form of emotional
expressions. An ICEVORG must include emotion since it is part of her very nature.
Freeland (2007) explains that a key aim of images constructed with the intention to depict
the likeness of a particular person is to serve also as a conduit to connect the viewer with
the person being observed. The function of this connection is to convey the emotional
input that the subject painted (or photographed) expresses in order to construct his or her
persona. As Freeland writes,
A key aim of portraitures depicting the sitters is to convey his or her “person-ness”.
This goal is central to our modern conception of the portraits since “at the core lies
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the relation of the viewer

and viewed” (Podro, 1998 p. 106). We could describe

this aim by saying that the painter seeks to convey the subject’s unique essence,
character, thoughts and feelings, interior life, spiritual condition, individuality,
personality, emotional complexity. Just how this is done involves use of the varied
techniques of portraiture to show many significant external aspects of a person,
such a physiognomy, in addition to the depiction of features such as status and class
through the use of props, clothing, pose, and stance, composition and artistic style
and medium. (p.98)
When constructing an ICEVORG, the aims that Freeland (2007) describes become tools
for success. The more control one can have in the construction of an ICEVORG, the better
the result. Of course, there are many aspects one cannot control in the construction of any
visual representation. Yet, as times change, and technology becomes more and more
capable and powerful, it is much easier to mimic reality to the point of no return. To a
certain extent, we have already surpassed that frontier in terms of technology, as in the
case of Cameron’s 2009 film Avatar. However, as a collective consciousness in constant
evolution, we are not there yet. What I mean is that in spite of having forced the majority
of the population to become candid photographers and empirical designers and artists, the
overall quality of the images constructed and shared through electronic media has not
reached industry standards. Put differently, we, as a collective, have not assisted in the
construction of a convincing virtual reality just yet. The case of Facebook may be the first
attempt to construct such a reality, but given its relative infancy, there is still a long road
ahead. However, I must stress that we—collectively, as an interconnected society—are not
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doing such a bad job. ICEVORGs are constructed on a daily basis, and each and every one
of them carries with it the original intention to contain and procure an emotional response
in the viewer. Freeland (2007) further explains that a good portrait ultimately
conveys the person’s subjectivity. The [subject] should appear to be autonomous
and a distinct person, with unique thoughts and emotions. As a persona the
[subject] is embodied, but the self is there “in” the embodiment, and the artist must
“realize”, “concretize” or “objectify” it in the image. (p. 98)
Freeland (1998) points out, yet again, the importance of capturing emotion, and the
complexities associated with such a challenging task as capturing it in the surface of an
illusory construct: an image.
It becomes a daunting task to capture emotion in a conceptual entity that will be
fixed in time and space. As we can see, in spite of the amazing development of current
technology, super computers, smaller and faster computers, interconnectivity—a smaller
village as McLuhan (1964) predicted in the seventies—we continue to search for meaning
through the deployment of images that attempt to “touch” us and to “move” us in
emotional ways.
However, it is fascinating that regardless of how hard we try, and how well we
control technology, there is a “something” inside the image that will always place the
image beyond our control. Barthes (1981) named this something “punctum,” explaining it
through the analysis of images captured to deliver emotional input. He defines “punctum”
by contrasting this term with another construct he calls “studium,” detailing both concepts
in these terms:
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What I feel about these photographs [he is describing images from a news
publication] I can of course, take a kind of general interest, one that is even stirred
sometimes, but in regard to them my emotion requires the rational intermediary of
an ethical and political culture. What I feel about these photographs derives from an
average affect, almost from a certain training. I did not know a French word which
might account for this kind of human interest, but I believe this word exist in Latin:
it is studium, which doesn’t mean, at least not immediately, “study,” but application
to a thing, taste for someone, a kind of general, enthusiastic commitment, of course,
but without special acuity. It is by studium that I am interested in so many
photographs, whether I receive them as political testimony or enjoy them as good
historical scenes: for it is culturally (this connotation is present in studium) that I
participate in the figures, the faces, the gestures, the settings, the actions. The
second element will break (or punctuate) the studium. This is it is not I who seek it
out (as I invest the field of the studium with my sovereign consciousness), it is this
element which rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me.
A Latin word exists to designate this wound, this prick, this mark made by a
pointed instrument: the word suits me all the better in that is also refers to the
notion of punctuation, and because the photographs I am speaking of are in effect
punctuated, sometimes even speckled with these sensitive points; precisely, these
marks, these wounds are so many points. This second element which will disturb
the studium I shall therefore call punctum; for punctum is also: sting, speck, cut,
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little hole – and also a cast of the dice. A photograph’s punctum is that accident
which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me). (p. 26)
In interpreting Barthes’s (1981) conception of the punctum, it is interesting to read his
original text to better understand how he arrives at the word he chooses to convey such a
complex meaning. The most important reason for reverting to the original text, however, is
to fully comprehend what he calls the studium, since it can be observed with regularity in
everyday life in the form of advertisements, for instance. We are living in times where the
image overwhelms our daily lives. It is hard to believe that we have moved from cave
paintings to Times Square, where images are so abundant that before we realize it, we are
one more image projected onto gigantic displays of liquid crystal communicated at the
speed of light. My amazement ceases to be subdued as I think about the infinite studia
constructed by the powers of advertising and mass media on a daily basis. Isn’t it amazing
and overwhelming to accommodate the idea that we departed from scenes of hunters and
animals and arrived at today’s Instagram? Or Facebook? Flickr? All of a sudden, we have
been forcefully compelled to become photographers, artists, image-makers, and designers.
Yet, it is precisely because of this consequence of technology that the concept of punctum
becomes relevant. Punctum is the soul of the image, which cannot be controlled in its
construction. It is there. It is what pictures want, as Mitchell (2005) would claim. Images
want to be, to exist, and to be seen. However, not all images have souls, or punctums; only
certain ones carry this aura within. One could argue that the punctum is that unforeseen,
ethereal, unexpected element, the monster that we bring to life; the punctum is the fiend,
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the monster, the wretch that takes on a life of its own, as Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein
would concur.
Accordingly, I have chosen to throw the notion of punctum into the theoretical
melting pot, in which I am concocting the ICEVORG. ICEVORGs, therefore, must seek to
contain a punctum, while keeping in mind that a punctum is inherently uncontrollable;
therefore, this is something the ICEVORG must do on its own. The quest for the punctum
is how the dissertation gains its status as poetry and mystery. As creators of the punctum,
we cannot help but aspire for punctums to break the boredom of our images, to land on our
constructs as butterflies land on the flowers they so choose.
In elaborating upon the concept of punctum, Jenkins (2013) argues that what
Barthes introduces to the academic world with his notion of punctum is not a singular
concept or entity. Rather, punctum is a multiplicity of instances because its presence
allows viewers to depart from the surface of the image and enter into virtual worlds,
powered by their own thinking. In her words:
Barthes’s notion of the punctum is plural; there are multiple punctums, each of
which is a punctuation in mode transforming the spatiotemporal parameters of
perception, leading viewers on an adventure into blind fields and often raising
metaphysical questions about space, time, life, and death. (p. 576)
Jenkins indicates that Barthes (1982) outlines two instances where punctums emerge: one
that references life in the act of puncturing, with the other referencing its opposite, death,
by discovering the pricking wound in the reading of an image. She writes,
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Given his phenomenological commitment and ontological desire to learn at all
costs what Photography was in itself many readers understand the punctum as
exclusive to photography, making any attempt to expand the concept to other media
seem dubious, at best. (p. 577)
Jenkins (2013) argues that applying punctum to other media “seem dubious” (p. 577) to
stress that puctums are not found in animation or cinema as constructs, given the level of
control over images in those media. In other words, punctums cannot be created, only
observed. Punctums, Jenkins continues, are subjective in nature because they create a
paradox through a conceptual rupture of a static image, and that paradox’s importance
relies on the fact that it “points to the potential variances in punctums, variances permitting
the expansion to other media” (p. 579). Jenkins then further develops the idea of the
subjective in the punctum by stating that:
[T]he depiction of the punctum as subjective is somewhat misleading because the
punctum is about affect, and effect, according to recent theorists drawing on
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, is presubjective. Emotion is a subjective response,
experienced and acknowledged by the subject, but affect is distinct from emotion…
…In other words, affects are the lived, embodied sensations of experience prior to
the subject’s rational and emotional responses to affecting and being affected. (p.
580)
In applying the preceding ideas to the ICEVORG, I argue that one of the goals of an
ICEVORG—if not its main goal—is to create punctums as they move, spatiotemporally,
from media to media, and to create these punctums as true experiences lived by the
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creators of ICEVORGs and ICEVORGs in their own right. Barthes (1981) demonstrates
the affective nature of the punctum when he writes:
In this glum desert, suddenly a specific photograph reaches me; it animates me, and
I animate it. So that is how I must name the attraction which makes it exist: an
animation. The photograph itself is in no way animated… but it animates me: this
is what creates every adventure. (p. 20)
This last reflection on animation, and how it fits into the fabric of what an ICEVORG is,
leads into the next component of the ICEVORG acronym: the letter “v,” the virtual
component.
Considering all the preceding scholars and theories utilized in my dissertation, from
Baudrillard to Haraway to Barthes, I throw the notion of the virtual into the mix in order to
satisfy the main goal of my dissertation. The main goal of my dissertation is to offer a new
conceptual living form that results from the mating, interbreeding, transgression, and why
not, resistance of the previously visited concepts that give birth to it.
Even though the field of virtual reality today constitutes a vast and expansive sea of
textual interpretations, I see myself obliged to throw my creation into the wild waters of
the storm, while teaching it at the same time how to float. It is important that the
ICEVORG is viewed not as a theoretical construct only, but as a creature in its embryonic
stage. The creature I am proposing lives and feeds off of the capacity to move from one
medium to the next, and back again. Such flexibility in movement is possible thanks to
what I will theorize in the next pages as the blood of cyberspace, where I describe the role
of hypertextual communication as it relates to the ICEVORG. To better contextualize

237
where exactly I am planting my seeds, so to speak, I would like to briefly describe the
parallel reality we call the Internet.
In 1968, an electronic network became readily available to the public. It was opened
to anybody who owned a computer and had access—via modem—to the Advanced
Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET). Developed by the United States
Department of Defense during the Cold War, ARPANET stood as the world's first
operational interchange of information and the predecessor of the global Internet.
Immediately following its debut, ARPANET invited discussions of cyberspace.
Cyberspace is derived from the term cybernetics, which was coined by
mathematician Norbert Wiener to define “[t]he science of control and communications in
the animal and machine” (Manovich, 1995, p. 251). Wiener used this term to describe the
control of moving missiles in navigable space. Science fiction writer William Gibson then
deployed the term in his 1984 science fiction novel Neuromancer, and thus the idea of
cyberspace was born. In Gibson’s cyberspace, the body is adjustable in every possible
way, and reality is defined as merely a fragile perception. Similarly, time is defined only
by moments. These moments are shared, according to Gibson, by millions of people
around the world, who live outside the screen—cyberspace—but are perceived as part of it.
Today, this shared perception through cyberspace is typified by a highly complex
tapestry of electronic characters, signs, and symbols, mediated by hypermedia machines.
This new medium of communication is changing the way we live, learn, and love. Its
transforming power demands a reconstruction of paradigms, which are more adequately
adjusted to the fast-paced electronic evolution of human and machine.
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However, as early as 1945,Vannevar Bush theorized about the influence that
individualized electronic technology had on daily life. He introduced the idea of an
individual, private device, capable of immense organized storage, and called it “memex.”
In her own words a memex is “a device in which an individual stores all his books, records,
and communications, and which is mechanized so that it may be consulted with exceeding
speed and flexibility” (p. 45). Bush also reflects upon the convergence of different media
in the small electronic device she refers to as “memex.” Her prophetic words read as
follows:
Man cannot hope fully to duplicate this mental process artificially, but he certainly
ought to be able to learn from it. In minor ways he may even improve, for his records
have relative permanency. The first idea, however, to be drawn from the analogy
concerns selection. Selection by association, rather than by indexing, may yet be
mechanized. One cannot hope thus to equal the speed and flexibility with which the
mind follows an associative trail, but it should be possible to beat the mind decisively
in regard to the permanence and clarity of the items resurrected from storage.” (p. 42)
Her description of a general shared trail of information foreshadowed, to a certain extent,
what would later become the Internet. It could be argued that Bush (1945) is describing the
basic foundation for the Google enterprise when she writes: “There is a new profession of
trail blazers, those who find delight in the task of establishing useful trails through the
enormous mass of the common record” (p. 46).
Her vision of technology changing the conceptual indexing and sharing of
information also includes an expected degree of interdisciplinary conflict. Such conflict
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results, she claims, from different professionals sharing a common space. Further into her
prescient essay, she questions the change in the perception of reality that these new forms
of human interaction demand. She describes the potential brain reactions these electronic
machines stimulate by changing the mode of communication from mechanical to what
Bush (1945) calls “electric vibrations” (p. 43). Bush shows, however, a high concern for
the fragmentation of our perception of reality:
[B]ut who would now place bounds on where such a thing may lead? In the outside
world all forms of intelligence whether of sound or sight, have been reduced to the
form of varying currents in an electric circuit in order that they may be transmitted.
Inside the human frame exactly the same sort of process occurs. Must we always
transform from mechanical movements in order to proceed from one electrical
phenomenon to another? It is a suggestive thought, but it hardly warrants prediction
without losing touch with reality and immediateness. (p. 47)
Bush’s keen visions of the future demonstrate how correct she was in observing that these
electronic devices, or hypermedia machines, open the possibility for the unlimited
systematic exchange of indexed information. What she fails to see is that the loss of touch
with reality she refers to does not result from physical electric waves inside the human
brain alone, but from the way we symbolically construct identity.
Almost 30 years after Bush’s work, Nelson (1974) described a world where the
computer is considered a very special device, “a dream machine” (p. 21). He argues
against the emerging need for trained specialists to operate computers and electronic
devices, suggesting that computers use “technology that is bound only by the limits of our
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dreams” (p. 307). Nelson’s intention is to remove the magic aura placed upon all electronic
devices as highly technical machines, and take them down from the pedestal on which
technocrats place them. He empowers people to consider all electronic devices as tools to
express ideas, to build plans, and to propel dreams into reality. Nelson stresses the
importance of computers because they matter more than people think or want. Nelson
urges us to realize their role in society when he claims that computers matter because
we live in media, as fish live in water... (Many people are prisoners of the media,
many are manipulators, and many want to use them to communicate artistic
visions.) But today, at this moment, we can and must design the molecules of our
new water, and I believe the details of this design matter very deeply. (p. 306)
Nelson theorizes “water” as the medium that allows electronic communication to take
place. One could argue that this already has an abstract form, and, more importantly, a
name. It is called hypertext.
According to Moulthrop (1991), Nelson coined the term “hypertext” to describe the
blood, so to speak, of this new medium for expressing thoughts and exchanging life.
Hypertext differs from intertext on one front: the latter is an intellectual construct, the
former, a living entity. The construction of intellectual discourse in each one of these
media of thought representation does not change. What changes is the way one interacts
with and generates them. Moulthrop describes Nelson as a visionary who “...foresees a
renovation of culture, a unification of discourse, a reader-and-writer’s paradise where all
writing opens itself to/in the commerce of ideas” (p. 695). His observation of Nelson’s
hypertext could not be more precise, especially when it comes to his comments of the
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commodification of ideas. Hypertext is indeed the blood of the electronic network; without
it, the system would collapse. Imagine how the World Wide Web would be perceived
without hypertext. The Web would quickly turn into Egyptian hieroglyphs, prior to the
discovery of the Rosetta Stone.
Nelson’s (1974) request to consider computers as integral components of daily life
was fully realized in the 1970s. Computers and other media machines quickly flooded the
market place. In the 1980s and 1990s, Nelson’s “dream machines” were offered to the
public as electronic portable devices capable of producing everything the mind could think
of. They were information containers promising to “do it all,” using hypertext to mediate
between the electronic devices and the people who began to become dependent on them.
In 1995, a magazine ad announced the Intel processing chip (Figure 19). The ad
shows a personal computer in the center of a clean, white space. The advertising copy
introduces an electronic machine that provides everything but the kitchen sink, from
multimedia presentations, to financial plans, to face-to-face communication, to, ultimately,
the unlimited sharing of ideas. By the end of the Twentieth Century, hypertext was the
blood flowing through all electronic devices connected to the Net. Hypermedia machines
were taken for granted, as they were considered not only liberating tools of expression, but
augmentations of one’s body.
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Figure 19: Intel Inside. Advertising art. 1995. Artstor/The Image Gallery .

According to Bolter (2001), the electronic medium “allows complete graphic freedom: the
writer may ultimately control each pixel on the screen representing letters”; and he adds
that “...the computer encourages the democratic feeling among its users that they can serve
as their own designers” (p. 682). However, in spite of all this promised freedom, on the
other side of the printed advertisement, a revealing form is conspicuously placed. This
allows viewers to sneak a peek into the main internal component of the mighty machine:
its plastic green brain. It entices the viewer to consider the possibility of ownership, not
only of the electronic object as a tool to work and play with, but as a direct and safe
passage to the acquisition of power. The famous Intel chip is depicted on the page, in
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combination with text underneath that poses a provocative question: “Do you have the
power?” This seemingly harmless inquiry capitalizes on Francis Bacon’s maxim,
“Knowledge is power,” brought to intellectual discourse five years earlier.
The introduction of the personal computer into nearly every home paved the way for
the parallel world of the virtual, where the avatar and cyborg both live. In her article
“Looking toward Cyberspace: Beyond Grounded Sociology,” Sherry Turkle (1999) argues
that when we see ourselves in the reflection created by the shining surface of any
electronic device, we see ourselves differently. By the year 1984, Turkle was already
referring to the machine as a “second self” (p. 643), yet after a decade of research, she
went from explaining the identity of one-person-one-machine to the immense collective of
people that make the Internet. The Internet, in her words,
links millions of people together in new spaces that are changing the way we think,
the nature of our sexuality, the form of our communities, our very identities. In
Cyberspace we are learning to live in virtual worlds. We may find ourselves alone as
we navigate virtual oceans, unravel virtual mysteries, and engineer virtual
skyscrapers. But increasingly, when we step through the looking glass, other people
are there as well. (p. 643)
According to Coyne (1994), virtual reality [VR] is a computer that represents sensory
information and feedback with the intention of producing a convincing illusion that the
user is immersed in an artificial world that exists only inside the computer. When
comparing virtual reality to cyberspace, I must clarify that ICEVORGS are conceptual
entities that live in between these two constructs, entities that have not been limited to or
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by the borders of VR. At the same time, VR is not an integral part of cyberspace, and both
VR and cyberspace require avatars and cyborgs that may live in one or the other space. On
the other hand, ICEVORGS, having a more fluid and adaptable nature, may dive into one
or both arenas to communicate and search for emotive affect. However, the challenge of
emerging media lies with the development of identity in the collective. In other words, the
true challenge of our times is how one becomes unique and special in an endless
configuration of zeros and ones.
Turkle (1999) elaborates on her description of cyberspace by stating that it procures
experiences that challenge what we traditionally call “identity” by allowing each one of us,
cyberspace inhabitants, the possibility to live multiple parallel lives. She writes:
Online life is not the only factor that is pushing [identities] in this direction, there is
no simple sense in which computers are causing a shift in the notions of identity. It
is, rather, that today’s life on the screen dramatizes and concretizes a range of
cultural trends that encourage us to think of identity in terms of multiplicity and
flexibility. (p. 643)
In addition, I want to push a bit further to conceive of cyberspace as a gargantuan,
electronic, living and thriving organism that feeds off of us and our ever-growing need to
stay connected to the source. It reminds me of ants and the way they work for their queen,
and in doing so, obliterate their own individual identity. The monster we have created, I
will argue, needs blood in the same way we need it: as a constant supply to stay alive. The
difference here, however, is that cyberspace’s blood is electronic and textual—we call it
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“hypertext”—and it runs through the veins of the monster that we, following in the steps of
Mary Shelley’s genius, have created.
When Victor Frankenstein arrives, at the age of seventeen, at the University of
Ingolstadt, he is afraid and doubtful. The first professor he talks to is M. Krempe, who
teaches natural philosophy. Professor Krempe is characterized as the personification of
discipline; he is old, wise, and ensures that knowledge is well-preserved and safely stored.
Krempe is really a powerful figure within the institution. At first, Professor Krempe is
friendly and welcoming. However, when Frankenstein shares with him the boundaries of
his academic knowledge—limited to only a few authors—Krempe bursts into scholarly
wrath. “Nonsense,” Krempe says, “every instant that you have wasted on those books is
utterly and entirely lost” (Shelley, 1818, p. 31). Then, he concludes, “My dear Sir, you
must begin your studies entirely anew” (Shelley, 1818, p. 29). Frankenstein walks back
home, concerned and quiet, pondering the professor’s comments. Krempe is, after all, a
university professor, someone to look up to, a powerful figure. Pensive and somewhat
intimidated, Frankenstein walks back home with a comprehensive list of books that
defines, according to Professor Krempe, what counts as knowledge, and what is important
for the discipline.
During the next few days, the young Frankenstein hears about another instructor
who teaches chemistry, Professor M. Waldman. Mary Shelley characterizes Waldman as
mature, wise, relaxed, reassuring, and open-minded. He is described as benevolent and
kind. When the young Victor approaches him, he explains, again, the limited breadth of his
academic knowledge, and he includes now another component in his introduction: his lack
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of discipline. When Waldman hears the book titles that Frankenstein now timidly
verbalizes, he praises him and acknowledges the important value of such “scholarship.”
Professor Waldman encourages Frankenstein not to let his curiosity abandon him, and to
pursue several disciplines at once; he says, “I am happy... to have gained a disciple; and if
your application equals your ability, I have no doubt of your success” (Shelley, 1818, p.
29).
One could argue that Professor Waldman’s encouragement of a multidisciplinary
approach to education provides the most fitting environment for the story to evolve.
Professor Waldman’s words ultimately preview the perfect arena for Victor Frankenstein
to attain the unattainable: to create life, a task he accomplishes as a result of intertextuality,
as well as his interdisciplinary approach. Ironically, the novel presents interdisciplinarity as
Frankenstein’s greatest failure, characterizing Victor Frankenstein as a great and sound
example of a Ph.D. student running away from his own creation. Are we little
Frankensteins pretending to bring new ancient ideas to life? The answer to this question is
hiding in between the lines of theory and practice, history and innovation, text, intertext
and hypertext. We could venture to imagine, for a moment, that Victor Frankenstein
decides to embrace the discipline suggested by Krempe, while dismissing Waldman’s
encouragement to pursue interdisciplinarity. This slight change in events would have
meant that the eloquent creature, thoughtful fiend, and inspirational monster would have
never been born. This sequence of events would, consequently, create not only a sad void
in the history of literature, but it would also prevent the use of a powerful metaphor—one
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that has helped us understand, more profoundly, the ways of the world through
intertextuality.
Key to understanding all the content that will follow is the prefix “inter.” “Inter”
denotes reciprocity and connectivity. It represents a stream of data flowing in between the
prefix and the word to which it is attached. Interestingly enough, it is originally meant to
connote something that is both buried and alive. This semiotic something is underground,
interned “into the earth,” “enterrado”; however, it keeps its living and organic qualities
intact to allow for growth and expansion. Interblend, international, and interdependent are
just a few examples of the expressive power that this prefix imparts. Following this train of
thought, interdisciplinary would then imply constant coordinated action and
communication among elements that belong to one or more disciplines. According to
Moran (2010), interdisciplinarity is any form of dialogue or interaction between two or
more disciplines. It is always transformative in some way, and it is constantly producing
“new forms of knowledge” (p. 16). The new forms of knowledge Moran describes refer
more broadly to evolving ways of interaction between different bodies of knowledge.
When literature is combined with theater, for instance, a new form of knowledge emerges
in the same way that it does when geometry and music engage in dialogue. It is important
to consider, nonetheless, that these exchanges of action, which result in constructive
dialogue, require a medium to complete their transformative process. The medium
allowing different academic disciplines to interact results—similar to Shelley’s fiend—in a
construct-creature. This abstract intellectual entity, organic in nature, has gone through an
intense process of evolution that has taken several thousand years, innumerable
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bloodsheds, constant negotiations, and many persuasive myths that result in a collection of
letters we refer as “text.”
A text is comprised of a collection of graphics individually called letters. Each one
of them stands firmly on the surface of the medium to represent a sound. Collectively,
letters comprise the alphabet, and endure the passage of time due to systematic
organization by the institutions in power (Foucault, 1977). Alphabets form words, and
words, endless sentences, thanks to a tight yet flexible set of rules (syntax), and more
importantly, thanks to agreement on their use and implementation as a means to collect,
store, and deliver knowledge. The concept of the alphabet as abstract representation of the
spoken language is a phenomenon that prevailed in Western thought as an integral
component of culture. The alphabet constitutes the flesh and bone of a text. It is, by far,
one of humankind’s most important inventions (after agriculture), given the impact it
procured in society, the human brain, and the construction of reality (Meggs). The
alphabet, once organized and deployed in any medium, became written text and a natural
way to express thoughts and emotions. However, the inherent power of this invention
demanded an opposite to balance its inception in reality. Society’s construction of text
implied—by Hegelian dialectic of opposition—the destruction of some other element.
On the necessity of a destructive force to counterbalance the productive force,
McLuhan (1964) writes that “[t]he major advances in civilization are processes that all but
wreck the societies in which they occur” (p. 8). McLuhan is suggesting that the transition
from sound, representing abstract thinking through language, to graphics, representing
sound visually, became a representation of a representation, and therefore, the replacement
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of reality by simulation (Baurdillard, 1981). This reinterpreted reality, attained through the
naturalization of text as a form of language-thought, forced us to redefine how we encode
and decode reality in relation to time and space. Textuality, or the interwoven fabric
created among texts placed on the same medium, became a powerful way to preserve
knowledge, define power, and construct meaning. Text became our number one mode for
interpreting reality, intertextuality became a form of interaction among texts, using the
power of abstract thinking as its medium.
McLuhan (1964) posits that we drastically switched modes of interpretation—and
information reception—when we fully developed and embraced written communication.
He claims that we exchanged “an ear for an eye by means of the technology of writing” (p.
139). The alphabet in particular allowed us to break free from the constraints of real time,
and the reasoning of the tribal world. He describes the importance of glyphs, or inscribed
symbols, to represent not only the sounds they stood for, but more importantly, the
multiple concepts embedded in these objects through their graphic tracings. As humanity
moved forward, and history became obsessively attached to the people in power, the
alphabet evolved to become a written language and the perfect prison of knowledge.
Socrates expresses such a concern early in philosophy, when he questions writing as the
best way to represent knowledge.
Prior to the invention of the printing press in the 15th century, only the highest
authorities were allowed access to and control of the alphabet. The written word became so
important and fundamental to the construction of society and the distribution of power that
it was equated to the concept of God itself. This idea that text is God remains, even today,
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as it is expressed in powerful publications such as the James King Bible. Tyndale’s (1611)
work demonstrates the power of the written word as it relates to the ultimate controlling
entity. One may still note the power of these words 400 hundred years later, when the
commanding phrase attributed to the apostle John is repeated ad infinitum: “In the
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (John 1:1
King James Version).
It could be argued that there is nothing more powerful than textuality today, at least
for Western reality. The perfect unison among the constituents of the alphabet makes the
harnessing of power possible. The written text became so prevalent that it detached us
from reality. This idea is reinforced by McLuhan (1964) when he explains that the alphabet
“was a technical means of severing the spoken word from its aspects of sound and gesture”
(p. 193). However, this keen observation could also be interpreted positively. The severing
of the seemingly unified construct between sound and idea created the ideal conditions to
expand our understanding of the world. The alphabet became the perfect system of signs to
use language to express freely, and to expand with no apparent boundaries. Text was born,
and along with it, semiology.
According to de Saussure (1916/1983), semiology is the science of sign systems
that studies societies in relation to the symbols they create. De Saussure places a great
degree of importance in words as a means to create meaning. He argues that language:
[D]oes not have a direct relationship to reality but functions as a system of
differences: words (signifiers) have no inherent relation to the concrete things that
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they describe (signifieds), but generate meaning as a result of their differential
relationship with other signifiers. (p. 16)
As explained by Moran (2010), the arbitrariness between elements constructing the
language is important because it presents a twofold potential. First, the same notion of
meaning-making applicable to written languages can be extrapolated to other systems of
signs. Second, it opens the possibility for communication between many different systems
of signs to foster a text-to-text multidimensional dialogue, defined as “intertextuality.”
Moreover, Moran (2010) emphasizes the role of construction (and hence
structuralism) in this process when he describes intertextuality as “the notion that texts are
formulated not through acts of originality by individual authors but through interaction and
dialogue with other texts” (p. 84). He believes that this particular feature of textual
construction, embedded with the potential to promote inter-dialogue with any other textual
construction and/or system of signs, is one of the most significant reasons why
contemporary education promotes interdisciplinary knowledge construction. For Moran,
the notion of what constitutes “text” can be expanded to accommodate other forms of
nonlinguistic symbolic representation, such as “cinema, photography, music and
fashion...emphasizing the form that they share with other texts rather than their specific
content” (p. 85).
These other forms of symbolic representation, he continues to explain, are
summarized in Barthes’s (1957) Mythologies. Barthes’s text aids in the discussion of
intertextuality and interdisciplinary studies. In his text, Barthes places several cultural
commodities, such as wrestling matches, soap powders, children’s toys, wine, and French
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cars, on a single conceptual horizontal line. By analyzing these constructs under the same
lens, Barthes demonstrates the capacity of different systems of signs to interact with one
another.
In “From Work to Text” (1978), Barthes describes the ability of texts to
interconnect with other texts as a form of expression that could render new
multidimensional readings called “intertextuality.” This interchange of information
presents text not only as the perfect medium to fuse thoughts, plans, and ideas, but also for
bringing together authors with authors to foster a form of dialogue that thrusts the idea of
interdisciplinary knowledge forward. The idea of symbolically and intellectually merging
texts to create meaning—in the act known as “intertextuality”—is the most fitting medium
to promote the “interbreeding” of disciplines. Barthes expresses this principle of
interdisciplinarity and intertextuality in the following manner:
It is indeed as though the interdisciplinarity which is today held up as a prime value
in research cannot be accomplished by the simple confrontation of specialist
branches of knowledge. Interdisciplinary is not the calm of an easy security; it
begins effectively (as opposed to the mere expression of a pious wish) when the
solidarity of the old disciplines breaks down – perhaps even violently, via the jolts
of fashion – in the interests of a new object and a new language neither of which
has a place in the field of sciences that were to be brought peacefully together, this
unease in the classification being precisely the point from which it is possible to
diagnose a certain mutation. (p. 155)
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Barthes’s discussion of interdisciplinary communication corresponds to what I define as
hypertext. The concept of hypertext, according to Landow (1997) is best expressed as
“blocks of words (or images) linked electronically by multiple paths, chains, or trails in an
open ended, perpetually unfinished textuality” (p. 2). Landow establishes a connection to
semiology when he describes hypertext as a “galaxy of signifiers” (p. 32) that makes up a
living network of information. His reflections are an interpretation of Barthes’s (1977)
words, which read:
In the ideal text the networks are many and interact, without any one of them being
able to surpass the rest; this text is a galaxy of signifiers, not a structure of
signifieds; it has no beginning, it is reversible; we gain access to it by several
entrances, none of which can be authoritatively declared to be the main one; the
codes it mobilizes extend as far as the eye can reach, they are indeterminable. (p. 5)
Interestingly enough, Landow does not limit his theorizing to texts as words expressed
through alphabetic glyphs, but as units of meaning, or what Barthes identifies as “lexia.”
In his 1970 publication S/Z, Barthes describes the concept of lexia as
brief, contiguous fragments… they are units of reading. This cutting up will be
arbitrary in the extreme . . . . The lexia will include sometimes a few words,
sometimes several sentences; it will be a matter of convenience: it will suffice that
the lexia be the best possible space in which we can observe meanings. (p. 13)
For Landow (1997 not in your bibliography), lexia permits the further development
of a new and transformed version of text composed of many lexias that are “multilinear”
and “multisequential”(p. 3). At the same time, he continues to stress the flexibility of the
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medium through interchangeable denominations between hypertext and hypermedia.
Postmodern hypertextual literary works, such as Jackson’s (1995) Patchwork Girl and
Coover’s (1997) Briar Rose, are often analyzed to better illustrate the current application
and potential expansion of this new medium. Both of these literary works are constructed
with lexias that are electronically interconnected. Analyzing these electronic texts helped
me to understand, in a more comprehensive way, the concept of lexia.
New electronic media are capable enough and flexible enough to accommodate the
demands imposed by a seemingly chaotic intertextual exchange of lexia. The required
medium is expansive, inclusive, and can accommodate immense quantities of data, and
does not, necessarily, impose its specificity using the particular demands of a single
discipline. Even though severing intrinsic meaning from a medium is almost certainly a
utopian thought, the ideal medium for interdisciplinary action should allow the possibility
to function as a placeholder of meaning, as a tabula rasa. The placeholder that promotes
intertextual dialogue and the exchange of thoughts is conceptually embodied in cyberspace
(Turkle, 1999).
One could argue that cyberspace departs from the constraints of the physical world
and expands its breadth to include other forms of intertextual expression. These
intertextual forms of expression are welcomed by hypermedia technology, and thrive in
such technology due to hypertextuality. Literature, to name one technology, has fully
embraced the notion of new media as tabula rasa, as a means of expression, as is evinced
in electronic journals, ebooks, and hypertextual narratives. By the end of the 1990s, when
the notion of new media began to solidify, an unexpected conflict occurred: artists who had
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been using new media for two decades thought they were entitled to claim it as a discipline
of their own. Manovich (2002) explains that many artists began to use computers,
regardless of their preferred media, “to create, modify, and produce works.” “[D]o we need
to have a special field of new media art?” he asks (p. 14). However, this conflict is not
limited to the endless forms of cultural production derived from these emerging hypertextbased technologies. Rather, and more importantly, it expands to the people using them and
the apparent lack of a discipline, which is presumably required to construct seemingly
effective pieces of intertextual communication.
To conclude, contrary to the attitude that the young Victor Frankenstein adopts
toward his creation, the interdisciplinary monster that we are creating using hypertext and
inter-dialogue via new media machines is impossible not to acknowledge, analyze, and
embrace. The monster’s trillions of invisible arms, heads, mouths, ears, and eyes are
reaching everyone in the galaxy, for each monster is ignited by our own need to
communicate. The new galaxy we are creating, which is based on millions of lexia, will
soon surpass the galaxy that we know today, at least at the conceptual level. It is necessary
now to face this monster instead of running away from our lab. In confronting the monster
we are confronting ourselves, not only as individuals, but as a society. The proportions that
this faceless creature is gaining demand our attention and further exploration. Education
today can no longer limit itself to printed books and flat, unidimensional chalkboards. On
the contrary, education must embrace interdisciplinarity to take advantage of this unlimited
electronic fiend, which is inexorably turning into our own reflection. We must face the
monster, I insist, since the monster is slowly but surely becoming part of our bodies, living
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in our consciousness, and helping us construct ourselves. Hypertext and interdisciplinarity
work side by side, feeding each other, honoring their progenitors by constantly referring to
them to invoke history and signification. These emerging realities are calling for
immediate reflection about our role in the development of this invisible and omniscient
creature that continues to devour alphabet soups of hypertexts, as continues to grow and
gain a life of its own. Back in our Frankenstein-like micro labs, contained in the flickering
flat face of new media machines, hour by hour, many inventions arise in this shadowless
reality we call hypermedia. To embrace interdisciplinarity in education is no longer an
option, but a given. To not embrace interdisciplinarity would be incompatible with the
times. Is it going to be easy? Not at all. Interdisciplinarity requires, after all, the command
of at least two disciplines, and this subtle yet fundamental prerequisite implies hard work
and struggle. Interdisciplinarity is a new flexible realm where scholarly research can thrive
and expand to horizons that are no longer flat and unidimensional. What is even more
important is that interdisciplinarity fosters and nurtures the monster we all are helping to
raise. What is more, this monster demands attention. It demands constant attention in order
to know anything and everything, all the time, from what is on our mind, which takes the
shape of a Facebook status box, to what we are doing every second, as represented by the
tiny lexia that we “tweeted” to a restless world. However, we are still nowhere near the
realization Victor Frankenstein experienced upon creating his monster. We did not run
away when we saw our creature. Quite the opposite, we embraced it, and came to believe
that the monster is the creation of our own intellect. But, who is really in control? Who is
creating the monster? Whose monster is it anyway?
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Hypertext: the Blood of ICEVORGS
Having argued that the human sensorium mediates between one’s body and the
experience of the physical world engulfing body and mind, I can comfortably argue in
favor of Baudrillard’s (1981) order of the Hyperreal as working in unison with us to
construct the performative narrative we term “reality.” The Real, as a stage, is composed of
time and space, as well as of the different media that make up the dialogue that takes place
among chemical reactions, abstract thinking, and the physical world—all of which we
collectively refer to as “intertext.” Acknowledging this mind-body-reality intertextual
dialogue is a complex endeavor, one that continues to be an arduous task for philosophic
inquiry.
The connections—and disconnections—between mind, body, and space have been
problematized from generation to generation, from culture to culture, and from technology
to technology. Body, mind, and reality are, after all, only three of the many faces forming
the polyhedric intertext that binds individual to individual in order to ultimately construct
society. However, to function properly, societies need to recognize the individuality of
every one of its constituents; they must do this in order to maintain an acceptable level of
control to enable the proliferation of intertextual dialogue.
Inspired by the possibilities for identity representation offered by contemporary
technology, the agents in power maintain control by constructing portable objects designed
to represent the individual. These objects contain synthesized information resulting from
the combination of images and words, and bind the individual to what could be defined as
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a shared reality. However, given the arbitrary nature of the intertextual languages used to
construct them, and the reality in which they are implemented, their validity is interpretive
and open to transformation.
A dramatic way to experience the arbitrariness contained in these portable
contrivances, and the actual disengagement from the body-mind relationship they claim to
represent, takes place during overseas traveling. Upon arrival to any international port of
entry, one may observe well-guarded gates and innumerable checkpoints ready to propel
one’s mind into a liminal state where identity stands still, as uncertain and doubtful as
could be. Is the person described in the passport oneself? Is the photograph contained in
such a device a trustworthy likeness? The repetitive and scrutinizing gaze of the uniformed
officer’s eyes—the officer who is trained to doubt—reveals the fragility of these
intertextual objects as a mechanism for confirming identity.
To complicate matters, these portable gimmicks are already incapable of securing
the much-needed singularity required to construct identity. The uncontrollable power of
contemporary technology to generate an infinite number of originals demonstrates the
limitations and strengths of these modes of representation. When the discourse of identity
construction moves from intertext to hypertext, the process of identity construction must be
revamped, as reality is no longer constrained by time and space.
Today, the individuals’ options for identity construction are neither limited to a
single mode of representation, nor are they constrained by the flat, static surface of a
portable document. The purpose of this argument is to entice readers to consider
hypermedia machines as natural extensions of one’s body. Hypermedia are alternative
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ways to construct identity, which use hypertext as the vital, organic fluid in the
development of electronic dimensions aimed to push our sense of reality into simulation.
To further my analyses of the role of hypermedia in identity construction, I will relate the
current discourse to Baudrillard’s (1981) thoughts on simulacra and Haraway’s (1983)
thoughts on simulation.
What is a body after all but the sum of its parts? The naked body cannot exist in
society merely as such, but through the never-ending mediation of objects. The garments
protecting the body, for instance, become part of the identity of the user, as does the
jewelry one wears on his or her body. This idea expands ad infinitum to cars, houses, pens,
works of art, home appliances, and so forth; all become part of the intricate construction of
individual and societal identity. The objects we choose to own are extensions of our
bodies; we regard them representations of our identity. Consider, for instance, people who
own Harley Davidson motorcycles. The way they express their identities is taken to the
extreme. The bike is not an augmentation of the body; it is the body. Even more
importantly, portable hypermedia devices have been naturalized as part of the body. In
contemporary society, refusing to own a cellular phone has become a fashion statement. It
stands as a strong and loud message to the world regarding one’s political and social stance
on such technology. It is equivalent to claiming one’s allegiance to vegetarianism or
feminism. Ownership of a mass-produced hypermedia contrivance determines the social
class to which the owner belongs. Even more relevant is the fact that most of us carry
these electronic orthotics attached to our bodies, so we can protect them and be protected
by them. Cell phones help us construct identity at both an individual and collective level,
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while allowing us (thanks to hypertext) to maintain a sense of life as we move through
them. This observation is, by no means, a new concern. It has been the subject of critical
analysis since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. It has also been a source of
inspiration in literature for authors concerned by this overpowering human-machine
relationship.
In 1839, Burton’s Gentleman’s Magazine published the short story “The Man that
Was Used Up: A Tale of the Late Bugaboo and Kickapoo Campaign.” The story’s author,
Edgar Allan Poe, created a fictional character, General John A.B.C. Smith, who
metaphorically represents a socially successful person. He was a body, textually fabricated
by Poe, as a cutting-edge human-machine who was publicly admired and highly respected.
When presented as a single visually perceivable and cohesive whole, A.B.C. Smith is
commanding and overpowering. According to Poe's characterization, he is also physically
attractive. When General A.B.C. Smith speaks, he does so with a commanding voice.
Smith’s statements about the privilege of living in the age of mechanical invention are
expressed in a reassuring tone:
We are a wonderful people, and live in a wonderful age... ...And who shall
calculate the immense influence upon social life — upon arts — upon commerce
— upon literature — which will be the immediate result of the great principles of
electro magnetics! (p. 257)
However, as the narrating voice continues with the deconstruction of this seemingly
perfect social character, the end result falls far from the idea of “human,” at least from the
perspective of “human” as a single physical entity. When Smith was taken apart piece by
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piece, the remaining “thing” is described as a living form, a mass closer to what could be
defined as a consciousness container. Smith is an amorphous body, a living something with
no identity but that which was made out of augmented parts and pieces. Poe’s concerns
regarding the machine, and its effects upon society, continue to be relevant a century and a
half later. His vision and genius allowed him to construct Smith’s character out of
mechanical pieces, using electric energy as the “glue” holding everything together, alive
and unified. Poe’s metaphorical glue, one could argue, is comparable to hypertext today.
This ethereal substance, hypertext, can only be activated by electric impulses, and can only
be experienced through the mediation of hypermedia machines. In return, these electronic
devices can be considered as extensions of our bodies. In new media, identity is created in
a similar fashion. It uses pieces and parts of information to construct the individual as a
whole.
It is interesting to observe that Poe’s story also suggests that we currently live the
same predicament that General A.B.C. Smith faced: the need for hypermedia machines to
assist human beings in the construction of identity. The body cannot live in a natural state
anymore, only as a construct made out of symbolic objects orchestrated in a simulated
reality.
Electronic machines and humans are in constant interaction, as they do not work in
isolation from each other; on the contrary, they are quite interdependent. According to
Licklider (1960), the human-machine interaction is characterized by a symbiosis. He
defines “symbiosis” as ...[a] cooperative living together in intimate association, or even
close union, of two dissimilar organisms” (p. 74). What separates humans and electronic
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machines is nothing but physical distance. In the world of medicine, for instance, there are
several cases where the electronic machine has already entered the body. Pacemakers are
widely accepted devices that must develop an extremely intimate association with the host
organism. Similar cases abound throughout the world; the bodily incorporation of
machines is particularly easy to observe when it assists the sensorium in the interpretation
of reality. Such assistance as provided by machines includes hearing devices, tanks of
oxygen, vision-correcting eyewear, blood-pressure monitors, automated glucose-releasing
mechanisms, among many others. These objects are not only demonstrating the integral
role they play in the preservation of the humans who use them, but they also open up a
larger and more complex inquiry about identity, and the interpretation of the body. If the
body cannot stand on its own anymore, it could be argued, that it is just one more text in
the intertextual discourse of its own construction. Body is then bodytext, an intellectual
construct based on symbiotic relationships with the other objects that construct the whole.
In 1960, Licklider addressed this symbiotic relationship between human and
electronic devices as his visionary prophecies of what is to come. He describes “chemical
machines” outperforming the human brain in “most of the functions considered exclusive
[to it]” (p. 5). He also suggests that the main problem of this potential scenario is based on
the discrepancies between the language of the computer and the language of the human. He
refers to these discrepancies as obstacles to true symbiosis. Licklider observes the most
complex issue to overcome is how to allow a true symbiotic relationship between humans
and machines to occur, in order to develop a common language and thus foster interaction.
He advances his argument by saying:
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For the purposes of real-time cooperation between men and computers, it will be
necessary, however, to accept an additional and rather different principle of
communication and control. (p. 79)
The common language Licklider (1960) describes could be interpreted as the “flow of life”
that allows the symbiotic interaction to succeed. This electronic symbolic blood helping
the symbiosis to occur could be directly applied to the concept of hypertext. Hypertext is,
then, the common language flowing from one hypermedia device to another. Hypertext is
the vital fluid of the system, the binding agent, the element holding it together.
When hypertext is considered the common language described by Licklider, an
intimate association between objects and humans emerges, and it allows life to flow, and
symbiosis to engender interaction. The interaction promotes the redefinition of self and the
reconsideration of identity construction. This emerging human-hypermedia relationship
thrives in the textual gardens of information, with hypertext playing the role of nourishing
mediating substance.
New hybrid organisms exist in the pragmatics of this evolving human-hypermedia
machine relationship. Hypermedia machines are now attached to the body. They share
common ground through sight, hearing, and touch; smell and taste are still temporarily
frozen in the liminal world of R&D departments. Images working in unison with sound are
perceived through sight, and then they are manipulated through touch.
Touch becomes the new commodity to sell; it is now part of hypermedia machines at
all price levels. Hypertext uses these three senses as forms of interaction. It preserves the
fictive life as a continuous flow of invisible energy by using electronic waves and
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microwaves. Furthermore, hypertext is meaningful only when it exists in the public arena.
The definition of what constitutes “public” transforms to accommodate portable
hypermedia devices. According to Haraway (1983), cyborgs, such as these hypermedia
devices, are “[n]o longer structured by the polarity of public and private” (p. 517).
Bodies and hypermedia machines have co-founded a new space in compliance with
culture and the marketplace. Culture, Haraway (1983) suggests, “can no longer be the
resource for appropriation or incorporation by the other” (p. 517).
Contemporary cyborgs demand common ground with each other, and they find it in
the realm of social networking. Social networks are electronic simulations of reality, and
they are constructed intertextually using an infinite amount of hypertext. The individual
does not matter anymore, Haraway (1983) dramatically claims, because he “would not be
recognized in the Garden of Eden” (p. 517). There are problems, nonetheless, resulting
from this new form of human-hypermedia machine interaction. Identities, she says, are
fragmented and ultimately lost. We are caught up in the constant motion of the world of
hypermedia. The concept of “I” has been replaced by an infinite number of I’s existing as
simulated multiplex environments. Good argument. In a multiplex environment, several
identities may be tied to one identity constructing a single self. The constraints of the
physical world are no longer applicable to electronic media. Our new identities, Haraway
reveals, are in the process of redefinition from an “organic, industrial society to
polymorphous, information system--from all work to all play, a deadly game” (p. 523).
At the same time that bodies are no longer constrained by the limitations of the
physical world, the number of selves a person may possess in the simulated world are
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likewise limitless. Haraway (1983) introduces a theoretical construct she calls “informatics
of domination” (p. 523) to deliver a synthesized, comprehensive theory of reality, which
moves away from cyberspace, in order to propose simulation as the norm. Here, Haraway
argues that representation is replaced by simulation, reproduction by replication, and the
public/private dichotomy by a standardized, flattened, simulated citizenship.
Self then, following Haraway’s (1983) line of thought, must negotiate presence and
identity in this new polymorphic public environment. The individual expresses him or
herself by using hypertext as a metalanguage. This dramatic shift in perception completely
dismantles the boundaries established thousands of years ago. The sense of reality, kept
alive by the preservation of written languages, fades away to make room for new
interpretations.
To complicate matters, this simulated reality presents, according Baudrillard (1981),
“the impossibility of rediscovering an absolute level of the real” and “the impossibility of
staging illusion” (p. 19). For Baudrillard, illusion and reality are chimeras replaced by
simulation. This electronically constructed reality represents a multidimensional map of
nothingness, a desert, a simulation. He describes it in these terms:
[I]t is the map that precedes the territory -- precession of simulacra -- it is the map
that engenders the territory... ...It is the real, and not the map, whose vestiges subsist
here and there, in the deserts which are no longer those of the Empire, but our own.
The desert of the real ‘itself.’ (p. 166)
Both Haraway (1983) and Baudrillard (1981) are describing hypertextuality, an electronic
conceptual garden that took several decades to evolve. This simulated environment
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challenges notions of reality, which are better experienced as “social networks.”
Barely two decades have passed since Sir Timothy John Berners-Lee came up with
the idea to use the World Wide Web as a way to exchange information from individual to
individual, and from individuals to groups of individuals, and thus break free from the
traditional method of person-to-person communication (Manovich, 1995). The World
Wide Web hosts social networks, which account for the simulation that Haraway (1983)
and Baudrillard (1981 not in your bibliography) theorize. The current proliferation of
social networks in cyberspace is the result of the overwhelming demand for human
interconnectivity, and the commercialization of affordable hypermedia machines.
In an attempt to define cyber social networks, one could argue that social networks
are simulated reality environments shared by the simultaneous “presence” of more than
two people in the same electronic space. Cyber social networks exist (for the time being)
only in hypermedia machines: cellular phones, PDAs, desktop computers, portable
computers, notebooks, netbooks, laptops, game consoles, telephones, and cars. In practical
terms, a cyber-social network is usually composed of several million people who are
“present” in the same consensual cyberspace, which effectively dismantles preconceptions
of time and space as constructed by their sensoria to describe the real physical world. One
could argue that cyber social networks constitute the collective consciousness of humanity,
or what Gibson (1984) describes as “consensual hallucination” (p. 5). Furthermore, the
intertextual constructions taking place in hypermedia are redefining individual identity, in
addition to collective and cultural ones.
Using rhythm and hypertext to construct its plot, one literary work in particular
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prophetically recounts a radical futuristic social network. Blood Music describes a new
form of computational machine that does not only become invisible due to the progress of
nanotechnology, but is also capable of achieving real intelligence and individuality (Bear,
1985). The story’s protagonist, a misunderstood character, Virgil Ulam, is a scientist who
creates what could be described as nano-Frankensteins. These cell-sized invisible
“machines” are programmed with two very simple and very direct commands: improve and
multiply. He names his creatures “noocytes,” and embraces them with tender love as parts
of his self. When he finds out about the cancellation of his research due to the harmful
nature of his creations, he injects the noocytes into his own blood stream. These invisible
yet omnipresent computer-cells become part of him. They invade his body with the
predetermined and programmed mission of improvement and multiplication. To construct
the coda, Bear describes how the noocytes identify Ulam’s consciousness as a physical
entity subject to control. The noocytes then proceed to take over, turning him into a
“galaxy.”
At this point, I cannot help but wonder if Bear (1985) purposefully designed the
name of Ulam’s creation, “noocytes,” to sound like “new sites.” Interestingly enough, this
fictional narrative runs parallel to the current cyber social network businesses available
online. Ulam’s command of “improve and multiply” could be adapted as “interconnect and
expand” to fit cyber social networks. In both cases, the concept of speed is vital for the
preservation of this simulation. According McLuhan (1964), speed facilitates the quantum
leap towards accepting simulation as a meaningful constituent of one’s life. As McLuhan
writes, “All meaning alters with acceleration, because all patterns of personal and political
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interdependence change with any acceleration of information” (p. 199). Speed urges
growth, organization, and multiplication. In cyber social networks, speed is a vital
component of the discourse since it becomes the medium by which hypertext moves.
Speed in information exchange provides cyborg citizens with a meaningful placeholder for
their new identities. The placeholder remains “there,” in cyberspace, for as long as needed
or wanted.
To better illustrate the previous theoretical observations, I have selected the most
relevant social network today (determined by number of active users) as a case study:
Facebook. Facebook is a cyber social network, which nests more than two hundred million
“inhabitants.” Facebook exists as a true simulated megalopolis in full defiance of Picasso’s
famous quote “Everything you can imagine is real.” Facebook is not a science fiction
novel, but is rather a vast container of bodiless people constructed by thoughts, reflections,
and identities. All elements forming this simulation are expressed through hypertext.
Identities are put together using a hybrid composite of multimedia. The multimedia include
photographic portraits, virtual pets, playful simulated performances, and what claim to be
objective data such as CVs, marital statuses, religions, political parties, hometowns, and
other pieces of information subject to play and fictive construction. They share the same
space with what could be described as irrelevant, irreverent, and nonsensical information.
Statistical polls about sexual orientation, ways to cheat, places to visit, and shows to attend
are intermingled with thoughts, ideas, ideologies, conceptions, intimacies, complaints,
invitations, suggestions, colors, shapes, beliefs, tastes, and flavors to share—all of which
are spread out in the same space constructing the simulation.
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Facebook presents an overwhelming collection of images that desperately seek to
become, to exist, and to be relevant. Every Facebook identity is constructed as a personal
page. The page includes a photographic portrait open to the public at any time, yet it is
disguised, nonetheless, as private. Inside each “profile,” a virtual persona demands
attention. According to Mitchell (2005), images need a medium, “a place to be seen”; they
demand “to be looked at, to be admired, to be loved, to be shown” (p. 73). The
construction of identity in this simulated kingdom is closer to the construction of character
in fictional narratives.
What is more important to point out is that cyber social networks, such as Facebook,
are not constrained by time and space. Both time and space are, indeed, irrelevant for the
continuation of Facebook’s vital functions and sustainability. One could argue that
Facebook is the new hypertextual portable identification card. However, as mentioned
before, it is only one of them. Other simulated environments (such as Linkedin, Twitter,
MySpace, Flickr, YouTube, and Photobucket) serve the same purpose of acknowledging
physical presence in space and time, based on certain constructs, such as here, there, and
everywhere. The notion of reality is completely dismantled, and immediately assigned to
the realm of simulation, mediated by hypermedia machines and glued together by
hypertext. The proposition to consider hypertext as the metaphoric blood, or conceptual
living substance in constant flow through the entire system is possible to experience
through the Facebook interface. Good analysis.
To conclude this brief analysis of simulated environments, one distinctive piece of
information stands out to demonstrate the power of hypertext as a source of living energy
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and a symbiotic construct between humans and hypermedia machines. It is the possibility
of sharing thoughts on the top portion of the Facebook screen. There, a box is provided to
answer a simple question: “What’s on your mind?” Every time a new phrase is entered in
the box, sharing the mental or physical status of any given user, it immediately becomes
readily available to all the users listed as one’s friends. The replies swiftly return from
friends to acknowledge the injection of “life” into the collective discourse of the simulated
environment. The organism is alive, and it has the potential to simulate reality for its users.
A symbiosis is evident, and it is impossible to stop.
The liquid and organic nature of cyber social networks is now the subject of
scholarly analysis (including this paper) as means to provide a better understanding of
hypermedia and their effect on society. However, this brief analysis produces more
questions than answers. A few questions stand out among others: Are these electronic
organisms becoming part of our lives, or are we becoming part of theirs? Who is
controlling whom? Good questions. What is evident is that the construction of identity is
not limited to a passport, an ID card, or a driver’s license anymore, nor are time and space
determining constituents of the reality where identities are implemented. Hypertext is,
indeed, the medium holding all this simulation together, and hypermedia machines are
slowly but surely becoming integral parts of our bodies and our bodies themselves. In
return, our bodies are expanding their conceptual presence to become galaxies, units of
text, bodytexts that stimulate the expansion of an electronic garden of hypertext—a garden
nourishing a multiplex of identities, in a multiplex of realities, intertwined with a multiplex
of simulations. Virtual multiplicity turns out to be a valid way to break free from the
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constraints of body, time, and space.
As argued, ICEVORGS inhabit conceptual spaces, even though they can be observed
to embody real spaces, as well as virtual ones. Like electronic chameleons, ICEVORGS
adapt their fluid and mestizo nature to the circumstances, but unlike those beautiful
animals, ICEVORGS do not seek to camouflage, but stand out. By getting the observer’s
attention, they breed, spawn, are born, and thrive. However, to observe and identify them,
they must be caught as they move from one realm, or conceptual plane, to another. When
they cut through realities, they leave open doors to observe what is left of what once was
the Real, the dimension that took place before Baudrillard’s (1981) simulacra. To observe
and analyze ICEVORGS in their natural environment, I must introduce the only tool
capable of such endeavors, a figure of speech better known as “metalepsis.”

Metalepsis or the Strange Loop
According to Bell (2013), a metalepsis, as initially defined by Genette (1980) in his
seminal work Narrative Discourse, ‘is any intrusion by the extra diegetic narrator or
narrate into the diegetic universe (or by the diegetic characters into a metadiegetic
universe, etc.), or the inverse’ (pp. 234-235). Metalepsis is thus a term that describes the
movement of fictional entities between diegetic levels, either from the narrating space into
the narrated space, or from the narrated space into the narrating space. Providing a useful
means of conceptualizing the two types of metalepsis that Genette identifies, Pier (2005),
following Nelles (1997), has divided the term into two types: ‘descending’ and
‘ascending,’ respectively. (p. 22)
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Given the complexity of the subject matter, and my lack of experience, let alone expertise,
in narratology, I find myself nonetheless obliged to introduce this concept, integral to
ICEVORG, using a long and complex quote. That is one of the downfalls of the muchsought-after Holy Grail of education. I am talking about interdisciplinarity, and the
complexities associated with its pedagogical intent. Considering that my area of expertise
is in design and visual communication, I find myself in constant intellectual negotiation
about the extent to which I should enter disciplines that are not my own. That being said, I
think that in the case of metalepsis, the fact that I am venturing into the realm of
narratology is indeed a metalepsis in its own right, in that I narrate, and am narrator and
story as well. The first time I heard about this literary concept I fell in love with it. I cannot
precisely articulate why; it was probably honest and disinterested chemistry, love at first
sight, mutual curiosity. I cannot tell.
What I could tell is that from the first time I read about metalepsis, I could not keep it
from getting under my skin. I appreciate the fact that it exists to transgress boundaries. The
way I see it, and how I relate to it, is as a powerful tool to promote, nurture, and even
challenge, creativity and creative production. After teaching how to think differently for
almost two decades now, I have found my Narcissus pond in metalepsis. Once I developed
a better understanding of its operation, I began to use it in my own work and pedagogical
approach to design and art education. Metalepsis is, from my very personal point of view,
a form of resistance, a way to break free from boredom and predictability, and, ultimately,
an effective way to enter into what Baudrillard (1981) claims does not exist anymore:
reality.
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In their article entitled “Ontological Metalpsis and Unnatural Narratology,” Bell and
Alber (2012) further elaborate on Genette’s (1980) concept of narrative transgression by
describing how Marie-Laure Ryan (2004) proposes two forms of metalepsis. One is
ontological, which opens a passage between levels that result in their interpenetration, or
“mutual contamination,” while the other, rhetorical metalepsis, only “opens a small
window that allows a quick glance across levels, but the window closes after a few
sentences, and the operation ends up reasserting the existence of the boundaries” (Bell &
Alber, 2012, p. 207). Then, Bell and Alber proceed to reference Fludernik (2003), who
distinguishes not two but four levels of metalepsis: 1) authorial metalepsis, which serves to
foreground the inventedness of the story; 2) ontological metalepsis, in which the narrator
(or character) jumps to a lower diegetic level; 3) ontological metalepsis, in which a
fictional character jumps to a higher narrative level; and 4) rhetorical metalepsis. Bell and
Alber indicate that Fludernik also “discriminates between ‘real’ and metaphorical
metalepsis,” or in other words, “between actual crossing of ontological boundaries and a
merely imaginative transcendence of narrative level” (p. 167).
In response to Fludernik’s classifications, Bell and Alber (2012) propose yet another
way of dividing the stem. They claim that authorial and rhetorical metalepsis are “merely
metaphoric ones in which no actual boundary crossing takes place” (p. 168). In attempting
to reconstitute the complexity behind these concepts, I will translate the preceding into
layman’s terms. Metalepsis happens when a person realizes that the narrative that he or she
was experiencing at a phenomenological level—its intentionality—was not real. Basically
metalepsis consists of a paradoxical leap from one level to another. All of a sudden, what
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was taken for granted is no longer certain. As you may have already observed, I am not as
much interested in narratology as I am in the application of metalepsis to disciplines that
claim a new form of reality construction. More specifically, I am talking about reality
construction in virtual spaces, the Internet, cyberspace, and the concepts I have discussed
thus far.
When the concept of metalepsis is applied to the fields of fine arts and design, such a
powerful, creative tool becomes radically important in proposing creative ways of problem
solving, for it is a phenomenon observable in everyday life, as I will show in the case
studies that follow. It is of particular interest to my dissertation project that you understand
that ICEVORGs require a conceptual metaleptic machine (Ryan, 2005) to populate. In the
preceding chapters, I discussed the conceptual framework that permits me to propose the
notion of ICEVORG as an evolved form of representation capable of moving through
realities. It is precisely through the use of metalepsis that ICEVORGs navigate. In other
words, metalepsis is the conceptual aircraft preferred by ICEVORGs as means of
transportation among fields of different realities.
As far as Bell and Alber (2012) are concerned, another distinction must be made
when metalepsis is utilized in trans-medial environments. In other words, when the
transgression of narratives moves from one medium to another, a distinction between
“worlds” and “levels” must be addressed; they write that these interactions take place
“between ontologically distinct worlds rather than narrative levels” (p. 169). Bell and
Alber’s observation that metalepsis is more about moving between worlds than narrative
levels allows me to move beyond narratology, since I am more interested in the
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complexities of trans-medial storytelling than those particulars of literature. Nevertheless, I
find this linguistic tool pertinent to my proposed theoretical creature, the ICEVORG. To
stress even more how my views on metalepsis differ from narratology, I must add that it is
not interesting to me how a character moves between narrative levels, but how we,
humans, theoretical cyborgs with augmented electronic limbs, create avatars that will soon
enough become ICEVORGs that gain a life of their own. It is then, just then, that we move
from ontological planes via metalepsis.
Ennslin (2012) elaborates on how metalepsis is used to conduct what she calls
“transmedia journ[ies]” (p. 1) to move among different worlds, including short fiction,
comics, comedy film, participatory media, digital fiction, computer games, and virtual
worlds. Ennslin describes the experience lived during a visit to an art exhibition that
assisted her in the development of this theoretical observation:
A few months ago I visited the Magritte (1898-1967) exhibition at the Tate
Liverpool, titled ‘The Pleasure Principle’, and I saw a range of pictures that made
me think about reality and representation as different ontological spheres, and how
the two can be made to overlap and converge. And then, during my literature
search, I came across a painting by the same artist titled –Le maître du plaisir—
(The Master of Revels, oil on canvas), from early 1926, which is particularly
relevant to metalepsis across media. (Figure 20) The painting depicts a mise-enabyme: a picture within a picture—which isn’t the same as metalepsis but a very
closely related concept. What is metaleptic about this picture is the fact that the two
worlds portrayed in it are interlinked, thus blurring the seemingly impermeable
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boundary between them. The fictional world of the embedded picture is connected,
quite literally, to the fictional world of the painting with a piece of black string. The
Master dances along the tightrope between the painting’s reality and ‘his’ outside
world. (p. 2)

René Magritte, Le maître du plaisir. 1926. Matteson Art (2008-2011).

Figure 20: Le Maitre du Plaisir, 1926 (oil on canvas), Magritte, Rene (1898-1967) / Private Collection /
Bridgeman Images

Ennslin’s (2012) experiences are a good example of the theoretical path I am pursing with
the concept of metalepsis, as applied to the notion of ICEVORG. My goal is to find the
concept of metalepsis applied outside of literature and narratology by expanding the idea
that this form of transgression is not particular to the world of narratology, but to life itself.
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Ontological transgression is possible thanks to the rupture of realities and perceptual
planes brought on—and expedited—by today’s electronic communication technologies.
Ennslin (2012) continues her analysis by focusing on how storytelling has an
inherent ability to [create] the illusion of another world, or fictional universe. Fludemik
(2009) explains: ‘narrative texts create the illusion that the fictional world is directly
accessible while a text is being read, that it really does exist, and in the precise form in
which it is described. (p. 3)
Wolf (1993) explains how narratologists refer to this idea of aesthetic illusion as
“mimesis,” not in the sense of an authentic reconstruction of the real world, but rather “an
illusion of experiencing reality” (p. 31 as cited in Ennslin, 2011, p. 89).
I will take a step further and argue that given the electronic contraptions that we
have designed and made part of our own Self, namely cell phones, computers, tablets, and
other more conceptual creatures, such as the Internet and cyberspace, the illusion of
experiencing reality is no longer necessary since it is not possible to access a single
experience of reality anymore (Baudrillard, 1981).
Drawing upon Baudrillard’s (1981) reflections on simulacra and the order of the
Hyperreal, I argue that we live in a hybridity of worlds that intertwine fiction and reality,
and to inhabit these hybrid worlds we need to go above and beyond our physical
limitations. To achieve what seemed to be impossible, we make use of ICEVORGS to
transcend ourselves, and by way of said representations, we move through ontological
worlds as a result of metalepsis. On the other hand, to avoid stepping inside the lines of a
field foreign to me (here, I am referring to literature), I will refer to the implementation of
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the principles of metalepsis as the “strange loop.” I do this following the work of McHale
(1987), who refers to metalepsis as a “strange loop,” or a “short circuit” (p. 213), in the
structure of a narrative. The strange loop is in accordance with Barthes’s (1981) notion of
punctum in that it is a prick, a rupture, and ultimately, a component particularly important
for the construction of an ICEVORG.
At a more personal level, I must add that I have seen myself involved in the strange
loop I describe inasmuch as I see myself as a fictional character traveling through realities.
I may refer to these realities as cultural ontologies, or worlds that keep tremendous
similitude between them. They are worlds that are not only divided by 5000 kilometers of
physical matter, but more importantly, by light years of cultural differences ranging from
food to language, from beliefs to geography. Switching back and forth in terms of
language, for instance, entails a narrative rupture. To think in English is different than to
think in Spanish in the same way that writing in English differs significantly from writing
in Spanish. In addition, the fact that I have two different accents that, in reality, are three is
also another form of metalepsis. When I speak in Spanish, I do it with a very peculiar
accent from the high Andes. My “cuencano” accent is an integral part of my identity, and
serves me well in defining who I am and where I come from within the boundaries of
Ecuador. When I speak in English, I drop my original accent altogether, yet I still have an
accent, nonetheless. The accent I have when I speak English in America places me within
the category of “alien” within the world of the United States of America. These linguistic
differences have allowed me to experience, at a phenomenological level, the emotions and
sensations accompanying moving between ontological worlds and switching planes. I

279
strongly identity my life with metalepsis inasmuch as I am convinced, as I mentioned
earlier in my texts, that we live in the midst of fiction. I see myself then as my own
character in need of an avatar to be able to move from story to story. However, an avatar is
not enough, for it does not offer me, us, the flexibility and adaptability to move from
ontology to ontology in the telling of my life. Therefore, I must move beyond the concept
of the avatar; hence for the last twenty years, I have been transforming and nourishing my
ICEVORG, but more specifically, and with more intentionality, for the last five. I have
done it to be able to “jump across” stories with full physical transgression (Kukkonen and
Klimet, 2011). In order to move between stories, we all need, I argue, to birth our very
own ICEVORGS.
ICEVORG: The Seed of What Will Eventually Become Self
After having walked through mountains of text, I must stop, seek respite, and then
venture to synthesize all things thought and written in order to proceed with the conclusion
of my proposed theoretical monster, which I hope will take life of its own in a future to
come.
The ICEVORG is a creature, a monster, a fiend that will evolve on its own. It is a
poem, a sentence with no words. The ICEVORG is a conceptual organism that is neither
avatar nor cyborg, but could be both or part of either one. It is a visual representation of the
Self, understanding Self here not in the limitation of any given person, but extending the
concept so as to cover ideas, organizations, corporations, brands, even political or social
ideologies.
The ICEVORG does not have one body, but as many as are needed to be transcended
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by disappearance. It is an entry point into the backstage of the hyperreal. An ICEVORG
could be two-dimensional, three-dimensional, or multidimensional to adapt and thrive in
emerging electronic media.
The ICEVORG’s ultimate goal is to conjure emotion in the observer, as well as in its
creator. ICEVORGs are creatures born by the reflection of the Self as it is expressed on the
media where they thrive.
An ICEVORG is capable of communicating the identity of its creator or creators in a
self-referential mode, and by means of repetition, iteration and honest expansion, to as
many people as they can reach. An ICEVORG is meant to spread and populate the
different media as extensively, as rapidly, and as intensely as possible.
An ICEVORG inhabits the spaces in between realities and feeds off of hypertext; it
can only be observed through scholarly inquiry in the empty spaces created by the
intermingling of the intertext.
The last constituent of an ICEVORG is the dialectical pairing of presence and
absence in various media, and the ICEVORG’s capacity and/or potential to become an
electronic virus, a phenomenon that takes place when a message becomes the medium of
itself.
The electronic viral dissemination of an ICEVORG secures its perennial existence by
breaking free from the traditional constraints of time and space that bind and limit avatars
or cyborgs.
Once created and released, they gain life of their own and will never disappear, for they
are pure electricity. They have no fear of death, for they cannot die since they never live.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
ICEVORGs under the Magnifying Glass
If I had a world of my own, everything would be nonsense. Nothing would be what it is, because
everything would be what it isn’t. And contrary wise, what is, it wouldn’t be. And what it wouldn’t
be, it would. You see? –Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland & Through the Looking Glass (Carroll,
1865)

The time has finally come to make myself clear. I must now find some ICEVORGS
to pin down under the microscope for observation and analysis. Will there be at least
one ICEVORG to help me demonstrate that I am not too far into the rabbit hole?
In an attempt to express what an ICEVORG is, I will say that the presence of
said creature takes place when the observer realizes that given objects—virtual or
real—become mechanisms to construct the world that one used to be accustomed to
in a slightly different way. An ICEVORG is meant to ignite a need to expand one’s
mental frontier in a conscious way. In order for this expansion to occur, a concept
that has been mentioned throughout the dissertation must be present. I am talking
about intentionality. The presence of intentionality will turn the apprehension of an
ICEVORG into a phenomenological experience, as the observer realizes that there
are more planes, or worlds, beyond those he or she was previously able to digest
through the mere use of the senses.
Per my definition of an ICEVORG, a punctum must be observable through
analysis. The prick must be there in the perceived reality where an ICEVORG is
discovered. Said puncture will then allow us to analyze the different worlds that
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metalepsis permits the ICEVORG to transgress, as well as to reflect upon the ways in
which the boundaries between worlds are ruptured. By gazing upon the ICEVORG,
one is able to acknowledge the limitations we humans are subject to, limitations that
will no longer exist once the doors among planes have opened as a result of the
ICEVORG. ICEVORG-watching takes place where the creature jumps across the
interstices created by its movement through different media to spawn the idea it
carries within. Good description.
This last chapter will begin by presenting the case study of South American
Olympian Oscar Pistorius, and how Pistorius’s lack of biological legs, in conjunction
with his message and life events, validates his case as an ICEVORG. Following
Pistorius a case study will then move into more detail by presenting the work of
contemporary French artist Orlan. This case study will discuss Orlan’s transgressions
of space, time, and body through her well-documented performative plastic surgeries,
by which she became artist, artwork, and message.
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TWO CASES STUDIES
ICEVORG A: Oscar Pistorius
According to Howe (2011), elite sporting has never been more challenging
than it is today due to never-ending technological contributions to the field of
professional sports. A constant flow of criticism and debate engulf modern
professional sports—to the point of dismantling historical notions of what it means to
be an elite athlete with the minute interpolation of high-tech incursion in the field. In
his article entitled “Cyborg and Supercrip: The Paralympics Technology and the
(Dis)empowerment of Disabled Athletes,” Howe (2011) describes the case of South
African runner Oscar Pistorius, who having been born with physical impediments
that led to the amputation of both legs at an early age, went on to become a famous
Olympian during the Athens 2004 Olympic and Paralympic Games. Pistorius often
runs using prosthetics devices, or “blades,” which have led him to be dubbed “Blade
Runner” (Hunt-Grubbe, 2007). For Howe, the use of such high-tech contraptions by
Paralympic athletes “means that they can be conceptualized as the embodiment of
Haraway’s (1991) cyborg, which is a hybrid body resulting from the fusion of a live
organism and man-made technology” (p. 858). Howe argues that in the context of the
Paralympic sports, the most successful athletes may have been seen as “supercrips”
(p. 858). I must add that the contradictory semantic nature of the term “supercrip”
makes it engaging and interesting to follow, though not an ICEVORG just yet. The
term “supercrip” penetrates the semantics of its components to render an engaging
new form of description that challenges both our understanding and perception of it.
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The term “super” infers a characteristic or value that surpasses what is understood as
“normal.” After a brief etymological inquiry, however, one can observe that its
counterpart, “crip,” evolves linguistically from the word “decrepit,” which comes
from the Latin “de,” meaning “down,” and “crepitus,” meaning to “crack” or
“break.” The resulting term generates an engaging semantic juxtaposition that
represents, in a very valid manner, what it purports to be. “Supercrips,” following
Berger (2008), are “those individuals whose inspirational stories of courage,
dedication, and hard work prove that it can be done, that one can defy the odds and
accomplish the impossible” (p. 648). Yet, the case of Oscar Pistorius becomes
relevant to my discourse, and capable of being bestowed the status of ICEVORG,
when he is perceived as “better” than his so-called “normal” peer athletes. The
stigma of an abnormal body, which in the past would have most likely caused him
pain and suffering, thanks to technology, pushed Pistorius into another stigma: a
superman. Pistorius’s body was not human enough to compete with other “normal”
bodies. The fact that “normal” athletes attempted to prevent Pistorius from
participating in the Olympics represents the first of two pricks, or punctures, in the
ethereal identity that the Olympian had created for himself. As Howe (2011)
explains, Pistorius’s participation in the Olympics opened the debate to what
Haraway (1991) once presented as a theoretical chimera. In Howe’s words:
It appears that in Paralympic track and field athletics the closer a body is to a
cyborg the more capital it holds, which is the opposite to the world articulated
by Haraway (1991) in relation to the boundaries between humans and non-
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humans… Butryn see the nexus between the natural and legal and the artificial
and illegal as hegemonic humanness (2003:28). Hegemonic humanism can be
seen to have been practiced when Oscar Pistorius was initially excluded from
competing in able-bodied athletics (Howe, 2008). His right to compete on his
prostheses was restored because he has no other option but to run on man-made
legs and by the fact they were not advantaging in the context of competition. In
a sense, Paralympic sports celebrates ‘transgressing the taboo boundary
between blood, sweat, and tears, and blood, sweat and gears’ (Butryn, 2003, p.
28). (p. 878)
In addition, according to Beil (2009), Weyand et al. (2010) published an analysis of
Pistorius’s running ability in The Journal of Applied Physiology, where the researchers
reported that “his mechanics differed from human legs” (p. 29). In addition, Beil explains:
Peter Weyand has studied whether sprinter Oscar Pistorius’ artificial limbs confer a
biomechanical advantage. Weyand’s team reported that Pistorius hits with less force
and spends longer with each “foot” on the ground that runners with intact legs. The
paper did not directly assess performance advantages. But in an article in press in the
same journal, Weyand and Matthew Bundle of the University of Wyoming release
their conclusion: Pistorius has an edge over other runners. He can reposition his
lightweight legs more rapidly than any sprinter ever measured, including Usain Bolt.
In addition, Pistorius doesn’t have to push as hard to produce the same force, much
like a bicycle rider can switch to a lower gear and pedal less without losing speed.
Other members of the investigation team however, maintain that Pistorius does not
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gain an advantage from his artificial limbs. (p. 29)
The punctum that I argue in favor of pushes itself forward with what would come next for
Pistorius. After Pistorius’s name made its way into the worldwide news, and began its viral
spread to inhabit cyberspace as the “Blade Runner” (Hunt-Grubbe, 2007), a tragic event
occurred. Pistorius found himself being tried for the murder of his then girlfriend, model
Reeva Steenkamp. He allegedly shot her three times at his South African home early
Valentine’s Day morning. The innumerable reports released to the public by the South
African press suggest that he may have been enraged as a result of illegal performanceenhancing steroids. However, to this day, Pistorius’s motives for shooting his girlfriend
remain unknown.

Figure 21: Pistorius Cyborg. Pistorius running in the Olympic Stadium during the heats of the 400 metres at the 2012
Summer Olympics on 4 August. Image by Jim Thurston. Wikicommons.
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Aside from the minute details of the case circulating cyberspace on a regular basis,
what I find interesting is the act of disappearance (Baudrillard, 1992) Pistorius is subject
to, and the impossibility of achieving it. When one visits his official site, all the links lead
to the same message that reads, “Not Found. The requested URL /category/mediaarticles/was not found on this server. Apache Server at oscarpistorius.com Port 800.” Upon
further investigation, an official message can be reached. The message presents us with the
following text:
14 February 2014
No Words can adequately capture my feelings about the devastating accident that has
caused such heartache for everyone who truly loved – and continues to love Reeva.
The pain and sadness – especially for Reeva’s parents, family and friends consumes
me with sorrow.
The loss of Reeva and the complete trauma of that day, I will carry with me for the
rest of my life.
-

Oscar

The message Pistorius sends to the world meets another criteria of the ICEVORG. His
attempt to disappear, and his actual act of disappearance from cyberspace, elevates the
man-machine to a status far beyond the reach of a “normal” human being. His attempt to
conceal a body—and I am not talking about his girlfriend’s body, but his very own—is
what makes him relevant and interesting. It is his attempted act of disappearance
(Baudrillard, 2009) that assists his ICEVORG in its endless replications and expansions
within cyberspace. A simple Google search for the term “Pistorius” results in 10,800,000
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connections, even while the man himself was living in jail. The same search term,
“Pistorius,” when entered into academic search engines, returns 4,483 references from
databases, scholarly articles, and citations. Thus, Pistorius’s act of disappearance is an
impossible task to achieve. He may no longer die. In Baudrillard’s (2009) words:
Let us speak, then, of the world from which human beings have disappeared. It’s a
question of disappearance, not exhaustion, extinction or extermination. The
exhaustion of resources, the extinction of species – these are physical processes or
natural phenomena. And that’s the whole difference. The human species is doubtless
the only one to have invented a specific mode of disappearance that has nothing to do
with nature’s law. Perhaps even an art of disappearance. (p. 24)
As it pertains to the application of Baudrillard’s words to the specific case of Pistorius, I
believe that his case represents the art of disappearance through infinite repetition and
transgression of boundaries. Pistorius as ICEVORG has transgressed many boundaries,
including boundaries of his own, as a “supercrip” (Howe, 2011), as well as the boundaries
assigned to him by the others (media, popular culture, science, Academia, etc.). The
Pistorius-ICEVORG is then expressed and represented as a combination of disciplines
ranging from design (via his limbs) to media communication (via his website), in addition
to the ramifications that have been produced by his actions and emotions. His status as
ICEVORG is reinforced by the fact that his creation surpassed his limitations as a physical
being. Oscar Pistorius made a monster of himself, one which he cannot control any longer.
In the same fashion that Shelley’s (1818) Frankenstein runs to the eternal ice just to find
his own death, Pistorius is chasing not one but many ghosts contained in a single complex
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entity I call the ICEVORG.

Figure 22: Pistorius ICEVORG. Collection of images grabbed from the
thousands of pictures available online on the subject of “Pistorious”.

Figure 23: BRIDE. Image by Orlan, 1947Official Portrait with a Bride of Frankenstein Wig, 1990, photograph,
aluminium, 50 x 39 in. Artstor accessed October 2015
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ICEVORG B: Orlan
When Baudrillard (1993) talks about disappearance, he describes the tension that
presents itself when we attempt to “cultivate our bodies, our ‘looks’…and desires” (p. 55).
As Baudrillard writes,
[h]e who lives by the same will die by the same. The impossibility of
exchange, of reciprocity, of alterity secretes that other invisible, elusive alterity,
that absolute Other, the virus, itself made up of simple elements and of
recurrence to infinity. (p. 2)
Our endless attempts to control the way we construct our identity, in turn, create a tension
that is constantly fleeing from us. We are constantly searching for ways to alter our
identity. We search to prevent the feelings of incarceration that life conjures in our hearts
as soon as we realize that life is a finite experience, as well as an abstract thought. As I
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demonstrated in the preceding chapters, it is only when we become aware of the surface of
Narcissus’s pond that we are able to claim—to a certain extent—the ownership of our
constructed image.
However, to control the reflected image is a daunting task, given the illusory nature
of it, and our lack of control over the medium and its liquid nature. Yet, as we realize that
we are nothing but another medium, or as McLuhan (1964) claims that “the content of any
medium is always another medium” (p. 8), we may begin to entertain the idea that
controlling our bodies (as medium) is a valid form of exploring the Self. We are told by
many organized institutions, including church, state, and educational systems, that our
bodies are containers of knowledge and wisdom; even the Catholic God himself inhabits
our body and refers to it metaphorically as a temple. We decide to take control of said
medium, and in understanding it as such, the narrative of what constitutes the Self varies
along with the elements that construct it. By gaining control of the container, we may be
able to become the agent between medium and message, and, more importantly, we may
control what circulates in them, by them, and through them. Through the awareness gained
by education and experience, we could even develop a sense of control over our own
destiny, as well as our presence and/or absence in any given space and time.
We may even be capable of deconstructing the Self, and by means of analysis,
transgress our own limitations. We can aspire to become ICEVORGS and transcend—
avoid even—the unavoidable, which is the erasure that time will perform on each and
every one of us, as mortal and finite beings made of heartbeats, thoughts, and decaying
flesh and bone. As ICEVORGs, we become transparent beings living in the era of
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electronic blood, living in the “era of transparency [where] plastic surgery becomes
universal. And the surgery performed on the face and the body is merely the symptom of a
more radical surgery: that performed on otherness and destiny” (Baudrillard, 1993, p. 55).
In other words, by attempting to control our own body, both internally and externally, we
let our desires go wild in an attempt to feel free from the constraints imposed by nature. In
doing so, one will (without possibly meaning to) become an ICEVORG, as its very nature
incorporates the electronic soul, or punctum, that allows for transgression among realities
as facilitated—theoretically—by the “strange loop,” or “tangled hierarchies” (Hofstadter,
1980, p. 21).
One of the most relevant case studies that I have found to demonstrate the validity of
the conceptual monster that I call ICEVORG is the life and work of a French postmodern
artist. Born “Mireille Suzanne Francette Porte” in 1947, this artist later adopted the name
“Orlan.” Orlan is a scholar in residence at the Getty Research Institute in Los Angeles
whose artwork is described by McKoy (2009) in these terms:
French artist Orlan undergoes a recurring self-directed surgical transformation of her
appearance. Her work, which she refers to as Carnal Art (“Intervention” 318),
embodies resistance to the ways in which femininity is produced by the male
imaginary in the fine arts, in religious doctrine, and in the operating room. (p. 113)
Orlan’s decision to make art that transgresses the boundaries of what society defines as art,
beauty, acceptable, or even comprehensible is what makes her an apt embodiment of the
ICEVORG, its various elements, and the relationships among them.
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La Reincarnation de Sainte-Orlan. Creator: Orlan. Photographer Larry Qualls. Organized by
Exit Art Fall 1996, Artstor Collection accessed October 2015

Mouth of Europa and the Figure of Venus: “a little while longer and you will see me no
more…” Creator: Orlan. Video projections. Sydney Biennal, Data from University of
California, San Diego. Artstor Slide collection accessed October 2015
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Succesful Operation 2: Eyes. Creator: Orlan. Photograph. Exhibited at Gering & Lopez
Gallery and Penine Hart Gallery, Winter 1995. Tryptich: mirror image photos with b/w.
33’x46’, 30’x12’, 33’x46’. Photographer: Larry Qualls. Larry Qualls archive. Artstor
Slide collection accessed October 2015

[From the exhibition] “Omnipresence” Creator: Orlan. Sculpture and Installation, 1993. Exhibited at Gering &
Lopez Gallery and Penine Hart Gallery, Fall 2004. Video monitor playing tape of seventh surgical operation at
Sandra Gering Gallery, New York. Photographer: Larry Qualls. Larry Qualls archive. 2008 Artists Rights
Society (ARS), New York / ADAGP, Paris . Artstor Slide collection accessed October 2015
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“Omnipresence” Creator: Orlan. Sculpture and Installation, 1993. Exhibited at Gering &
Lopez Gallery and Penine Hart Gallery, Winter 1995. 41st and final photograph of Orlan’s
transformation after 7th operation. Photographer: Larry Qualls. Larry Qualls archive. 2008
Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York / ADAGP, Paris . Artstor Slide collection
accessed October 2015

“Orlan Visiting South Africa in 2012.” (De Swardt, 2012)
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Orlan’s entire career is best described as “a series of rebirths and triumphs of will
over technology” (Sumitra, 2013, para. 04). Her work has always been identified with
boundary transgression as a means to shock audiences and challenge culturally ingrained
notions of beauty and how it is constructed in today’s world. With all the technology at
our financial reach, it is surprising that we do not find more people jumping on the
bandwagon of mediated beauty. According to Mckoy (2009), Orlan’s continuous reference
to her body as “obsolete” (p. 142) summarizes the framework for her art, and demonstrates
the artist’s conviction that boundaries between physical existence and what used to be
considered a natural body have been dismantled through the mediation of science and
medicine. McKoy claims that “Orlan’s work anticipates a future in which ‘bodies will
become increasingly insignificant—nothing more than a ‘costume’ or ‘vehicle’ something
to be changed in our search to ‘become who we are’” (p. 113).
To demonstrate Orlan’s status as ICEVORG, I only need to refer to her endless
attempts to gain control over her identity. Her transgressive acts and performances
illustrate her non-conformity to what has been given to her by default. I am not talking
about accepting one’s self-perceived ugliness, for one could easily observe that Orlan was
a person that could be defined as attractive prior to the interventions she made to her own
facial structure. In order to develop a strength and motivation to become the seed of an
ICEVORG, one must experience—psychologically—some form of resistance against one’s
own body to push beyond the flesh, inwards or outwards. It has nothing to do with socially
perceived beauty. As explained in chapter two, in search of betterment, people religiously
attend the Cathedral of Simulacra to alter their bodies, and by doing so, they
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subconsciously accept not only the finite nature of their being, but also their lack of
conformity to the physicality of the mind’s container. In other words, in spite of any
possible “perfect” body, the Cathedral of Simulacra regulars do not accept themselves and
their beauty as good enough. In fact, in their pursuit of beauty and perfection, some of
them are even willing to take a step further into a cyborgian state of mind and ingest hightech chemical compounds that will alter their bodies. In Orlan’s case, her awareness of the
expectations imposed by society, particularly by media and art, provide sufficient cause to
push beyond what is described as “art” today. In constructing and presenting “Carnal Art,”
Orlan explores corporeal boundaries and identities.
Westley (2008) elaborates on how Orlan’s project could be considered “abject art,”
a term coined by the Whitney Museum of Art to present works that revolve around the
notions of repulsion and desire in the American imagination. Westley writes that the term
“abject art” necessitates one’s position in the art world and society as “the rebel that
reconfirms the hegemonic order through its oppositional stance” (p. 189). She then asks,
“To what extent does Orlan’s project transgress binary distinctions and terms of symbolic
difference, or in its horror-filled content, merely offer provocation that allows the viewer to
walk away, reassured and reconfirmed in their coherent subjecthood?” (p. 189).
By calling her work “Carnal Art,” and situating it in the tradition of self-portraiture,
Orlan critiques the domain of self-representation, and how art aims to tackle the evergrowing tension accompanying identity construction in today’s complex, technologydriven culture (Westley, 2008). In Westley’s words:
Orlan’s work, and its connotations with a sort of social sadomasochism and
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corporeal alteration, often uses violent imagery that elicits strong emotional and
physical responses. Her use of plastic surgery both alludes to a cultural norm of
feminine beauty (through its conventional associations and purpose) and
transgresses it, by enacting rituals of pain on the body through cutting and
dismemberment. (p. 190)
According to Westley (2008), Orlan’s work has been associated with cyber-feminism
because of its links to the technologies of plastic surgery. Her work has also been
associated with cyber-feminism in that she creates her identity, and delivers it through
several media, where she breaks free from the constraints of her physical existence to
move beyond the notions of representation (avatar) or reinterpretation (cyborg), thus
providing the most fertile soil to birth an ICEVORG.
In her project “La Reincarnation of Saint-Orlan,” Orlan (1996) documents a series
of nine surgical operations/performances, performed over a period of three years, with
corresponding art installations. Eight of the performances have already been completed,
but the ninth, in spite of the previous radical surgical interventions, may not be possible
due to the ambition of Orlan’s aims. Orlan’s goal is to have her nose surgically enlarged as
much as her bodily structure can physically support in order to reflect her reading of a
Mayan mask. McKoy (2009) explains her attempt in these words:
Medical technology hasn’t quite caught up with Orlan, however, and to situate her
surgical transformations as mere changes of costume is to trivialize the radical
nature of the procedures. [I]t seems unlikely at this stage that the ninth operation,
intended to give Orlan the nose of a ‘pre-Columbian Mayan mask’ (Faber 86) will
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ever take place. Since the beginning of La Reincarnation, Orlan has completely
transformed her body through extensive liposuction, the reshaping of her eyes, lips,
and nose, and implants in her chin, cheeks, and temples. Her new face is a
composite of Western artworks: her chin taken from Botticelli’s Venus, her lips
from Moreaus’s Europa, her eyes from an anonymous Fontainebleau portrait of
Diana, the nose from Gerard’s Psyche, and the forehead from Leonardo’s Mona
Lisa. (pp. 113-114)
It would be incorrect to approach Orlan’s work from the perspective of what it looks like;
rather, it should be approached from the perspective of what it means. By altering her
physical body, she is expressing a desire to disappear into the works of art she has chosen
as ideal references of beauty. She uses her transformation as a tool, a mechanism, a means
to an end, to disrupt the establishment: “In fact, Orlan claims to be largely uninterested in
the results of her surgeries; instead, her focus is on the surgical spectacle as it unfolds in
the operating theatre, and on the ensuing public debate about the status of her modified
body” (McKoy, 2009, p. 114).
With respect to Orlan’s intention to construct a critical response to feminism
through her art, Auslander (1997) finds a powerful voice for problematizing the
relationship between Self and body, writing that Orlan’s work “bring[s] her external
appearance more in line with her inner sense of self by transforming a masculine
appearance into a more feminine one” (p. 134). Orlan’s desire, Auslander claims, is best
summarized an interview she gave to The Washington Post:
This is a meticulous attempt, little by little, to find a more fragile, reflexive, less
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sensual person. It’s a transsexual operation—from woman to woman. I was always
very timid, very tender, fragile. I was like that as a young girl. But when I wanted
things in society I had to create an aggressive, hard personality. An external
sensuality. [T]he idea is to find what I think is most deep, most elusive to me… A
more vulnerable person, who allows herself to show that vulnerability, tenderness
and timidity… it’s not a question of putting on a mask, but taking one off… I think
we can bring appearance around to reality. (Waxman, 1993, p. 9 as cited in
Auslander, 1997, p.134)
For Auslander (1997), it is through her various transformations that Orlan attempts to craft
a new identity free from the constraints of social norms. However, her new identity is
never a finished entity; it is never fully established, but always deferred until the next
operation. Orlan’s work is about a lack of identity, and the malleable nature of her identity,
or Self. It is through her work that we are able to reflect upon our very own selves, and
how we react to the idea of taking control of our physical constructs in the pursuit of a new
identity that is, for once, one we control in a more sophisticated and technocratic way.
Auslander (1997) explains that Orlan “has said that when the surgical project is complete,
she will hire a public relations firm to choose a new name for her and work within the
French legal system to have her new name and face legally accepted as her identity” (p.
136). It is very important to understand that the operating table becomes integral to the
construction of an ICEVORG. The body must be invaded, conquered, and transformed, so
it can reach the status of Haraway’s cyborg. By acquiring a “new,” temporary body, one
opens the passage between realities, the strange loop enters, and thus the ICEVORG is able
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to move freely through conceptual dimensions and grow through viral expansion. At a
perhaps subconscious level, one must perceive one’s own body as nothing but meat,
product, matter, capable of transformation at will. In Baudrillard’s (2002) words:
It is because the body of the cow has become a non-body, a meat-machine, that the
viruses lay hold of it. It is because our human bodies have become non-bodies –
neuronal, operational machines – that they have lost their immunity and the viruses
are laying hold of them. And it is also because computing has become purely a
matter of media technology that it has become vulnerable to all viruses of
information. All viruses are in league: from the prion which infects the cow to the
cow which infects man, and to man who infects the whole planet (to the point of
infiltrating himself in to his own genetic code to modify). (p. 172)
As I see it, Baudrillard’s words reflect the same inner intention in Orlan’s artwork: the
intention to become a virus that infects the whole fabric of reality. In the same manner that
an iconic work of art influences (a term derived from influenza) culture as a whole, when
an ICEVORG creates art and becomes art in return, the end result is capable of virulent
infection through all possible media. The ICEVORG’s ultimate goal is to inhabit in, and
spread through, media. When artwork has been transformed into hypertext, it becomes an
optimal mechanism for viral expansion. The idea then becomes Baudrillard’s prion, which
will become the seed that will move from body to body, from mind to mind, until the
infection is so intense and deep that nothing can be done to avoid its existence.
The computational component required by an ICEVORG to grow is found here.
Orlan’s work is an ideal candidate for ICEVORG status inasmuch as it transcends itself as
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body, as matter, and becomes the idea that moves through realities by means of boundary
transgression. I must add that due to its nature, the ICEVORG must be understood as a
liquid acronym. By this term, I mean that no letter of the acronym represents a single
concept, but instead a multiplicity of them. I, as explained before, stands for Self, eye,
intertextuality, interconnectivity, immersion, introspection, etc., whereas C represents
computational, calculation, creation, critical inquiry, even the coldness that allows ice its
volumetric dimension. Ultimately, though, the C in cyborg should represent the
ICEVORG’s status as conceptual creature. Another very important component of any
ICEVORG is Barthes’s punctum. This particular component may be the most difficult
entity to observe and pin down for analysis. As I search for a punctum in Orlan’s work and
her persona as artwork, I cannot help but connect them to the text that has served as point
of departure for this project, as well as my very own construction of Self throughout my
doctoral candidacy years: Shelley’s (1818) Frankenstein.
Francis Bacon is credited as saying, “Some books are to be tasted, others to be
swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested.” I have found Shelley’s text to be
one of those digestible books that Bacon describes. Not only are the characters of the story
captivating and exciting, but the story itself contains a narrative capable of spawning
hundreds—if not thousands—of intertextualities. As a result, Shelley’s plot became—
without intending to do so—an uncontrollable monster itself. Her keen observations
allowed her text to become an intertextual interpretation of the historical moments taking
place in 1818. This intertextuality was then picked up by emerging new media such as
film-making. One of the very early reinterpretations of Shelley's work was in 1910, with
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the first motion picture adaption of Shelley’s novel. The film’s writer and director, J.
Searle Dawaley, reinterpreted the original plot, and reduced it to just15 minutes of silent
film. Technological constraints forced artists like Dawley to extract and compact the entire
plot to adapt to what technology was capable of delivering in those times. It could be
argued that the decision to step away from the original text to adapt to technology nurtured
the emergence of intertextuality. It is important to note the outstanding achievements in
terms of special effects that this movie delivers. Additionally, in terms of conceptual
development, this movie makes a powerful statement in the scene that shows a monster
that, in a purely Lacanian way, discovers its image reflected in the mirror and reacts in awe
and complete fear of it. The monster’s realization, therefore, demonstrates true
transcendental discovery of consciousness. The monster reacts with disgust to its own
bodily distortion as a result of his human “creators.”
I argue that Orlan does exactly the same when she sees herself in the reflections she
creates in different media, including those reflections she creates through her
performances, and those she delivers to the world via satellite. It is the punctum that allows
her work to cross from media to media. The puncture in Orlan’s work resides in the fact
that the viewer cannot and will not ever be able to pin down which representation is the
artwork, and/or if there is one at all. As monster and creator, Orlan presents in her work a
critical response not only to her body, but also to technology with respect to its insatiable
hunger for self-awareness. At the same time, her work also summarizes the emotion of the
times, emotions that engulf a human race incapable of realizing the full impact of the
machines we bring to life, and how they flood society with dependence and needs unheard
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of before. I find Orlan’s work fascinating inasmuch as she becomes a fully developed
metaphor for Mary Shelley’s novel. Orlan as medium continues to release new versions of
the same story, surgery after surgery, where the medium (as message) evolves in the same
fashion that the story of Frankenstein evolved over time as it was developed by several
authors.
It took more than two decades for the world to see a new interpretation of
Frankenstein. This new interpretation would be, however, transcendental in what sense? in
the construction of global popular culture. In 1931, James Whale produced a movie that
would change popular culture and reality forever. Whale's work introduced a new monster
to the screen—a monster of giant stature, thanks to industrial work boots "enhanced" by
platforms to increase the monster's height. This new monster was not only of intimidating
stature, but, more importantly, of green skin. The monster’s skin color is a very interesting
decision that may seem innocuous and theatrical. However, considering that the film is in
black and white, the green color speaks volumes about the meaningful decisions made to
attract the attention of the audience of the time, as it became an element meant to
transgress boundaries at the conceptual level. What I mean by this is that the promotional
material made public outside the theaters helped to construct the story before people would
enter the movies. What they “saw” on screen was a green monster. Orlan’s work, on the
other hand, uses color to enhance the drama of her proposed art. Blood becomes both
means and end, as its redness and fluidity carries the shock value necessary to procure a
Strange Loop, both literally and metaphorically. One could argue that Whale's film was
also speaking to the fear of the unknown, the fear of technology, electricity, and resources
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in but a few hands. At the same time, technology had progressed to a point where new
machines were being introduced to the market with prices intended to reach larger
audiences. Such is the case of the photographic camera and the early version of film
cameras. Toolan (2001) suggests a form of dialogue between brains and machines
anchored to a particular setting that allows for the creation of a monster more rational and
intellectual than his maker. Here, we can observe yet another metaphor for the human
dilemma: the creature who questions its creator to the point of denying its life source. A
hybrid between fiction and nonfiction allows the myth-making process to thrive and
inform the public about how to construct reality. However, intertextual reading allows an
even more important development: expressive and experimental reinterpretations. The
results, far from being independent, claim individuality and a voice of their own. In the
case of Frankenstein, the reinterpreted work slowly took over and became more important
than the original source.
However, it is important to note that the most remarkable aspect of this
reinterpreted narrative is twofold. First, the moment of creation introduced the concept of
lightning as the means to inject life in inert body parts sewn together. This new idea
changed Shelley's (1818) concept of life-making from one of chemistry to one of physics.
This seemingly benign switch was of great symbolic importance, considering that Dr.
Frankenstein's attempt to create life was based on his ability to manipulate chemical
compounds. Therefore, Dr. Frankenstein attempted to control nature (and hence god)
through intellectual knowledge, through the command of physics, in order to create life,
and, ultimately, mimic god. Second, the negotiation between narratives is a key component
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of this silent dialogue between media. Whereas Shelley's text spoke to the fear of
technology and the machine embodied in a hybrid being, Whale's (1931) "text" speaks to
society's fears about societal labeling, a general lack of communication, and solitude in a
new society where people are being packed into isolated tribes incapable of direct
communication. Whale's Frankenstein was never intellectual but a pure monster from the
very beginning. His ultimate demonstration of some human consciousness was expressed
through two basic human emotions: love and hate.
Whale (1931) constructed the film’s character by transforming the monster from a
noble, nameless, and intellectually gifted person (as it was constructed by Shelley) into a
growling, hideous, and intellectually impeded being. Frankenstein is now a new form of
the human-machine grotesque. The creature represents a new society perplexed by
excessive "technification," and the acceleration of everything. This transformation gives
birth to the contemporary iconic character that abounds in Halloween commemorations,
cartoons, toy stores, and costume parties all over the world. In this version of the story, the
moment of creation depicts a not-so-mad scientist harnessing the power of nature to give
birth to his creation. The process in this version is conducted with the assistance of "Fritz,"
his loyal servant, and an audience of important people. The observers of this moment are
trapped between two worlds: one of fiction, triggered by the creature and all the equipment
constructing the scenario, and another involving the people observing the event who
represent society and all that is considered normal, formal, and legal. The famous phrase
“It's alive, it's alive” epitomizes the moment of creation, and it provides the structure for
the plot of the story and its coda. More importantly, Whale's character solidly constructed,
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in terms of popular culture, an icon that would take several years to be fully implemented
in society at large, but, nonetheless, successfully accomplished its task. When the original
story moved through different media, it evolved into different forms, creating a concert of
intertextuality that aids in the creation of the endless commercial representations still
prevalent today. However, it could be argued that most of these products were based on the
Boris Karloff's (1931) portrayal of Frankenstein. To a certain extent, Karloff’s acting
becomes an emotion that transgresses boundaries to transform the original text. His acting,
or any acting for that matter, reminds me of an old-time observation of mine about how
we, as society, exalt actors for their ability to fool us into believing what they are not. That
is the nature of the reality we have been living ever since cinema became integral to the
fabric of culture. We pay to be fooled by actors, and we love it. By accepting their acts as
real, we agree to the terms of simulacra in the same way that a kid walks out of the cinema
completely convinced of his ninja skills after watching a movie on the subject.
In her transgressive performances, I argue that Orlan, as ICEVORG, becomes the
creator, the monster, as well as the media where all events take place. Orlan is text as well;
she is the point of departure from which her story is born. In searching for the puncture in
Shelley’s (1818) text, I have found it in a single paragraph written to describe the very
moment when life enters the decaying, dead body of the assembled creature. The "seed"
that created the evolving structure of the narrative, as well as the characters that have
assumed so many forms of analog and digital existence, lies in the opening lines of chapter
five of Shelley’s novel. These six opening lines of text have suffered, just like Orlan, the
most unimaginable transformation in order to become, what is today, the iconic image of a

308
tall, sometimes brutal, other times gentle, never human but always posthuman, creature.
The paragraph that my analysis is founded upon is as follows:
It was on a dreary night of November, that I beheld the accomplishment of my
toils. With an anxiety that almost amounted to agony, I collected the instruments of
life around me, that I might infuse a spark of being into the lifeless thing that lay at
my feet. It was already one in the morning; the rain pattered dismally against the
panes, and my candle was nearly burnt out, when, by the glimmer of the halfextinguished light, I saw the dull yellow eye of the creature open; it breathed hard,
and a convulsive motion agitated its limbs. (p. 39)
The voice of the narrator for this particular paragraph encapsulating the intensity of the
plot is described in first person narratorial voice. The paragraph is replete with symbolic
terminology that creates contrasts to increase the symbolism and relevance of this
particular section to the story. "Life" is opposed with "lifeless"; "spark" is opposed with
"burnt out"; and "half-extinguished" is opposed with "breathed hard." These contrasts help
create a sense of mystery and anxiety in the reader, which constructs a remarkable sense of
accomplishment, in spite of itself. In other words, the text desperately seeks to generate—
within the artificiality of fiction—the puncture required to bring the concept of
Frankenstein to life. In addition, the above description of the narrator’s environment
summarizes the years of experimentation and learning described in the preceding
paragraphs. However, it is not a storm but a sense of discomfort produced by the dying
light of a candle that opposes electricity, alluding to the society’s changing use of time, and
a new form of life-light that was reserved for a few after the sun set.
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As a sign of dawn (to create more tension with the candlelight), the creature opens
an eye to reveal the culmination of enormous amounts of research and dedication. It is
important to note that the creature opens one eye, not both eyes. This seemingly
insignificant detail refers to technology as the spectacle of society, and photography as an
emerging means to record "objective" historic events. The narrator then describes the
infusion of life into the previously inert body. The extinguishing of the candlelight also
refers to the dying technologies, which were making way for the new ones. The single
opening eye, moreover, alludes to the control that machines began to hold over people.
Machines made out of parts and pieces began to gradually take control over society, and
the nameless monster exemplifies the impossibility of assigning one term to all of the
machinery propagated throughout society. The collection of "instruments of life" is
charged with meaning as it says almost too much without saying anything at all. The
instruments of life could be anything from surgical instruments to machines, even bibles.
The beauty of the structure of this paragraph relies precisely upon the symbolic flexibility
in its semiotic construction. When Frankenstein describes the "lifeless thing," he points to
it being at his feet. Such a description is crucial for creating the environment where this
amazing event is to occur, as Frankenstein implies his emotional superiority over his
creation. He is not constructing a scientific scenario surrounded by machines and "hightech" equipment, and waiting for a lightning bolt to strike.
As an interesting note, 63 years after Whale’s production, Kenneth Branagh
directed a film described by its promotional title as Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, starring
Robert De Niro. It claimed to be an adaptation of Shelley’s original text. Even though
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Branagh's work follows the novel more closely than other film adaptations, it deviates
conceptually and literally from the original plot. However, the claim made in the
promotional title is a clever marketing tool to attract people to the theaters. The moment of
creation is evidently a re-interpretation of Whale’s 1931 version. Using a generous budget,
and incorporating Academy Award winner Robert De Niro as the monster, the analyzed
scene begins with Frankenstein deciding to complete the creation process, in spite of the
disease and decay around him. His childhood friend and bride-to-be comes to check upon
him; she tries to bring him back to reason, and to take him away from the village struck by
disease. However, Frankenstein is so obsessed with his work that he dismisses the strong
feelings he has for her. The issue of gender plays into this: Frankenstein creates a male
monster that will destroy his female friend. It is as if Frankenstein wants to free himself
from the expectations of a traditional male to female relationship. The camera takes the
audience into a close up of Leonardo Da Vinci's famous Vitruvian Man in order to
underscore Frankenstein’s credibility as a scientist. Additionally, this image is charged
with meaning, as Da Vinci signifies excellence in interdisciplinary scholarship. By
establishing this association, Frankenstein's attempt to make life, and transcend history, is
perceived as acceptable, and possibly as a deed deserving all attention and public interest.
His creation is expected to be the perfect marriage between art and science. Frankenstein's
character, in conjunction with the setting, prepares the audience for the moment of
creation, the coda of this scene. To finalize the construction of this moment, a very
interesting scene is put together. In this scene, we can observe Frankenstein writing in his
scholarly journal about the events. In the background, a dead body hangs from the ceiling
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by chains, naked, vulnerable, apparently dead, therefore releasing Frankenstein from any
harm. The great advantage of scholarly research would had been accomplished had the
movie ended here, but this scene is only the interpretation of a single paragraph of text that
evolves into a wealth of content. The film then progresses the story, narrating more and
more events. These events are sometimes close to the original text, but, most of the time,
they are reinterpretations constructed to suit the entertainment of the masses. Even though
there remain differences between the original text and Karloff's monster, and then Robert
De Niro’s, the intertexual exchange of information between every text demonstrates how
new media technologies are making the emergence of new forms of life possible. “Whose
text is the original?” we may ask ourselves. Is it Mary Shelley's text? Is it Boris Karloff's
interpretation? When does De Niro's interpretation become a text? Promoted by the
emerging power of mass media communication and entertainment, I think Karloff's
Frankenstein surpassed Shelley's text. What is important, nonetheless, is that the fear of
technology prevails. The act of creating life continues to be a human predicament that
spawns all forms of Frankensteins across media. Innumerable forms of nameless monsters
will emerge, evolve, and, ultimately, really live. The famous expression "It's alive, it's
alive" will soon become an open source code, or the name of a software that simulates life,
reality, and, eventually, human consciousness.
Yet, even more important is how this analysis relates to Orlan’s work, and how
such a comparison informs and validates the status of ICEVORG that I argue is present in
Orlan as a living, breathing, post-cyborgian construct. The sought-after punctum that
ignites life in Orlan’s work is observable in the repulsion and disbelief her artwork creates
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in her audiences. Providing a source of doubt about what is real and what is fiction
establishes the punctum necessary to declare “It’s alive, it’s alive!” with respect to Orlan as
an ICEVORG.
The effects that Orlan as ICEVORG has upon society are numerous and
observable. Orlan’s work provides a sense of female empowerment that quickly moves the
discussion about the dangers inherent in cultural media to a place where what we consume
as live performance is in fact nothing but “mediated performance,” where audiences
exercise “considerable discretion in how they use and interpret the texts offered to them”
(Auslander, 2009, p. 151). As Auslander concludes, “mediation does not in itself
determine the ‘meaning’ of the mediated text” (p. 151).
However, to establish a connection between the moment of creation in Shelley’s
(1818) artwork and the creature in Orlan’s intertextual construct, I cannot avoid pointing
out that regardless of whether we are discussing reality or fiction, we are ultimately talking
about desire and pleasure as the ultimate goals both creatures so desperately seek to obtain.
In both performances, I can find any ICEVORG’s reasoning for existing: to incite emotion.
In analyzing Orlan as both creator and monster, the emotions expressed via her work
assume the form of desire and pleasure, and assist in the construction and birth of an
ICEVORG. In both Shelley and Orlan pleasure is also associated with pain, destruction.
Both pleasure and desire entail a form of glue that, at once, keeps them apart and fuses
them into a single semiotic cell; this glue is seduction.
As Baudrillard (1990) says, seduction “represents mastery over the symbolic
universe, while power represents only mastery of the real universe” (p. 8). It is precisely
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through seduction that an ICEVORG manages to move from reality to reality, from
medium to medium, from text to hypertext, to keep our attention active and our
imagination blooming. ICEVORGs are meant to transgress ontologies, and seduction is a
valid and reliable way to do it; seduction is also one way to differentiate an ICEVORG
from a cyborg. ICEVORGs have the capacity to dismantle any reality by questioning it.
They are able to transform from chameleons to peacocks, as long as the goal of
transgression is attained. ICEVORGS are masters of appearances. In Baudrillard’s (1990)
words:
The capacity immanent to seduction to deny things their truth and turn it into a
game, the pure play of appearances, and thereby foil all systems of power and
meaning with a mere turn of the hand. The ability to turn appearances in on
themselves, to play on the body’s appearance, rather than with the depths of desire.
(p. 8)
In the particular case of Orlan, I want to finalize my case study by analyzing her 1993
sculpture and installation entitled “Omnipresence,” which was exhibited at Gering &
Lopez Gallery and Penine Hart Gallery in the winter of 1995. The figure below is a
photograph taken by Larry Qualls, and was extracted from the scholarly image database
Artstor. In this image, the artist is presented as a piece of art, a sculpture, a lifeless object
that has been captured to be observed, not as an image, but as evidence of a physical
presence in a gallery space. That seemingly unimportant fact reveals the nature of Orlan as
ICEVORG. Her declaration that she is the sculpture is one that transgresses ontologies
through the use of an adapted form of metalepsis, which is applied not to text but to
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hypertext.The living and breathing sculpture poses for the camera with a distant gaze.
Those eyes are the embodiment of Frankenstein’s fiend; dead yet alive, they are
motionless, yet will not stop looking back at me. They are sterile and cry tearlessly in grief
as she shouts her frustration to become a fully formed work of art (figure 22).
Her eyes are as artificial as the plastic cheekbones inserted in her forehead that
aspire to become horns. As Barthes (1981) would say, “I cannot transform my grief, I
cannot let my gaze drift, no culture will help me utter this suffering which I experience
entirely on the level of the image’s finitude” (p. 90). Her pain becomes mine—her need to
transcend her own body, mine as well. The cyan background enhances the yellowish color
of her skin, or is it the photograph’s skin? I am several levels removed from the possibility
of experiencing the artwork with all my senses. The title of her work does a fair job in
classifying her, her work, as ICEVORG, for she is not there but everywhere. The word
Orlan chose to describe her work (“omnipresence”) is an observation of language and its
consequences. As Westly (2008) notes,
[T]he word in thought and the spoken word are but distantly related. In an organic
metaphor, the word is compared to a seed… [t]he power of language is not to be
underestimated, in public it even presents a danger as it transforms itself, takes on
manifold meanings, exercises untold influence and operates as in a game of
Chinese whispers, where the final word has no bearing on its original intended
meaning. (p. 152)
“Orlan is not her name. Her face is not her face. Soon her body will not be her body (Rose,
1993, p. 82). The image is neither the artwork nor is it the title; her “cyborged” body is not
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it either. The construct as a whole is it. Yet, more importantly, even and in spite of their
invisibility to our eyes, the spaces between elements are the backbone and embodiment of
Orlan as ICEVORG.
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Conclusions
In summarizing what has been done and said, I must add that I began writing in the
bliss of ignorance, sharing my personal life and how I became a cyborg myself. The
proem, or introduction, to the dissertation aimed to validate autoethnography as a form a
scholarly writing—a method and style that slowly and progressively disappeared as
chapters kept blooming. Even though my text turned out to be a hybrid form of writing,
probably acceptable only within the experimental and interdisciplinary MATX program, I
came to believe that autoethnography must be further explored in all fields of doctoral
research, as it brings the human back into the development of knowledge. I find this
particularly important today, when the debate of computers and the evolution of artificial
intelligence is only the tip of the iceberg of what the future may hold. To be individuals
and to have a unique perspective on life is what renders the contribution of doctoral
research relevant, regardless of the mind-blowing achievements of electronic technology.
Error will keep us human, and the capacity to make mistakes is what prevents the
apocalyptic future that media present us with on a daily basis. Autoethnography provides
authority to the personal voice, with all the faults and unexpected glitches that make us
human.
Chapter one is about self-discovery. I am not referring to the person, but to the
potential doctoral scholar. It is an acknowledgement that I found myself standing in the
unknown, and that anything and everything could be subject to scholarly investigation.
Through my investigations, I was able to understand the fragility of life, reality,
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perception, and the thin membrane that separates scholars from the general public. Still
unsure as to which side I belonged to, I enjoyed the process of learning the mechanics of
scholarly writing, which I am far from mastering. By presenting a comparative approach, I
realized that the path I chose to walk began to make sense inasmuch as the capacity for
philosophical thought had germinated in my head. The dissertation in the field of
humanities, I realized, was not about describing life to the minute detail of science, but
about sharing my unique philosophical vision of the vicissitudes of lived experience.
I could not help but visit the words of philosophers of stature, such as Descartes,
Heidegger, Husserl, Baudrillard, Derrida, and Barthes only to experience a sense of despair
and impotence never felt before. In pure honesty, I wanted to become Count Dracula in
order to have eternity to learn, and, probably, just probably, understand and master these
philosopher’s thoughts, which have been encapsulated for an eternity in fragile, decaying
words. However, internalizing some seeds of their thought here and there allowed me the
possibility to break free from literal thinking and fly into the realm of philosophical
thought. Said liberation took place on the sidewalks of The Fan, Richmond’s historic
neighborhood, when I discovered a thin, almost invisible, spider web, observable only with
the help of sunlight or raindrops caught on their way to feed the soil. Observing what was
previously invisible allowed me to find the door into my argument that would eventually
became the evolving notion of the ICEVORG.
From the thin web that I found, equipped with a more philosophical view of daily
life, and encouraged by my readings of Baudrillard and his hard-to-digest ideas, I
discovered and built the conceptual framework that helped me construct the Cathedral of
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Simulacra. Interestingly enough, I was caught not by the spider web, but by the seemingly
empty space in between objects. In the same fashion that Neo from The Matrix is capable
of perceiving the constituents of the matrix, I found myself describing the nuances of my
observations. Filled with doubt about the certainty of my thoughts—and at that point, even
my very own existence—I continued to incorporate arguments to feed my observations.
However, frustration resurfaced and invaded my life, as I felt doubtful of all else. I was
arguing that reality is no more; what else could I have I expected from my ponderings?
Fooled, the monster within fled and years went by. Upon the return of my Self, I moved
into the next phase, from presentation to representation to interpretation.
Chapter two tackles the idea of avatar, as I continued in my attempts to understand
the spaces between elements. Inside the Cathedral of Simulacra, I realized that the distance
between my physical body and its mirrored representation was a territory with no maps, a
place where I could exist, but only through the mediation of an avatar. I then needed to
understand what that concept was all about, so I immersed myself in research about said
concept just to find myself, once again, the subject of my very own study. I played with
my avatar on social media without hesitation or limit. One year, for instance, I decided to
show to the world a digital representation of my likeness and the status of my emotion at
that moment. One image per day non-stop, for 365 days, produced 365 self-portraits shared
through Facebook. It was not about narcissism or ego. It was to learn not only about
people’s responses to the intimacy of a portrait aimed to present pure emotion as it is
shared on a bursting viral social network, but, more intensely, about my own reaction to
the construction of my avatar. That intellectual investigation helped me to understand the
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relationship between image, emotion, and message, which would lead to the construction
of the proposed conceptual creature that I later baptized as ICEVORG.
At that point in my life, I was working as a tenure-track assistant professor for
Saint Olaf College in gelid Minnesota. With my divorce initiated and the dismantling of
my family as a social construct in my head, I traveled to Europe for the first time. In
chapter three, I continued with my philosophical observations and experiences. In chapter
three, I go into detail about the emotions and feelings I experienced during my travels, and
how I met God’s avatar in a very peculiar way. The text constructed in chapter three
attempts to share the mechanics of the brain from the inside out. The evolution of the texts
and the scholarly investigations supporting my observations and claims were in preparation
for a deeper analysis on existing theoretical creatures, specifically cyborgs. The next step
in the development of my dissertation was to move the concept back into the body, so to
speak, and I found the backbone of my proposed contribution in Haraway’s words.
Chapter four is devoted to constructing a comparison among ontologies, concepts,
and other ideas accepted at face value among theorists today. In other words, at this point,
it is highly unlikely that a young scholar would propose the dismissal of the notion of
cyborg, for instance. It was my interest as a professor of media culture, fine arts, and
design, to put all learned and experienced theories into a melting pot and mix them well,
just to see what would come out of it. My four years at Saint Olaf College, and the
innumerable exercises conducted with students using Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein as the
foundation for digital construction and new media arts, served me well in understanding
where I was headed. It was not cyborgs or avatars that I was interested in. It was not
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media, mass media, fine arts, or design in particular, but all of the above. I am a child of
the MATX program, after all.
However, life happened. I quit my job at Saint Olaf College mainly because I could
not find inner peace there. I got rid of all my earthly possessions, packed my life into two
suitcases and flew south to the Andes. I needed mom.
Two years went by, as did many attempts to rebuild my life. I failed and failed and
failed again, so many times, in fact, that I became good friends with failure. I was about to
give up on taming my dissertation monster when life pushed me back into it. Once again, I
got rid of all my possessions, except for two suitcases full of clothing, and flew back to
Richmond. And with incredible reluctance and honest intellectual pain, I went to writing.
I birthed chapters five, six, and seven. My ADHD bliss provided the wings to fly
into the unknown, one more time. Chapter five continues the comparison between cyborgs
and avatars, while incorporating the role of media and textual mediation. In the process,
this comparison leads to the construction of ICEVORG, and how posthumanism serves as
the ideal supporting theory for the concept.
Chapter six focuses on the theoretical construction of ICEVORG, a conceptual
creature inhabiting the interstices existing among disciplines, and what I see as my
contribution to the fields of fine arts and cyber culture. I am aware that my proposed idea
may be underdeveloped at this point, yet I am fully confident that it is a valid conceptual
proposal. As knowledge continues to evolve, it demands new ideas. Whether the proposed
ideas are good or bad, valid or decrepit, is beyond the control of scholars. I think it is time,
though, that we move into a post-cyborgian era, as the subject matter is depleted already.
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New ideas must emerge to add to the discourse, even if their existence only lasts as long as
the blink of a flickering screen. Denial is another form of validation.
I think, therefore I ICEVORG.
Chapter seven, the last one, presents two case studies to demonstrate the
application, implication, and implementation of the concept of ICEVORG in two fields:
the first one I claim to be regular daily life, and the second is the peculiar field of
contemporary fine arts. Both case studies served me well to present the proposed theory in
action.
In closing my intellectual journey, I would like to add that I am heading to a land
that has no map for me. I do not have a job or a place I could call home, but I will finally
take the splinter out of my soul and live with my mind open to embrace my life as a
posthuman being hoping to one day become an ICEVORG
To conclude, I found myself bathed in tears last night. The droplets, soon to
become tears, kept sliding south, down my face, in martial obedience to gravity. I couldn’t
help it; it was happening. I released my hold on the edge of the precipice. It’s been eight
years already, almost nine since I was tricked by my Self into pursuing the doctoral path
just to find myself drowning in stormy seas of alphabet soup. Learning to swim along the
way, I managed to push my body and mind to write, and write, and then write some more.
It is hard to believe that nearly a decade ago I wrote my very first paper ever. I opened it
with a cautionary note warning of precisely that. Two years later, hundreds of anecdotes
chose me as the protagonist of my fictive life. In spite of despising the term “journey” and
what it entails, I cannot help but acknowledge that it has been a journey to arrive to this
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particular peculiar reality. I lost my life as I knew it, and without meaning to, I became my
own shadow. The disillusion and burden brought along by this experience became a
splinter in my spirit. For eight years, I could not breathe without the daunting sensation
that I was wasting my time by not writing the dissertation. At some point during the
journey, I came to believe that I lost my family. I fooled myself into believing that “el
PhD” was the ogre eating anything and everything that I touched. It ate my family, my life,
my job(s), my reason to live, even my reason to die. I became numb and dissociated from
reality. At some point, though, I became the subject of my own research interest. Now I
understand that I had to be that way. I identified with Frankenstein and his monster, and I
became alive and dead, angry and peaceful, frustrated and hopeful. I hatched into a bird
that couldn’t fly, then into a black and white butterfly. I am a chameleon dreaming to
become a dragon, and the dragon dreaming to become a dragonfly. I am here. I am now. I
am done.

“It is always the same:
once you are liberated,
you are forced to ask
who you are”
Baudrillard
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APPENDIX A

[Regrets]
by Guido Alvarez

Her mother burst into tears. Her deep blue eyes, plowed by time, revealed to the globe
her righteous suffering in surrealist high definition. She was drained, crushed, perplexed.
Amelia was her only baby after all, she was fifteen when her brain flew away and the coma
parasite spread across her youthfulness. The pristine fabric of her young body remained
horizontal, frozen, and intact. Thriving silently day after day, night after night. After a few
years her bosom bloomed while she became silent desire of all those flourishing ratings
who followed her thru the glare, day after day, night after night.
For three years Amelia lingered peacefully, crippled under the biased glimmering of the
lonely hospital neon light. The whole world twittered every detail of her immurement. The
blogosphere throve almost a whole nine percent during the years the precise jury took to
nurture the verdict, while the networks molded Amelia and her mother, mercilessly, into
unexpected theatrical characters, bumper stickers, home-made picket signs, collectible
pins, brand names, everlasting cheap perfume, Facebook support groups, email scams; and
even the name of a mediocre rock band.
It was a warm and cozy afternoon in September when Mary, her best friend,
walked into the hospital room with a tall and slim lawyer wearing Armani by her left side
and the dreadful will, yes that incomprehensible repugnant penned manuscript on the
other. Why? Why? Why? Her mother would never cease to cry her brain out. After that
mournful visit her hopes turned into rage, pure rage against the system, law, and God. Why
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would Amelia, her beautiful Amelia, fall in love with Poe’s macabre tales so much, so
passionately? She must have been confused. Amelia was so young and innocent. When did
her infatuation begin? Why Poe and not Lewis Carroll? Why Poe and not Osho? Why that
ravenous murderer and not text messaging as every other girl? Impossible!!! She would
say gasping for air, every time she broke free from the recurrent nightmares haunting her
nights.
Unfortunately, it was real. It was very real. She realized walking out the Supreme Court
of Justice. Justice? She thought. The sentence was final. No appeal, no court could change
the empowering fate. The supreme power of law sealed the written request and declared
the trial as a triumph of the rights of the individual. The ultimate success of democracy and
freedom concluded. Media was glad as could be and ready to release a new victim into the
circle of sand.
That morning Amelia looked stunning, beautiful, and alive! Her white long gown shone
radiant against the glitter of her favorite purple shoes. Ironically, her mother found a pair
that exactly matched the detailed description on Amelia’s will. All cameras loved her so
much. Some cameramen stood still in disbelief as she was wheeled out of the church. For a
brief moment the wind blew Amelia’s hair and along with it the scattered clouds who
wanted to see her. The overexposing star hastily appeared on top of the blue demanding
hats, shades, and forcing wide open eyes into thin lines laying side by side with running
noses in between. More than a million hands covered curious eyes of minors at home that
skipped school to watch it happen -live! Then the wind stood and gazed accomplice of the
immutable history before her. Quiet and Peaceful Amelia left her bed of flowers. Her
mother clinched her fists tight while read streams of life escaped free to meet the soil yet
she wouldn’t notice.
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It was written. It was ready.
Her mother’s voice turned into a deep, long, and everlasting shriek that froze Billions for
eternity.
With the entire universe as one witness…

Amelia was buried alive.
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APPENDIX B

Documentation of collected evidence during my trip through Italy, Germany, and France. January
2011. All the images captured by the author.
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